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ABSTRACT This thesis is concerned about the role of technological progress and reforms in economic growth and development. The first two essays develop stochastic endogenous growth models to examine the impact of uncertainty on the technology adoption decisions of agents, and how this affects the long run growth and development outcomes of an economy. The second essay is concerned with the political economy implications of inequality for technology adoption and economic growth in the presence of uncertainty. The third essay focuses on the topic of globalization and structural reforms, and their impact on economic development within an empirical framework.  The analysis presented in the first essay shows that, in the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, the interaction between the initial productivity of the technologies available in the economy and the costs associated with adopting the superior technologies results in a variety of long run outcomes and ‘sub-outcomes’. We broadly characterise these outcomes and ‘sub-outcomes’ as poverty trap, dual economy, and balanced growth. Moreover, holding the distribution and other parameters of the model constant, changes in uncertainty influences the timing of technology adoption decisions, the steady state technology adoption levels, and the long run growth and inequality outcomes. We provide empirical evidence consistent with this role of uncertainty in short run and long run technology adoption.   Because high adoption costs and large idiosyncratic shocks may delay technology adoption and induce bad long run outcomes, institutional and policy reforms aimed at addressing these issues are inevitable. These reforms, in turn, alter the fundamental structure of the economy and present new implications for growth and inequality. To that end, the second and the third essay explore the implications of these reforms on economic outcomes. The second essay introduces political economy issues in the model to analyse how economic agents, through a voting mechanism, would react to these reforms, and how this will in turn affect growth and inequality. In this case, we allow for redistribution through taxation, transfers payments, and allocation of funds towards structural and institutional development. Although inequality decreases quicker in this model, distributional conflicts among economic agents create political cycles, which in turn trigger sub-optimal outcomes and delay economic development.   The third essay analyses the role of certain economic reforms within an empirical framework. It explores the idea that reforms may improve the functioning of markets, thereby improving economic growth by enhancing reallocation of resources from non-productive to productive sectors. Using firm level panel data from South Africa, this essay shows that reforms are associated with improvement in intra-sector and inter-sector efficient reallocation of capital.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 This thesis presents three essays that are concerned with the link between structural change and economic growth. The first two essays focus on the technological and institutional aspects that define the fundamental structure of an economy, and examine how these characteristics determine its long run outcomes. Specifically, these essays focus on how the state of the technology, and the barriers to technology adoption, which take the form of institutional and political conditions that impact on the costs of adoption, or the uncertainty that surrounds the technology adoption decisions, influence long run growth and development. These issues are addressed in the framework of stochastic endogenous growth models. The third essay addresses similar issues in the context of an empirical framework. This essay analyses how some of the reforms that alter the structure of the economy, for example economic, institutional and policy reforms, as well as reforms aimed at integrating the economy to the global world, can influence long run growth through their impact on the reallocation of resources within and across sectors. This essay focuses on firm-level panel evidence from South Africa.   To elaborate on these three essays, the first develops a simple stochastic growth model (hereafter referred to as the benchmark model) to explain the diverse growth experiences of developing nations, and the non-convergence of incomes within and across these nations. The model developed highlights the idea in models such as Greenwood and Yorukoglu  (1997),  Khan and Ravikumar (2002) and  Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012) that barriers to technology adoption may delay technical change, thereby affecting both the short run and long run relationships between growth and inequality. However, the novelty of our model is in the sense that we consider a situation where agents make technology adoption decisions in the presence of uncertainty. The uncertainty emanates from the fact that economic agents do not have enough information on how unexpected events will affect the productivity of the superior technology.   The benchmark model highlights the idea that the absence of institutions which can help agents to alleviate the risk associated with superior technologies can slow down the rate of technology adoption. This is particularly the case in developing countries where formal insurance schemes are typically unavailable, and the available informal risk-sharing agreements do not adequately smooth out these shocks (Dercon, 2002, 2004; Morduch, 1995; Townsend, 
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1995). As such, the presence of uncertainty is likely to affect both the short run technology adoption decisions of agents, as well as the long term economic outcomes of an economy, thereby helping to explain the diverse economic experiences of nations.  In terms of the predictions of the model, the addition of uncertainty turns out to be an important contribution for a number of reasons. Firstly, it sharpens the predictions of the model in a manner that enhances the model’s ability to account for the diverse growth and inequality patterns observed in the empirical data. Secondly, the model with uncertainty produces a rich range of new findings that are distinct to those in related existing literature. More specifically, in the absence of uncertainty, three main outcomes are possible, depending on the initial levels and differences between the productivities of the inferior and the superior technologies, and the adoption cost associated with the superior technology. These are characterised as poverty trap, 
dual economy, and balanced growth, and each of these outcomes is associated with a single set of productivity parameters and adoption costs. In the poverty trap outcome, long run growth stagnates and the wealth of all agents converges. In the dual economy outcome, some agents adopt the superior technology while others adopt the inferior technology. In this case, the growth of the economy is determined by the productivity level of the superior technology and the proportion of agents who adopt it. Moreover, given initial heterogeneity in resource endowments, inequality is persistent because the wealth of agents adopting the superior technology grows while that of the agents who adopt the inferior technology stagnates. In the 
balanced growth case, both the growth rate and inequality sharply increase in the transitional process and converge at high levels.   When we account for idiosyncratic uncertainty in the model, further ‘sub-outcomes’ emerge within the poverty trap and the dual economy outcomes. Each of these ‘sub-outcomes’ is associated with its own set of productivity parameters and adoption costs, and shows its own unique transitional growth and inequality patterns, suggesting the existence of a diversity within 
diversity. For instance, in one of the poverty trap ‘sub-outcomes’, transitional growth is more volatile than in the other ‘sub-outcomes’. Furthermore, the transitional gap between the poor and the rich agents differs between these two poverty trap ‘sub-outcomes’. Within the two dual 
economy ‘sub-outcomes’, the inequality patterns differ both in transitional stages and in the long run. In one of the ‘sub-outcomes’, inequality is mean-reverting both in the transitional stages, and in the long run, while in the other ‘sub-outcomes’, inequality sharply increases in the 
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transitional process and converges at a very high level. As we shall discuss shortly, each of these ‘sub-outcomes’ has a distinct implication for policy.  The outcomes and ‘sub-outcomes’ found in the benchmark model are useful in explaining the diversity that characterizes the empirical observations regarding growth and inequality. Thus, our model makes an important contribution in the sense that it captures these features within a single, unified framework. Models that capture the diversity of growth outcomes evident in the data are relatively scant in the literature. Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012) and Iwaisako (2002) are notable exceptions. However, by incorporating the role that uncertainty plays in technology adoption decisions, our model makes a significant contribution along two dimensions; it provides insights on how uncertainty matters, and produces a richer, more diverse range of outcomes relative to those unearthed in previous theoretical literature. The numerical experiments show that, holding the distribution and other parameters of the model constant, changes in the magnitude of idiosyncratic uncertainty affects the timing of technology adoption decisions, the transitional path of growth and inequality, and the long run economic outcomes of a nation. This is a key contribution of this thesis, as it highlights the impact of uncertainty on technology adoption and economic development. Using data on aggregate technology adoption in the Indian agricultural sector, we provide some empirical evidence consistent with this contribution of our model.   A number of policy implications can be drawn from the findings of the benchmark model. Although we provide a detailed discussion of these policy implications in Chapter 6, we summarise some of them here, as they form the basis for the political economy extension to the benchmark model. The first implication stems from the ‘diversity within diversity’ feature found in the benchmark model. This feature suggests that, although nations may have similar long run outcomes (i.e. poverty trap or dual economy), the underlying conditions that define these outcomes, and the transitional path of growth and inequality may differ across these nations. Consequently, appropriate policy responses for each bad long run ‘sub-outcome’ are dependent on a clear-cut and precise understanding of the initial conditions that underlie that particular ‘sub-outcome’. Policies that are tailored to the underlying conditions have a better chance of success than broad international policy responses that are often predicated on classifying nations as low-income (poverty trap) and middle-income (dual economy). The latter approach to 
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policy application might explain why some policy prescriptions suggested by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) have been unsuccessful in some developing nations.1  The second implication emanates from the fact that the initial technological and institutional aspects of an economy determine its long run economic outcomes. In the context of our model these initial conditions are reflected in the productivity levels of the various technologies in existence, in addition to the differences between the productivity levels of superior and inferior technologies. An important question that arises regards the specific policy responses to  ‘create’ the initial conditions that lead to the best possible outcomes. One possible policy response is allocating more resources towards research and development (R&D) to improve the initial productivities of the technologies available in an economy.   The third implication stems from the fact that a high adoption cost delays the adoption and diffusion of new technologies, and thus hampers economic development. In our benchmark model, this adoption cost relates to the cost associated with both human and physical capital accumulation, as well as the ‘learning-by-doing’ element that is associated with human capital. Therefore, possible policy responses include improving human capital development through investment in education, poverty reduction and health.2 In addition, investing in physical capital and infrastructure, and improving public dissemination of information relating to how the new technologies operate may help to expedite the learning.   The last implication relates to the fact the risk affects both the short term and long term outcomes of an economy. This means that two countries which possess technologies with similar initial productivities and adoption costs could still end up with different long run economic outcomes if the quality of their institutions (especially those that help agents to diversify or alleviate production or consumption shocks) is different. Therefore, in order to improve technology adoption and economic development, institutions such as shock-relief funds and risk insurance schemes, can be developed to help agents facing such circumstances.    
                                                          1 See, for example Dollar and Svensson (2000) for the failure of Structural Adjustment Program (SAPs) in countries such as Kenya and Zambia. These authors argue that failures and successes of SAPs in developing nations are related to country-specific features, particularly political-economy factors. 2 Medsen (2012) provides evidence from 21 OECD that health enhances the quantity and quality of schooling, innovations and growth. 
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While the policy proposals mentioned above can be useful for technology adoption and economic progress, implementing them often requires major policy and institutional reforms. However, implementing these reforms is a subject of contention, particularly in democratic societies. This is mainly because reforms affect the preferences of agents. As a result, conflicts often arise between those who benefit and those who lose from these reforms. The presence of these conflicts complicates technology adoption decisions, and thus entails new growth and inequality outcomes relative to those found in the benchmark model. This is the subject explored in the essay presented in Chapter 4.  Specifically, the essay presented in Chapter 4 is a political economy extension of the benchmark model. In this extension, we assume that there are institutions that help agents alleviate the risk associated with superior technologies in return for a fixed entry cost and a periodic variable cost. The former cost implicitly includes the fixed cost associated with adopting the superior technology. The latter cost varies with the return on the superior technology. In order to introduce political economy issues in the model, we assume that the fixed entry fee is endogenous, in the sense that it depends on the proportion of government revenue allocated towards R&D and cost-reducing financial development expenditure, which, in turn, is determined through a political process. The role of the government in the political economy extension is that of collecting tax and then redistributing the revenue according to the alternative preferred by the majority of agents. The alternatives in the ‘menu of choice’ for the agents are lump-sum transfer payments and expenditures allocated towards R&D and the development of cost-reducing institutions.   The outcomes of the political economy model are quite distinct to those of the benchmark model. In the presence of redistribution, which occurs primarily through lump sum transfers, the wealth of the agents in the economy quickly converges. However, this redistribution results in poor growth rate during the transitional process. In the transition to the steady state, the pattern of inequality resembles recurring ‘Kuznets curves’, and the relationship between growth and inequality is non-linear and bi-directional. These recurring patterns emanate from political cycles, which are partly caused by distributional conflicts created by the heterogeneity in the initial resource endowments of agents, but further exacerbated by the presence of uncertainty. To elaborate on this, these political cycles emanate from the fact that there is a two-way, dynamic relationship between redistribution and inequality; inequality impacts on the political outcome, which determines the amount of redistribution that takes place in any given period. 
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This redistribution, in turn, determines the inequality that will prevail in the next period. If inequality is lower relative to the previous period an entirely different political outcome is possible, with a lower amount of redistribution taking place in this period. This would then impact on inequality in the next period, leading to a different outcome in that period, and so on.  In our model, inequality interacts with uncertainty in a manner that substantially exacerbates this cyclical pattern.3 These political cycles are more pronounced the higher the uncertainty and the lower the initial inequality. In light of these features of the model, empirical results from studies that impose linear, one-way and parametric relationships between growth and inequality need to be interpreted with caution.   Further numerical results show that the political outcomes are sub-optimal in the early and transitional stages of the economy. This occurs in the sense that they do not coincide with outcomes that maximize the collective welfare of all agents in the economy. An explanation for this is that the distributional conflicts among different groups of agents in the economy retard the speedy implementation of developmental policies. This finding is consistent with an idea in the related literature that democratic institutions increase redistributive conflicts, particularly in middle income countries, thereby harming economic growth (Aghion, Alesina and Trebb, 2004;2007; Boix, 2003). In light of this idea, some authors suggest that nations should delay the democratisation of institutions until they have reached a certain threshold level of income per capita (see for example Barro, 1996).  Turning to the third essay presented in Chapter 5, we explore the impact of a broad range of financial reforms, commonly referred as financial globalisation, on intra-sector and inter-sector reallocation of resources across firms. The role of the reallocation of resources in economic growth has been emphasised in a number of studies and is a key mechanism underpinning the ‘structural change’ mentioned above (see for example Fan et al., 2003; Feder, 1986; McMillan and Rodrik, 2011; Robinson, 1971; Swiecki, 2012). To that end, the essay presented in Chapter 5 is important as it helps us understand the sources of the reallocation of capital in the context of South Africa.   South Africa is an interest case for a study of this nature for a variety of reasons. Firstly, in terms of its standing in the world economy, South Africa has become one of the closely watched emerging economies, along with Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa. These five countries 
                                                          3 Huffman (1997) and Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2010) develop models which show that, in the absence of central bank independence, inflation and inequality tend to exhibit politically-induced fluctuations.   
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have increasingly become influential by cooperating in economic and political issues through what is commonly known as the BRICS. Secondly, South Africa is interesting in terms of its regional location. It is part of poorest and the most underdeveloped region in the world, the Sub Saharan Africa region. This region has attracted considerable research attention as researchers seek to understand the sources of poverty and underdevelopment. Although this study could have benefited from including the sample of all the nations in this region, only South Africa has the relevant data needed for the current analysis. In spite of the data challenge, the results of this study will be of policy relevance to the entire Sub Saharan African region given that South Africa has an important standing in the region. More specifically, South Africa is the largest economy in the region (see World Economic Outlook, 2011). As we shall elaborate in Chapter 5, South Africa also has the largest financial markets and financial institutions in the region.  In terms of the contribution to the related literature on South Africa, this is the first study of this kind, from a methodological point of view. In the context of other countries, closely related studies have focussed on economy wide firm-level reallocation of capital (see Almeida and Wolfenzon 2004; Galindo et al., 2007; Abiad et al., 2008). As we shall elaborate in Chapters 2 and 5, the classical literature on development highlights that the take-off of nations is associated with structural transformation that is often characterised by the reallocation of resources from the primitive sectors to the modern sectors of the economy. Our focus on intra-sector and inter-sector as opposed to economy-wide aspects of efficient reallocation of resources is an important contribution in the sense that it allows us to interpret the results in the context of the structural transformation described in the classical literature on economic development. Secondly, by focussing on intra-sector and inter-sector resource reallocation, we are able to yield some useful findings which are distinct to those in the existing literature.   We find that globalisation, along with factors such as institutional quality and human capital development enhances efficient intra-sector and inter-sector reallocation of capital. This reallocation-benefit of globalisation is stronger at the inter-sector than intra-sector level. Nevertheless there is evidence suggesting that resource reallocation is poor in the primary sectors of the economy.  With regards to policy implications, the results from this empirical essay suggest that the reforms undertaken in South Africa since the early 1990s constitute a positive step towards improving the allocation of resources. The fact that the reallocation benefits of globalisation are 
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stronger at the inter-sector than intra-sector level implies that the implicit/explicit barriers to free movement of resources across firms in different sectors may limit the benefits of reforms. Therefore, policy makers need to be mindful of the fact that market-structure based barriers such as monopolies and institutionalised barriers such as government incentives that promote the concentration of investment in certain industries or regions can limit the efficient resource-reallocation benefits of reforms.  Furthermore, evidence of poor resource-reallocation in the primary sectors of the economy entails that structural and institutional transformation is not yet adequate in South Africa. Typically, adequate transformation is signalled by the convergence of the productivity levels of all sectors to a stable level. This usually begins with improving productivity levels in the primary sectors, and then integrating the primary sector (particularly agriculture) to the rest of the economy through infrastructural development and market-equilibrium linkages (see Timmer, 1988). Thus, more effort is needed to integrate the sectors of the South African economy.  There is also evidence to suggest that the high level of corruption resulting from poor political and legal institutions in South Africa has negatively affected efficient reallocation of capital. As such, policy makers need to improve these legal and political institutions in order to ensure that corruption and other crimes are combated.4  The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter reviews some of the existing literature with a view towards highlighting the issues that motivate this thesis. Chapter 3 develops the benchmark model and presents some empirical evidence consistent with the main prediction of this model. Chapter 4 presents the political economy extension to the benchmark model. Chapter 5 presents the essay on the resource-reallocation benefits of financial globalisation. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. The technical aspects of each of the chapters are chronologically presented in the appendix of each of the chapters.     
                                                          4 South Africa has the world’s highest crime rate (see Schönteich, 2010). Demombynes and Özler (2002) outline the various channels through which crime has negatively affect economic development in South Africa.      
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
 
2.1 Introduction This chapter discusses some of the theoretical issues and empirical observations that are of motivational relevance to the thesis. We begin with the empirical observations that motivate the technology adoption model (henceforth the benchmark model) developed in Chapter 3. These empirical observations are with regard to the divergence of growth rates across countries, and non-convergence of incomes within and across nations. To provide a basis for these empirical observations, we explore the literature on the idea that differences in technological progress are the main source of cross-country differences in per capita incomes, and compare the technological progress of different countries and regions. In order to explain the sources of the differences in technological progress, we then discuss some of the barriers to technological progress and adoption. We particularly emphasise two barriers that are of relevance to the benchmark model. These are the cost of adopting new technologies and the uncertainty associated with the returns on new technologies. We then highlight how differences in these barriers across nations can explain the differences in technology adoption, and how the latter affects growth. Furthermore, we explore the relationship between growth and inequality during the process of technology adoption.  Next we explore the idea that the technological progress/adoption can be endogenously determined by economic agents in the economy whose preferences influence the strength of the barriers to technology adoption/progress. These issues form the basis for the political economy extension to the benchmark model presented in Chapter 4. We further discuss how these political economy issues might alter the evolution of growth and inequality during the process of adopting risky technologies. Finally, we present issues motivating the empirical essay presented in Chapter 5. These issues concern the role of globalisation in promoting economic growth through the reallocation of resources across firms and sectors. We end this chapter by summarizing and highlighting the issues to be discussed in the subsequent chapters.    
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2.2 Growth and Inequality: Some Stylized Facts   In the post-Industrial Revolution period, the income per capita of Western Europe and Western Offshoots (United States, Canada, and Australia) forged ahead on the basis of significant technological advances, while those of other regions stagnated (Lin and Huang, 2012). The income per capita of Western Offshoots further accelerated in the post-World War II period.   However, since the 1950s, global economic growth has shown considerable diversity. Some economies, for example Japan and South Korea in the 1960s, and China since the 1970s, have converged towards the above mentioned early per-capita income leaders. On the other hand, other regions such as Sub Saharan Africa and former USSR have either stagnated or diverged from the growth leaders.   The diversity that characterizes per capita income growth, especially in rural areas becomes even more evident on a cross-country basis. In Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, we present data suggesting this diversity. Table 2.1 presents the per capita incomes of some of the developing countries whose per capita incomes have been converging towards that of the US since 1950. Table 2.2 presents some of the developing nations whose per capita incomes have diverged away from that of the US since 1950. Within each group of these countries, there is additional diversity in the sense that the rate of convergence/divergence towards the US per capita incomes differs across countries. This suggests the existence of diversity within diversity, a feature that has not been captured in existing theoretical literature.  
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Figure 2.1: Development in the post-World War II period (Per capita GDP measured in  1990 Geary-Khamis PPP adjusted dollars) Source: Data from Bolt and van Zanden (2013): Maddison data 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Selected Top Contributors to Global Growth by Decade since 1960 Source: Author’s computation based on World Bank Development and IMF databases      
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Table 2.1: Cases of Catch-Up (Economies with a greater than .10 increase in relative GDP per capita to the 
US) 
 1950 1980 2008 Change 1950 – 2008 Hong Kong SAR, China 0.23 0.57 1.02 0.78 Singapore 0.23 0.49 0.90 0.67 Equatorial Guinea 0.06 0.08 0.71 0.65 Taiwan, China 0.10 0.28 0.67 0.58 S. Korea 0.09 0.22 0.63 0.54 Ireland 0.36 0.46 0.89 0.53 Japan 0.20 0.72 0.73 0.53 Spain 0.23 0.50 0.63 0.40 Austria 0.39 0.74 0.77 0.39 Norway 0.57 0.81 0.91 0.35 Finland 0.44 0.70 0.78 0.34 Greece 0.20 0.48 0.52 0.32 T. & Tobago 0.38 0.67 0.68 0.30 Israel 0.29 0.59 0.58 0.28 Italy 0.37 0.71 0.64 0.27 Germany 0.41 0.76 0.67 0.26 Puerto Rico 0.22 0.44 0.48 0.26 Portugal 0.22 0.43 0.46 0.24 Mauritius 0.26 0.24 0.47 0.21 Oman 0.07 0.22 0.27 0.20 Thailand 0.09 0.14 0.28 0.20 Belgium 0.57 0.78 0.76 0.19 France 0.54 0.79 0.71 0.17 China 0.05 0.06 0.22 0.17 Malaysia 0.16 0.20 0.33 0.17 Netherlands 0.63 0.79 0.79 0.16 Botswana 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.12 Bulgaria 0.17 0.33 0.29 0.11 Source: Author computation based on Bolt and van Zanden (2013): Maddison data   
Table 2.2: Divergence leaders (Economies suffering a .10 or higher decrease in relative GDP per capita to 
the US) 
 
1950 1980 2008 Change 1950-2008 Bolivia 0.20 0.14 0.09 -0.11 Iraq 0.14 0.34 0.03 -0.11 Lebanon 0.25 0.19 0.14 -0.11 South Africa 0.27 0.24 0.15 -0.11 Nicaragua 0.17 0.12 0.05 -0.12 Djibouti 0.16 0.09 0.04 -0.12 Switzerland 0.95 1.01 0.81 -0.14 Argentina 0.52 0.44 0.35 -0.17 Uruguay 0.49 0.35 0.32 -0.17 Gabon 0.33 0.36 0.12 -0.20 N. Zealand 0.88 0.66 0.60 -0.29 Venezuela 0.78 0.55 0.34 -0.44 UAE 1.65 1.49 0.50 -1.15 Kuwait 3.02 0.71 0.41 -2.61 Qatar 3.18 1.55 0.56 -2.62 Saudi Arabia 0.23   0.71  0.27 0.04 Moldova    0.27          0.11 -0.15 Georgia    0.33          0.19 -0.14 Source: Author computation based on Bolt and van Zanden (2013): Maddison data.  
 Next we consider the evolution of inequality within and across nations.  We begin by looking at the trends in inter-country global inequality since the 19th century. This measure of inequality relates to the differences in the mean incomes of countries.  In Figure 2.3 we plot the 
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time series of the Gini Index computed by Milanovic (2009). It is evident that global inequality has steadily risen since 19th century. In fact Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) show that cross-country income inequality has increased nearly four times between 1820 and 1950, from its initial level of 15%. Based on a review of a number of studies on inequality, Cornia (2003) suggests that global inequality accelerated between 1980 and 2002.    Secondly, we consider global inequality across different income groups (see Figure 2.4). It is evident that the share of income received by the poorest and middle class slightly increased between 1990 and 2007 while the share of income received by the richest 20% decreased. Despite this improvement, the overall level of global inequality is still very high. When countries are divided according to per capita income level (see Figure 2.5), it becomes evident that the middle-income countries have the highest level of inequality. However, between 1990 and 2007, inequality has improved for middle-income countries, while it has worsened for low-income countries. More specifically, in the middle-income countries, the share of income received by the richest 20% decreased while that received by the poorest 20% increased. The opposite happened in low income countries.   Regarding the regional decomposition of inequality, the Latin America and Caribbean region has the highest level of inequality, followed by Sub Saharan Africa (see Ortiz and Cummins, 2011). Generally, the inequality has decreased in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, while it has decreased in the Sub Saharan African region for the period 1990-2008. Further decomposition of inequality to national levels reveals the extent of diversity in the inequality experiences of nations.5 For instance, the decrease in inequality in the Sub Saharan African region was mainly driven by large decreases in the following nations: Lesotho, Malawi, Ethiopia, Burundi, Mali, and Burkina Faso (see Ortiz and Cummins, 2011). On the other hand, inequality increased in the following Sub Saharan African nations: Seychelles, South Africa, Ghana, Cote d’ Ivoire, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Although Eastern Europe and Central Asia experienced the highest increase in inequality between 1990 and 2008, two nations from this region, Azerbaijan, Moldova, are among those that experienced the largest decrease in inequality in the world during the same period (see Ortiz and Cummins, 2011).   
                                                          5 Detailed statistics on intra-country inequality are available in Ortiz and Cummins (2011). 
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 Figure 2.3: The Trends in Global Inequality (Gini Coefficient) Source: Data from Milanovic (2009)     
  
 Figure 2.4: Global Income Distribution by Population Quintiles, 1990-2007 in PPP constant 2005 international dollars.  Source: Data from Ortiz and Cummins (2011), UNICEF 
Notes: Q1 denotes the poorest 20 % of the population; Q5 denotes the top 20% of the population 
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 Low Income Nations      Middle Income Nations 
   High Income Nations 
 Figure 2.5: Summary Results of Income Distribution by Income Levels, 1990-2007 in PPP constant 2005 international dollars Source: Data from Ortiz and Cummins (2011), UNICEF  In order to understand the sources of the diversity in growth and inequality, and the non-convergence of incomes described above, it is important to understand the factors that influence growth and development. In the existing literature, technological change, also commonly referred to as total factor productivity growth (TFPG), along with human and physical capital accumulation, and structural change have emerged as the major sources of growth. Typically, human capital and physical capital accumulation are treated as elements of technological change, as both factors improve the adoption and diffusion of existing technologies, and enhance the better use of new technologies. In what follows, we discuss the role of technological change in growth. This discussion forms the basis of the essays presented in Chapters 3 and 4.  
2.3 Technological Change and Economic Growth  The role of technological progress in growth and development has been recognised in the literature of economic growth and development. Early contributions include neoclassical growth theories of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956). In these models and their related extensions (e.g. Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965), technology is treated as an exogenous component. 
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Furthermore, holding labour constant, capital accumulation is subject diminishing marginal returns. As such the economy will eventually converge to a steady state characterised by a constant capital-labour ratio (Lahiri and Ratnasiri, 2013).   Given the assumptions of the neoclassical models, convergence in the income per capita across nations is inevitable for two main reasons. Firstly, the poorer nations do not have to invent technologies, but to simply adopt superior technologies from richer nations at relatively low cost. Secondly, since the poorer nations have a lower level of capital than richer nations, they are bound to grow at a faster rate than the richer nations once they adopt the superior technology. As a result of this, capital will flow from richer nations, where its marginal returns are lower to poorer nations where its returns are higher, until labour-capital ratios, and the per capita incomes are equal across the nations. This type of convergence of this known as 
conditional convergence, as it is dependent on occurrence of the two events mentioned above.   Despite their important early contribution, the neoclassical models are problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, they completely abstract from the role of technology adoption in economic growth. Consequently, these models fail to account for a key mechanism through which cross country differences in per capita incomes can be explained.  Secondly, by treating technology as exogenous, the neoclassical models fail to account for the factors which underpin technological progress.   Attempts to address the problems of the neoclassical growth models have led to the emergence of another group of models typically labelled as ‘endogenous growth models’. These models include, among others, Romer (1986, 1987, 1990), Lucas (1988), Robelo (1991), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992). These endogenous growth models differ in the manner in which they model the process technological change. In models such as Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and Robelo (1991), technological change is indirectly ‘endogenized’ by assuming that growth takes place through investment in human capital or ‘learning-by-doing’. In the models of Romer (1987, 1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), technological change is modelled by allowing for endogenous growth through investment in R&D, which in turn leads to technological innovation. However, ‘endogenizing’ technological progress has a similar implication in that it produces positive spillover effects on the rest of the economy, and reduces the diminishing returns to capital 
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accumulation (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). As such, the production technologies used in these models assume increasing returns to capital accumulation.   The main implication of endogenous growth models is that policies that promote competition and innovation enhance long term growth in per capita income, while policies that restrict competition will slow the pace of technological innovation with a negative impact on long term growth (see Howitt, 2007). In this regard, it is possible to explain the diverse growth and inequality outcomes of countries as induced by differences in policy. In terms of empirical validity, the endogenous growth models, particularly those that emphasise the role of R&D and technology spillovers have been credited for their ability to explain productivity growth in OECD countries, especially in the post WW II period (see, e.g., Coe and Helpman, 1995; Kneller and Stevens, 2006; Ha and Howitt, 2007; Madsen, 2007, 2008).   However, endogenous growth theory has also been subject to criticisms. Two common criticisms pertain to the complexity of these models, and their application to developing nations. For instance, Parente (2001) argues that the contribution of endogenous growth theory is not substantial enough to justify its complexity relative to neoclassical growth theory. The second criticism pertains to these models that they model endogenous growth as occurring through R&D. Parente (2001) argues that these models are not applicable to developing countries because these countries hardly engage in R&D. As such, the growth of developing countries is not through R&D and innovation, but through imitating or adopting readily available technologies. He cites examples of Japan, South Korea, and China as previously poor countries, which experienced large gains in income per capita through imitating and adopting existing technologies. In light of this criticism, the ‘correct’ question to ask in the context of transitional and developing countries is: why do these countries not adopt productive technologies?  The benchmark model developed in this thesis addresses some of the issues raised in the preceding paragraph to some degree. Firstly, the endogenous growth model we develop in this thesis is a model of technological adoption, which characterizes the idea that economic growth in most developing nations occurs through adopting existing superior technologies, rather than inventing new ones. Secondly, we address the complexity criticism by assuming a model with a linear AK – type technological structure.   
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The AK – type model was first introduced by Frankel (1962) as an alternative to the models that assume diminishing marginal returns to capital deepening (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998: 26). The idea here is that the aggregate production function can exhibit constant or even increasing marginal returns to capital deepening. This is essentially because, as firms accumulate more physical and human capital, some of the human capital will be the intellectual capital embodied in labour. The availability of more intellectual capital would then augment technological progress, and therefore counter the tendency for the marginal product of capital to diminish.   The AK – type model was then introduced into the endogenous growth theory by Romer (1986) and was subsequently used by Lucas (1988). This model structure further gained popularity in the endogenous growth literature, since it was first applied by Barro (1990) to explain the divergence of incomes. The major implication of the AK – type model is that permanent changes in government policies that have a bearing on investment rates will result in permanent changes in GDP growth.  The AK-type model has been challenged on grounds of empirical validity, albeit the debate on this front remains inconclusive. The leading critic of this model is Jones (1995), who uses post-WW II data for 15 OECD countries to show that GDP rates did not match the increases in investment rates during this period. However, McGrattan (1998) argues that Jones’ (1995) finding were incidental, in the sense that the sample coincided with a short-lived period when investment rates simply grew faster than GDP growth. Using data stretching to the 19th century, McGrattan (1998) shows that the main prediction of the AK-type model is consistent not only for the sample of OECD and three non-OECD Asian countries, but also for a cross-sectional sample of nations at different stages of development. Similarly, Li (2002) shows that Jones’ (1995) empirical findings are neither robust to changes in the definition of investment nor changes in the dataset.   Despite the above and other criticisms, the AK – type model remains a desirable modelling tool for two main reasons. Firstly, its simplicity entails that it is a tractable framework. This property is particularly desirable for the technology-adoption model developed in this thesis. Secondly, the presence of constant returns to capital deepening in the AK – type model ensures that the framework generates sustained growth. Consequently, it is possible to interpret the 
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non-convergence of cross country per capita incomes as resulting from the process of capital deepening.  The foregoing discussion highlights that technology is an important factor in economic growth. Thus, in order to understand the sources of per capita income differences across nations, it is important to measure the level of technological innovation and technology adoption, particularly in developing economies. However, measuring technological progress and technology adoption is a challenging task. This is mainly because these variables are neither countable, as with goods, nor is it possible to definitively determine their market value, as with services (see World Bank, 2008). As such, the existing measures are indirect, and they focus on different aspects of technological progress. Giving an exhaustive list of these measures is beyond the objectives of this discussion. However, we highlight some of these measures in passing, and refer readers to World Bank (2008) for a detailed discussion.  One type of measure encompasses input-based measures such as education levels, number of scientists, expenditure on R&D. Another type includes output-based measures, for example, the share of high-tech activities in manufacturing value added and exports, indices for competitive industrial performance (see World Bank, 2008; United Nation Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), 2002), etc. Yet another type of measures focuses on the mechanisms by which technological progress is achieved (Sagasti 2003) or by which technological learning occurs (Soubattina 2006). Finally, other measures are based on the information on technological diffusion and innovation, for example the number of patents granted.   A report by the World Bank (2008) shows that most developing countries have performed poorly according to all of the above measures since the 1950s. However, there have been improvements in some of the Asian countries, for instance South Korea, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, and India, particularly based on measures such as educational attainment and the proportion of high-technology exports in total exports.  A question that arises, then, is why developing countries have fared so badly. In what follows, we discuss the barriers to technological progress and technology adoption as one of the major explanations for this.  
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The role of various barriers in slowing technological progress, technology adoption, and economic growth has been emphasised in several endogenous growth models. These barriers can manifest in different forms, such as physical and human capital constraints that might hinder the proper use of the new technology (see Basu and Weil, 1998), politico-economy induced barriers such as resistance by competing political groups, unionism, violence and vandalism (see Mokyr, 1990), institutional, policy, and legal induced barriers, and barriers that are created by the existence of monopolies (see Parente and Prescott, 1994). These barriers have been incorporated in endogenous growth models in a variety of ways.   In Parente and Prescott (1994), barriers to technology adoption are modelled in the form of a country-specific and time-variant cost of additional investment that is required to adopt the new technology. Holmes and Schimitz (1995) use a policy parameter that discourages investment, while Ngai (2004) uses a legal parameter that distorts the market price of goods produced by the superior technology. Yet another strand of studies model barriers to technology adoption in the form of a cost associated with using the superior technology. Within this strand, the adoption cost is modelled as manifesting in different forms. For instance, in Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), and Canton et al. (2002), the adoption cost is modelled in the form of a productivity slowdown during the process of innovation. However, these three studies differ in the manner in which they interpret the source of this productivity slowdown. Hornstein and Krusell (1996) interpret the productivity loss as emanating from all the possible costs that are associated with investment specific technological change. Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) interpret the productivity slowdown as manifesting through learning and accumulating the new skills needed to operate the new technology. Canton 
et al. (2002) interpret the productivity loss manifesting through the leisure time forgone by workers when they learn the new skills needed to operate the new technology.   Another approach to modelling the barriers to technology adoption is using a fixed cost of some sort. This fixed cost is in turn interpreted in a variety of ways. For example, Leung and Tse (2001) interpret this fixed cost as a sunk cost (e.g.  the units of capital) that agents must pay to adopt the more productive technology. Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012) interpret this fixed cost as a ‘learning-by-doing’ cost associated with the more productive technologies. Furthermore, their model adopts an overlapping generation structure which characterizes this ‘learning-by-doing’ cost as being incurred by every generation. In the current study, we interpret the cost in a manner somewhat similar to that of Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012), although the ‘learning-by-
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doing’ feature takes on a slightly different meaning due to the presence of uncertainty. We provide further discussion and motivation for this interpretation in Chapter 3.  Other barriers to technology adoption manifest in the form of shocks that affect either the productivity of the technology or the consumption of agents. Although these shocks have been particularly emphasised in the literature on the adoption of agricultural technologies, and electrical energy and green energy technologies, in the current study, we generalise these shocks to apply in the context of any type of technology. In the context of the adoption of agricultural technologies, there are production shocks, which include the variability in weather conditions, the uncertainty with regards to dynamics of pests, and fluctuations in the prices of the inputs that are important in the adoption of the new technology. These shocks will then affect the expected yield. On the other hand, there are shocks such as droughts, domestic or global macroeconomic shocks, and financial crises which may be classified as consumption shocks.   The effects of shocks on long run patterns of technology adoption and economic development will then depend on the agents’ individual risk preferences, and the ability of agents to diversify these shocks. This then implies that an economy would delay technology adoption and potentially fall into risk-induced poverty traps if the majority of the economic agents in the economy are risk-averse (see Dercon, 2002). Similarly, poverty traps would most likely result if most agents do not have access to institutions that alleviate the shocks. Thus, shocks are most likely to constrain agents from developing nations than agents from developed nations, since the former nations do not have well developed institutions to alleviate/diversify the risk associated with new technologies.   There have been many attempts to analyse the effect of risk on technology adoption, although much of this literature focuses on micro-level effects of risk and uncertainty. More specifically, the literature stops short of analysing the impact of risk on macro-level economic outcomes such as economic growth and inequality. Studies such as Jensen (1982), Just and Zilberman (1983), Fishelson and Rymon (1989), Dinar and Zilberman (1991), Dinar et al. (1992), and Dridi and Khanna (2005) have empirically analysed the structural, socio-economic and demographic factors that impact on the diffusion of technologies. Although the results from these studies are mixed with regards to the importance of all the other factors used, there is a consensus that risk is the major factor influencing the rate of adoption. Another strand of 
 22 | P a g e  
 
empirical studies has analysed role of perceptions about the uncertainty in future yield on the adoption of new technologies (see Tsur et al., 1990; Saha et al., 1994). The results from these studies show that information dissemination enhances technology adoption.   On a theoretical level, many micro-level models show that, in the presence of various forms of production and output uncertainties, risk aversion can influence technology adoption decisions in the agricultural sector (see for example Hiebert, 1974; Feder, 1984, Just and Zilberman, 1983; Isik and Khanna, 2003; Koundouri, etal., 2006).6 Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) focus on the effects of consumption shocks on technology adoption. They develop a simple model to show that the consumption shocks associated with drought reduce the adoption of modern agricultural technologies. Using an empirical model that controls for seasonal working capital constraints, fixed effects (such as risk preferences and permanent income) and time-varying community fixed effects (such as input output price ratios, current weather circumstances and extension programs), they find evidence consistent with the idea that consumption risk reduces the use of fertilizer by Ethiopian farmers.   In light of the literature discussed above, the endogenous growth models developed in this thesis incorporate the idea that the barriers to the adoption of superior technology are not only in the form of the adoption costs associated with superior technologies, but also  the risks that are associated with the returns of these technologies. As already mentioned, we do this by assuming that the adoption of the superior technology takes place in an environment which is subject to idiosyncratic risk.   In a nutshell, the foregoing discussion suggests that various barriers constrain technological progress, which in turn affects the long economic outcomes of a nation. This, then, implies that in nations where barriers to technological progress are higher (lower), the rate of technological progress is lower (higher), and consequently, economic growth rate will be lower (higher). Therefore, technological change is potentially the key source of the diversity in growth experiences of nations as well as the non-convergence of incomes within and across nations. In light of this, the next section discusses the various issues relating to the relationship between growth and inequality, particularly during the process of technology adoption. Furthermore, because inequality often leads to distributional conflicts among groups of agents, we also 
                                                          6  Feder, Just and Zilberman (1985) provides an extensive survey of some of this literature. 
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explore the political economy issues pertaining to the relationship between growth and inequality.   
2.4 Growth and Inequality: The Role of Technology and Politico-Economy Issues A large body of empirical literature has explored the link between growth and inequality, albeit the results still remain mixed. These studies stem from Kuznets (1963) whose classical contribution, popularly known as the Kuznets hypothesis has shaped subsequent discussions on this subject. The Kuznets hypothesis suggests that there is a natural tendency for inequality to follow a market-driven inverted-U shape. According to this view, as the economy ‘takes-off’, opportunities arise in the modern sectors of the economy, particularly those in urban centres. Because workers from the traditional sectors of the economy (usually those in rural areas) are unskilled, they cannot easily switch to the modern sectors unless they are willing to accept low wages. This widening gap between rural and urban labour drives overall inequality upwards. However, once the economy has ‘taken-off’ and reaches a certain threshold level of development, more resources are allocated towards human capital development and redistribution, thus reducing inequality. In line with the Kuznets (1963) hypothesis, Barro (2000) uses panel data from Deininger and Squire (1996) to show that the relationship between initial inequality and growth is negative for poor nations and positive for rich nations.  However, two main issues are raised against the Kuznets (1963) hypothesis. Firstly, researchers question why East Asian countries experienced a decline in inequality during their early stages of development (between the 1960s and 1970s), but suffered growing inequality in the 1990s when they had reached a higher stage of development (see Krongkaew, 1994; Zin, 2005; Ortiz and Cummins, 2011). Similarly, researchers question why India experienced an increase in inequality between the 1960s and the mid-1990s, even though its growth rate stagnated (see Chusseau and Lambrecht, 2012). Secondly, questions regarding why a number of high-income economies experienced an increasing inequality since the 1980s have been raised (Chusseau and Lambrecht, 2012). Consequently, alternative explanations regarding the relationship between growth and inequality have emerged.   One such explanation suggests that causality runs from initial inequality to growth. This explanation is based on the idea that the relationship between growth and inequality is driven by political economy issues. Although not stated explicitly, this idea is indirectly implied in the 
Kuznets hypothesis since the redistribution that takes place once the economy has reached some 
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threshold level of development is likely to be driven by the political conflicts arising from high inequality. Typically, political economy models examine how the existence of agents with conflicting interests affects the optimal choice of policies and the long run economic outcomes.   In line with this explanation, Alesina and Rodrick (1994) develop a politico-economy endogenous growth model where agents vote on the tax rate on capital. The political outcome of the model is determined by the median agent. When the economy is characterised by high initial inequality, the median agent is poor. As such, the political outcome is characterised by a high tax rate on capital resulting in poor long-run growth. The authors use inequality in land holdings as a proxy for initial inequality to provide empirical evidence consistent with this result. Persson and Tabellini (1994) also develop a model with a relatively similar structure and predictions. Furthermore, they provide empirical evidence suggesting the income equality enhances economic growth in democratic economies, although their measure of inequality is based on income share of the third quintile. Similarly, Bénabou (1996) develops a political economy model to show that high inequality creates distributional conflicts, thereby slowing down growth. The author provides supporting empirical evidence showing that South Korea, which had lower inequality in the 1960s and 1970s, grew faster than the Philippines, a country that had quite similar macroeconomic features but higher inequality.  Nevertheless, other politico-economy studies such as Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Li and Zou (1998), and Forbes (2000) show that growth and initial inequality are positively related. Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) develop a model where agents vote on the preferred proportion of government revenue from a tax on labour income that should be allocated towards education. Their results show that high initial inequality results in more expenditure on education. Since education improves future human capital development, this then leads to long run growth. Li and Zou (1998) modify Alesina and Rodrik (1994) model to accommodate for the idea that the government expenditure consists of both production and consumption goods. They then show that if consumption goods are combined with the agents’ private consumption, the predictions of this modified model could either be positive or ambiguous, depending on the trade-off between private and public consumption. Using a measure of inequality based on the Gini coefficients for a sample of 114 developed and developing nations, Li and Zou (1998) show that the relationship between growth and inequality is positive and significant, even after controlling for other determinants of growth. Forbes (2000) uses a model controlled for omitted-variable 
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bias to document robust evidence of positive short-term and medium-term relationships between growth and inequality for a panel of 45 developed and developing nations.  A number of studies have also analysed the impact of new technologies on the relationship between growth and inequality. In most of these studies, superior technologies affect inequality through human capital (see Krusell et al., 2002, Acemoglu, 2002, He and Liu, 2008). The intuition here is that technological change seems to be biased towards certain skills (see Krusell, 
et al. 2002; Caselli, 1999; Acemoglu, 2002; He and Liu, 2008). Thus, agents with the relevant skills will earn a skills-premium over unskilled agents. The empirical support for this argument is based on the observation that the productivity of skilled workers rises faster than that of unskilled workers. Since workers are paid according to their marginal productivity, it must be the case that the earnings of skilled labour have accelerated faster than those of unskilled workers.   However, Weiss (2008) shows that the technology-induced inequality between skilled and unskilled labour is not as large in the long run. The explanation for this finding is based on the idea that factors of production are paid according to their marginal value, which is the product of marginal productivity and output price. During the process of technological progress, factors of production move from low-technology to high-technology sectors, thus reducing the supply of low technology goods. As a result, the relative prices of ‘low-technology’ goods rise above those of ‘high-technology’ goods. Since workers are paid according to the marginal value, the increase in the relative price of low-technology goods will then counter the initial decrease in the relative wages of unskilled workers.   Recent evidence also suggests physical capital accumulation has increasingly become an important channel through which technology affects inequality (Atkinson et al., 2011). This is because new technology does not only enhance the skill-capital complementarities, but also enhances capital intensity (Lansing and Markiewicz, 2011). Atkinson et al. (2011) and Lansing and Markiewicz (2011) argue that these features have been observed during the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) led innovations.  There are also political economy studies that attempt to analyse the relationship between inequality and growth during the process of technology adoption. Results that commonly emerge from these studies are consistent with the ‘economic loser hypothesis’. This hypothesis 
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was coined by Kuznets (1968) and later developed by Mokyr (1990), and was then formalised in the technology adoption literature by Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) and Parente and Prescott (1997). According to this idea, ‘interest groups’, comprising of agents at the top end of the distribution block the introduction of new technologies if they threaten their ‘economic rent’. This creates a twin-negative effect of poor rates of technological adoption and economic growth, and persistence of inequality.   However, Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2000; 2006) political economy models show that new technologies are not merely blocked on the basis that they threaten ‘economic rent’, but on the basis that they threaten ‘political power’. Based on this prediction, the authors suggest that, in order to understand why technology adoption is poor in some countries, researchers should look at the factors that determine the distribution of political power such as political and legal institutions.  The foregoing discussion shows that the relationship between inequality and growth is not easy to analyse empirically. Depending on the theoretical framework being used, the relationship can be either positive or negative, unidirectional or bidirectional. Furthermore, given that politico-economy conflicts affect the evolution of inequality, the relationship between growth and inequality is likely to be non-linear since preferences of different interest groups vary, depending on the level of inequality and wealth.  Furthermore, the evolution of political preferences and the expressions of these preferences are likely to differ across countries because of differences in social factors, political and legal institutions, and type of political regime. In light of these issues, caution should be exercised when interpreting empirical studies that impose a one way, linear and parametric relationship between growth and inequality. Likewise, empirical studies based on cross-country data should also be interpreted with caution in light of differences in the institutions that shape different nations (see Banerjee and Newman, 1991; Aghion and Bolton, 1992; 1997).  To illustrate the complexity of the relationship between growth and inequality, we consider the evolution in inequality and growth for six countries at different levels of development. These include the USA, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, and Malawi. All the six countries experienced a positive average growth between 1990 and 2005. However, three of the countries experienced a decrease in inequality (Brazil, Malaysia, and Malawi), while the remaining three experienced an increase in inequality (USA, China, and India). Inequality is 
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measured by the share of wealth received by the upper most quartile versus that received by the bottom-end quartile of the income distribution.   Figure 2.6 presents the countries that experienced a decrease in inequality, while Figure 2.7 presents the countries that experienced an increase in inequality. In each of these figures, the inequality data for each country is presented separately in the first, second, and third quadrant, while the growth rates are presented together in the fourth quadrant. It is evident that the growth and inequality data presented in the figure below cannot be easily interpreted by a single theoretical model.  For example, in two countries at their early stages of development (Malawi and Brazil), growth was associated with a decrease in inequality between 1990 and 2005, while in the USA, a developed nation, growth was associated with an increase in inequality. This is inconsistent with Kuznets’ (1963) idea that inequality increases at the early stages of development and decreases at the higher stage of development. However, in the case of China and India, the relationship between inequality and growth is negative and consistent with the Kuznets hypothesis.   Another question that arises regards why the relationship between growth and intra-country inequality differs for Brazil and India even though they are arguably at a comparable level of development. It could then be argued that country-specific and time-specific issues, such as political, social and demographic factors, might have played a role in explaining the difference in inequality changes in these two countries.   This discussion serves to highlight that there is substantial complexity in the relationship between growth and inequality, suggesting a scope for further research. Furthermore, cross-country differences in the relationship between growth and inequality entail that country-specific empirical studies are likely to be more useful in identifying the relationship between these variables than studies based on cross-country data. Unfortunately, relevant data, particularly for developing nations, is not yet rich enough to perform country-specific empirical studies.  Finally, in the majority of the literature on technological progress, the state of technologies available in the economy, and the barriers that constrain the adoption of superior technologies 
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are determined by certain initial structural features of the economy. Overtime, these structural features change due to changes in institutional and policy reforms thereby altering these initial conditions. Apart from altering the state of technologies and the barriers that constrain technology adoption, these can also affect long run growth by facilitating the reallocation of resources. This is the subject discussed in the next section, and this discussion forms basis for the empirical essay presented in Chapter 5.    
2.5 Globalisation, Allocation of Resources and Economic Growth  Many studies have emphasized the importance of resource allocation in promoting economic growth. Robinson (1971) develops a model to examine the contribution of the reallocation of resources between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors to growth. He then uses the model to provide empirical evidence suggesting that the role of played by the reallocation of resources in economic growth is much larger for less developed nations than developed nations. Using Robinson’s (1971) model, Feder (1986) provides cross-sectional evidence that reallocating resources from low productivity non-export sectors to high productivity export sectors results in large gains in growth. Similarly, Swiecki (2012) provides evidence suggesting that misallocation of resources reduces the welfare gains from trade.  McMillan and Rodrik (2011) present evidence suggesting that the growth success of Asian nations such as China, Singapore, South Korea, and India over Sub Saharan and Latin American nations was mainly because the former nations successfully implemented policies that are aimed at improving reallocation of resources. This sentiment is also shared by a number of studies on China and India. For instance, Cortuk and Singh (2011) document evidence that reallocation of resources was among the main drivers of economic growth in India for the period 1988 - 2007, using measures of structural change based on the norm of absolute values and the standard deviations of sectoral growth rates in employment. Likewise Fan et al. (2003) show that inter-sectoral reallocation of resources was among the main drivers of China’s impressive growth between 1978 and 1995. Furthermore, reallocation of resources is credited as one of the major factors behind the so-called ‘age of productivity’ between 1950 and 1975 in Latin Africa. More specifically, during this period, Latin America experienced a 4% productivity growth, approximately half of which is attributed to the reallocation of resources from non-productive to productive sectors (see Pagés, 2010).  
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Given the role that reallocation of resources plays in enhancing economic growth, understanding its sources becomes of policy relevance. In the classical economic development literature, the reallocation of resources from the primary sector to the modern sectors of the economy is driven by increases in agricultural productivity which then pushes labour from the primary sector towards other sectors. In contrast, studies such as Lewis (2008) and Hansen and Prescott (2002) provide an alternative view, in which an increase in productivity in the modern sectors of the economy will set in motion resource reallocation by pulling resources out of the primary sectors of the economy.   Globalisation has also been emphasized as a major driver of the reallocation of resources in recent years (see Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2004; Galindo et al., 2007; Abiad et al., 2008). In these studies, reforms aimed at liberalising the financial system and integrating the economy in the global world enhance economy wide firm-level reallocation of capital.7 In the essay presented in Chapter 5, we examine how globalisation, along with factors such as institutional quality and human capital development, enhances intra-sector and inter-sector reallocation of capital from low-productivity to high-productivity firms/sectors in South Africa.   
2.6 Concluding Remarks This chapter explored the related literature and the underlying motivation for this thesis. These include the diversity in growth experiences of nations and the non-convergence of incomes within and across nations. We then explored the role of technological progress and technology adoption in explaining these differences. The state of the technology available in the economy and barriers that constrain the adoption of technologies often determine the long run outcomes of the economy.   Existing literature has gone a long way in addressing some of the issues that motivate this thesis. Specifically, the role of technology adoption in explaining the diverse economic outcomes of nations has been explored in a variety of ways. Related studies have emphasized the role of technology adoption costs in constraining the adoption of superior technologies, thereby inducing bad long run economic outcomes.   However, the role of risk in constraining technology adoption and long run economic outcomes has not been emphasized. To that end, the 
                                                          7 We discuss this literature in detail in the essay presented in Chapter 5.  
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benchmark model presented in Chapter 3 extends the existing literature by addressing the role of uncertainty in technology adoption and long run economic outcomes.   The structural features of an economy change overtime due to factors such as institutional, and policy reforms. Chapters 4 and 5 present essays, which explore two channels through which changes in structural features of the economy affect long run economic outcomes. The essay in Chapter 4 is a political economy extension of the benchmark model to accommodate for the idea that these changes may generate political-economy responses, which in turn influence the technology adoption decisions, economic growth, and inequality. Chapter 5 presents an empirical essay, which explores the idea that the changes in the structural features of the economy can result in better functioning of markets, thereby promoting efficient reallocation of resources.                 
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  Figure 2.7: GDP Growth and Decreasing Inequality in Selected Countries, 1990-2005 Source: Data from Ortiz and Cummins (2011), UNICEF 
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CHAPTER 3 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INEQUALITY PATTERNS IN THE PRESENCE OF 
COSTLY TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND UNCERTAINTY  
3.1 Introduction While new technologies usually bring gains in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) (see Wirz, 2008), the decision to adopt these technologies is complicated by a number of issues. The first issue regards the size of productivity gains from the modern technology, particularly relative to existing technologies. The second issue regards the costs associated with adopting this modern technology. The size of this adoption cost is particularly relevant when compared to the relative productivity gains from the technology (see Lahiri and Ratnasiri, 2012). The third issue concerns the risk/uncertainty that faces agents when they make decisions on whether to adopt the modern technology.   Uncertainty in technology adoption decisions can emanate from a number of sources.  Firstly, it could emanate from the fact that the productivity gains associated with the modern technology are subject to particular future events whose occurrence is unknown at the time of the decision (Ulu and Smith, 2009). Secondly, uncertainty could result from the fact that the price of inputs used with the new technology may change unexpectedly. For instance, the adoption of high yield varieties (HYVs) in many developing nations is associated with risk in the form of weather and climate (e.g. Sharma et al., 2006; Gine, 2007; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011). Typically, weather and climate impact on the proportion of fertilizer use that is optimal with HYVs, but not with traditional varieties, because farmers already have good experience with optimal fertilizer use associated with the latter varieties. Thus farmers would need time to learn the optimal fertilizer application required with HYVs in different weather and climatic conditions. Furthermore, HYVs involve greater fertilizer use and the prices of such inputs are subject to fluctuations, which create an additional uncertainty.   Thirdly, uncertainty can emanate from unexpected consumption shocks that affect the welfare of consumers thereby directly affecting preferences for modern technologies. For 
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instance, Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) find survey based evidence from Ethiopia suggesting that consumption shocks resulting from drought lead to a reduction in fertilizer use among poor farmers. However, the effects of consumption shocks on technology adoption can also be indirect, through their impact on the inputs of technology adoption. For example, Dasgupta and Ajwad (2011) document evidence based on survey data suggesting that income shocks resulting from the 2007/2008 global financial crisis resulted in a reduction in households’ investment in education in Armenia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania, and Turkey. Since learning is an important element in the adoption of new technologies, any kind of shock that adversely affects education would delay adoption. These shocks would more likely affect developing countries than developed countries, which have historically invested in education and sufficient amount of human capital deepening has already taken place. Furthermore, the reduction in investment in education is also likely to amplify the delay in the adoption of technology associated with production risk. This is because educated agents are better able to manage risk than uneducated agents (see Lin, 1991). Finally, all the above forms of risk can be exacerbated by policy uncertainties. Typically, policy uncertainties affect the risk of new technologies through influencing the markets for the input used with the technology, or outputs from the technology.  Apart from the education channel mentioned above, uncertainty is more likely to constrain technology adoption decisions of agents from developing nations than those from developed nations for two main reasons. Firstly, reducing uncertainty depends on the availability of institutions that disseminate information about the factors that may affect future yields, input, and output prices associated with the new technology. These institutions are either underdeveloped or absent in developing countries. Secondly, it depends on the availability of institutions that help agents to alleviate the risk associated with the modern technology. Typically, these can either be private insurance companies or other informal risk sharing schemes (see Dercon and Christiaensen, 2011). In developing countries, insurance companies are often unwilling to insure poor agents, particularly those who rely on subsistence agriculture (see Gine and Yang, 2007). Although informal risk sharing schemes exist in some developing nations, they only offer partial protection against risk (see Morduch, 1995; Townsend, 1995; Dercon 2002). As a result, poor agents fail to switch to modern agricultural technologies.  A number of studies document that uncertainty influences economic outcomes, albeit most of this literature focusses on developed nations. For example, Bloom (2009) develops a model with time varying variance to show that macro-level uncertainty has a negative influence on 
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employment, productivity and aggregate output. Martin and Roger (2000) develop a model to show that business cycle fluctuations are negatively related to expected long term growth if labour supply is increasing and concave. Furthermore, they provide evidence to suggest that developed nations with higher fluctuations in growth and unemployment have low growth rates. Asteriou and Price (2005) provide panel data evidence from 59 developed and developing nations to show that uncertainty reduces investment and growth. Of course there are also studies that provide evidence to the contrary. For example Oikawa (2010) develops a model where uncertainty induces more research aimed at reducing it, resulting in the accumulation of social knowledge. Kose et al. (2006) document evidence of a positive relationship between growth and fluctuations for a sample of developed nations, but a negative relationship for developing nations. This result is in line with our discussion earlier that agents from developing nations, particularly those who lack access to financial institutions are more likely to be adversely affected by uncertainty. The model developed in this essay is motivated by this evidence.    It is interesting to examine whether the three factors mentioned above can explain the short run technology adoption decisions of agents and the long run technology adoption levels of economies. If that were the case, it would be possible to explain why different countries use different production technologies, and why some countries delay the adoption of superior technologies. Furthermore, given that technological progress is an important determinant of growth and inequality, understanding the determinants of short run and long run technology adoption would enable us to explain differences in global growth patterns and non-convergence in incomes observed across and within nations. To that end, the current essay seeks to address these issues. Relative to existing literature, the main contribution of the essay is in explaining the role of idiosyncratic uncertainty in technology adoption decisions, and how this affects the transitional path of growth and inequality, as well as the relationship between these two variables in the long run.   To address the issues raised above, we develop a simple two-period lived overlapping-generations model where endogenous growth takes place through physical and human capital deepening. In the model, agents can invest in either one of the two technologies available in the economy. The first technology is safe but less productive, and the second is more productive but its returns are subject to risk which is agent-idiosyncratic. Furthermore, the adoption of the latter technology is subject to a fixed adoption cost. The risk component emanates from the fact 
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that technology adoption occurs in an environment that is uncertain, partly due to unexpected shocks and partly due to the fact that developing nations do not have developed institutions that facilitate risk diversification. Put differently, in the absence of well-developed institutions, entrepreneurs face a ‘learning-by-doing’ cost of adopting technologies that have a high return on average, but are associated with risk. In this case this cost also has an opportunity cost element in the form of returns foregone due to a lack of developed institutions that would have otherwise helped alleviate this risk. Furthermore, we emphasize that this cost is not necessarily limited to ‘monetary value’ paid, but may also involve a ‘time component’ representing the time spent learning and acquiring knowledge that can only be gained experientially.  Based on some of the analytical outcomes of the model as well as the results of numerical experiments, we are able to explain a variety of outcomes. Firstly, we show that the diversity in growth and inequality outcomes of transitional economies can be traced to differences in certain initial conditions that characterize the economy. These conditions relate to the levels and the differences in initial productivities of technologies, the adoption costs associated with more productive technologies, and the ability to alleviate the shocks associated with the more productive technologies.   To elaborate on the aforementioned outcomes, our model shows that varying the standard deviations of the uncertainty parameters affects both the short term timing of technology adoption decisions, and the long run technology adoption levels. As such, shocks affect the transitional path of growth and inequality, and the long run economic outcomes of a nation. More specifically, holding other parameters constant, large shocks tend to drive the economy into the poverty trap, while moderately sized shocks result in a dual economy, and low shocks lead to a balanced growth.   Keeping the shock parameters constant, varying the adoption cost and the non-stochastic productivity parameters yields various outcomes.8 In this case, the ‘poverty trap’ and ‘dual 
economy’ outcomes have other ‘sub-outcomes’. Each of these ‘sub-outcomes’ is associated with its own set of productivity and adoption cost parameters. Furthermore each of these ‘sub-outcomes’ shows its own unique growth and inequality patterns, thus suggesting the existence of a diversity within diversity. Consequently, the presence of uncertainty in the model results in a richer range of growth and inequality patterns relative to models that do not account for this 
                                                          8 These outcomes are somewhat similar to those in Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012) although due to the presence of uncertainty there are sub-outcomes which are only possible in a stochastic model.  
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aspect of technology adoption. In this regard, another contribution of the benchmark model is in its ability to capture these diverse outcomes and ‘sub-outcomes’ within a unified framework.  Finally, our model also shows that the persistence in cross-dynasty inequality can be traced to the delays in physical and human capital deepening by poor dynasties due to their limited initial resource endowment. A feature of the model is that both growth and inequality are subject to fluctuations over time. These fluctuations are, in part, due to the presence of uncertainty, but intrinsic to the model is the possibility of reversals in the growth process, even if uncertainty were absent.  The benchmark model is related to a number of models in the literature. Firstly, it is related to models such as Hiebert (1974), Feder (1980), Just and Zilberman (1983), Isik and Khanna (2003), Koundouri etal. (2006), and Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) that emphasize the role of risk and uncertainty in explaining technology adoption decisions. However, most of these models focus on specific technologies, particularly those within the agricultural sector. As such they stop short of analysing the macro-level effects of these technology adoption decisions on variables such as growth and inequality.   Secondly our model is related to a strand of models that emphasize the role the of adoption cost as a constraint to technology adoption. These models include, among others, Parente and Prescott (1994), Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Leung and Tse (2001), Canton et al. (2002), Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012), and they characterise the adoption cost parameter in a different forms. Our characterisation of the adoption cost is in the form of ‘learning-by-doing’ cost associated with technical change, as in models such as Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), and Rebelo (1991), as well as some type of learning of the ‘new skill’ required to operate the modern high return technology (see for example Lahiri and Ratnasiri, 2012). It is then possible to interpret the persistence in inequality within and across developing nations as occurring through delays in the adoption of the superior technology. These delays result from a lack of resources for acquiring the high level skills needed to operate the superior technology. Furthermore, in the context of our benchmark model, the presence of uncertainty complicates the learning process, thereby causing further delays in technology adoption.   
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We employ a simple AK-type model within an overlapping generations construct. The AK-structure allows us to interpret capital as a composite good that incorporates elements of both human and physical capital. Endogenous growth in such models typically occurs through capital deepening, and this feature is also an intrinsic aspect of our model. The overlapping generations construct highlights the idea that technological change happens many times and so do the costs associated with it. This feature is quite consistent with a number of modern technologies where learning takes place in every generation. For example, the adoption of HYVs is influenced by weather patterns, which change from time to time, thereby requiring different types of learning in every generation. Similarly, modern technologies such as computers, mobile phones, etc continually change, and so do their inputs (such as software, antivirus, etc). Therefore, agents in every generation incur a cost associated with acquiring the new technology, its inputs, and learning how to use the new/upgraded technology.   Based on a proxy of technology adoption that incorporates different forms of agricultural technologies, and different measures related to production and consumption risk, we are able to find indirect support for the main prediction of our model that risk affects technology adoption both in the short run and long run. Our evidence is based on aggregate level yearly data from India for the period 1965 - 2001.   The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the economic environment, particularly focussing on the theoretical implications of the general version of the model. In Section 3.3, we conduct some numerical experiments to illustrate the insights derived from the analysis presented in Section 3.2. In Section 3.4, we conduct some numerical experiments that involve varying the standard deviations of shocks. In Section 3.5 we conduct some simple empirical analysis consistent with the main prediction of our model. Section 3.6 concludes the paper. The appendix presents technical details of the analysis in Section 3.2 and some of the results from our empirical analysis.  
3.2 The Economic Environment The economy consists of N two-period lived overlapping generations of agents whose wealth holdings are heterogeneous. Each agent is born with a unit of unskilled labour endowment that can earn them a subsistence wage, 𝑤� . Apart from the subsistence wage, an agent born in period t also inherits wealth from their parents in the form of bequests. Time is discrete, with t = 0, 1 , 2, ... The initial distribution of wealth is described by W ( . ). 
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 In each period t, agents must decide which among two technologies they should adopt. We refer to these technologies as Technology A and Technology B.  Technology A is both cost-free and risk-free. However, this technology is less productive, giving a time-invariant return of 𝜙. 
Technology B has a stochastic return, and is, on average, more productive than Technology A. However, the adoption of Technology B is subject to an exogenous adoption cost, δ. Furthermore, the return on Technology B is divided into two parts. The first part of the return 𝜂 > 𝜙 is certain. The second part of the return tε  is subject to uncertainty and depends on the type of shock that 
Technology B is subjected to. These shocks are idiosyncratic to agents. If the shock is bad, and this occurs with the probability p, then 0,, <= liti εε , while if the shock is good 0,, >= hiti εε . Furthermore, we assume that ηε <li,  and φεη <+ li, .   The economy’s produces output (Y) using capital (K). The production functions F(K) assume a simple “AK” specification. Specifically the production functions for Technology A and 
Technology B are F(Kt) = AKt and F(Kt) = BKt respectively, where A and B are the respective total factor productivities associated with the technologies, where A < B. In the context of this model, 
K represents a composite good embodying both human and physical capital. However, we emphasize the dominance of the ‘human’ component, which can be interpreted as investment in higher level skill needed to adopt the more productive technology. In this case, it is possible to interpret δ as an implicit fixed cost of experientially learning new technologies in the absence of developed institutions.9   Every period each generation faces a problem on whether they should adopt Technology A or Technology B. The choice of which Technology to adopt is not necessarily dependent on the Technology that their parents adopted. That is, offspring of parents who adopted B need not adopt B; it depends on the magnitude of resources they inherit from their parents.  The agent does not consume in the first period of his life.10 The utility of the ith agent, in the event he/she adopts Technology A is described by: 
                                                          9 An elaborate discussion of δ is given in Section 1. 10 This type of preference structure is consistent with the idea that ‘consumption’ consists of household consumption which includes the consumption of the children.  The agent therefore ‘consumes’ part of the consumption of his parents in the first period of his life and undertakes the consumption decision in the second period with his offspring in mind. 
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Agent i’s problem is optimise his utility subject to his/her budget constraint. Agents adopting 
Technology A maximise equation (1) subject to constraint (3). This yields the following consumption and bequest plans:  
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Alternatively, the optimal state-contingent plans for agents who adopt Technology B depend on the sign of the shock that their parent faces. These are described by 
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where 𝑈𝐴 and  𝑈𝐵 denote the indirect utility functions for the agents adopting Technology A and 
Technology B respectively and the subscript * denotes the optimal choice of the variable in question. It can then be shown that this is equivalent to the following (See Appendix 3.1): 
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  In equation (12), the LHS represents the geometric average of the wealth that is accumulated when an agent adopts Technology B. The RHS gives the wealth that is accumulated by an agent who adopts Technology A. It is easy to see that both the LHS and the RHS are continuous and monotonically increasing in Wit.  
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By setting certain parameter restrictions on (12), it is possible to derive some threshold level of Wit (hereafter to be referred as *W ) that would equate the LHS to the RHS.11 As such, it is possible to make the following proposition:   
Proposition 1: There is a threshold level of initial endowment, *W that is required for an agent 
to adopt Technology B. This level of endowment is implicitly defined as the *W  that solves equation 
(13):   
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An agent will adopt Technology B iff.  *WWit ≥  
To gain more intuition about *W  we carry out some comparative static analysis to examine how this threshold level of endowment changes with the parameters of the model.  This is done by implicitly differentiating *W  with respect to each of the parameters in equation (13). Our results are intuitively plausible; we find that *W  is decreasing in parameters 
hw εη,,  and increasing in parameters lp εδφ ,,, . 12   As in Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2012) and Khan and Ravikumar (2002), we assume that the agents cannot borrow to adopt the superior technology. We believe that this assumption is reasonable in the context of the current model. This is because access to borrowing may not directly help the agents since the investment needed to undertake Technology B is a human-capital intensive activity, whose main component is ‘learning-by-doing’. Secondly, even if the agents can access consumption loans, borrowing to adopt technology may not be economically 
                                                          11 We provide a sketch of the proof in Appendix 3.2. 
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tenable. This is because our model is such that agents who want to borrow access the loans from those who are willing to lend, who in this case are those who have adopted Technology B. For the lenders to be willing to lend, they should at least earn an interest equal to the expected net return on Technology B, i.e. 1)()( )1(,, −++ − phipli εηεη . However, this is not possible given that agents who adopt B must also incur the adoption cost δ . As such it is not possible for the lender and the borrower to reach an agreement.   The dynamics of the model are described by the evolution of bequests overtime. This is given by the following truncated system of first order difference equations:  
[ ] )14(*1 WWforWwW ititAAit <+=+ γ  and  
[ ]
[ ] )1(),1/(
)15(
),1/(
,,
1
*
,,
1
pyprobabilitwithWwW
WWfor
pyprobabilitwithWwW
it
hBhB
it
it
it
lBlB
it
−+−+=
>
+−+=
+
+
θθδγ
θθδγ  
where 11 ++ = itit bW  in equilibrium, θθφγ += 1A , θεηθγ ++= 1 )( ,,B lil , θεηθγ ++= 1 )( ,,B hih , and *W  is defined in Proposition 1. Equations (12) and (13) highlight the importance of the slopes Aγ , lB,γ, hB,γ  of the bequests function in determining the dynamics of the model. These slopes are proportionally related to the productivities of the respective technologies. Of particular importance are the sizes of these slopes relative to the 450 line, which has a slope equal to 1.   In the presence of idiosyncratic shocks, it is difficult to analytically develop some intuition regarding how the economy evolves over time. As such we begin by analysing a ‘deterministic’ version of the model where agents adopting Technology B do not face idiosyncratic shocks. In this case Technology B is associated with a deterministic return equal to a weighted average of the ‘low’ and ‘high’ shock cases. Stated differently, in the case of Technology B, we do not analyse the slopes of the two bequest functions individually, but we focus on the weighted slope i.e. 
hBlBwB pp ,,, ).1(. γγγ −+=   assuming that εi,t = 0. Consequently, for Technology B, equation (13) can be written as a single weighted wealth function as follows: )1/(][,,1 θθδγ +−+=+ itwBwBit WwW . Combined with equation (12), this function describes what happens ‘on average’ in the 
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stochastic version of the economy. Depending on the parameter representing the cost associated with Technology B, δ  and the productivity differences between the two technologies, 
wBA ,, γγ , three main possible outcomes are possible. These predictions can be labelled ‘poverty trap’, ‘dual economy’, and ‘balanced growth’, respectively. These outcomes are further sharpened once we allow a constant level of shocks to affect agents idiosyncratically.13 In this case, sub-outcomes emerge within the poverty trap and the dual economy outcomes are observable.    The main outcome for the poverty trap is presented in Figure 3.1. In this case the productivity parameters of both technologies are too low. Agents whose initial endowment is above *W  adopt Technology B. However, given the dynamics of the system, they converge to the steady state associated with Technology A. The sub-outcome of the poverty trap is presented Figure 3.2. In this case the model is primarily driven by the cost of adoption δ . Even though the productivity of Technology B is high enough so that the bequest functions of agents with wealth above *W  have a slope greater than unity, δ  is so high such that given the initial distribution, all agents have a wealth level below sBW , the unstable steady state associated with the technology B. As such, all dynasties in the economy converge to sAW , the stable steady state associated with 
Technology A. Because Technology A is the only one that exists in the long run, inequality always converges to zero irrespective of the conditions under which the poverty trap arises. However, long run growth rate is likely to differ depending on the productivity parameter of Technology A.  There are also two main outcomes for the dual economy presented by Figures 3.3. While the sub-outcome is presented in Figure 3.4 and As evident, Figure 3.3 is identical to Figure 3.2. However, in this case the adoption cost is quite low such that given the initial distribution of the economy, there are some agents with a wealth level above that of the unstable steady state sBW . The dynasties of these agents experience continuous growth, while all dynasties with wealth level below sBW  converge to the stable steady state associated with Technology A. This dual 
economy is associated with a growth rate that is above that of the ‘poverty trap’ as well as high and persistent inequality.   
                                                          13 Given that it is difficulty analytically characterize what happens in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks, we are only able to derive the insights about the existence of sub-outcomes by observing the results numerical experiments with the stochastic version of the model. 
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In Figure 3.4 we have a different type of dual economy. Here the productivity associated with both technologies is relatively low, so that the slopes associated with them are below 1, and other parameters of the model are such that some agents in the initial distribution fall above *W . The dynasties with initial wealth above *W  then converge to the stable steady state associated with Technology B, while the remaining dynasties converge to the stable steady state associated with Technology A. Since all agents who adopt Technology B have a unique and stable steady state, inequality in this dual economy sub-outcome (i.e. Figure 3.4) is not as high as the inequality that results in the main dual economy outcome (i.e. Figure 3.3).   Finally, in Figure 3.5 we present the balanced growth case. Here, the productivity associated with both technologies is high, leading to slopes of bequest functions associated with them that are above unity.  It is straightforward to see that the dynamics of the model imply complete adoption of the Technology B by all dynasties in the economy, regardless of the initial distribution characterizing the economy or adoption cost δ .   The inequality within the balanced growth economy increases sharply in the transition towards the long run and is persistent. This is because of two reasons. Firstly the fact that initially some agents adopt Technology A and some adopt Technology B means that the wealth of the latter group will faster in the early stages of the economy. Secondly, in the stochastic version of this economy, catching up is made more difficult due to the fact that Technology B is subject to uncertainty. For instance, agents of a particular dynasty may face a bad shock soon after their parents switch from Technology A to Technology B resulting in these agents falling back to 
Technology A. Since all agents eventually adopt Technology B, growth rate of the economy is driven by the productivity of this technology and it is higher than the growth rate under the ‘poverty trap’ and the dual economy.   
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Figure 3.1: Poverty trap sub-outcome 1. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Poverty trap sub-outcome 2.  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Dual economy sub-outcome 1 
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Figure 3.4: Dual economy sub-outcome 2  
 
Figure 3.5: Balanced growth outcome Secondly, by allowing idiosyncratic shocks to vary while keeping the other parameters constant, we are able to observe that shocks affect technology adoption decisions in the short run and the level of long run technology adoption. As we shall elaborate below, in the short run, the size of shocks affects the transitional path of technology adoption thereby impacting on transitional growth and inequality. In the long run, the size of shocks determines whether an economy falls into the poverty trap, dual economy, or balanced growth. Because it is difficult to analytically illustrate these findings, we only demonstrate them numerically. In what follows, we carry out some numerical experiments.   
3.3 Numerical Experiments and Discussion In this section we use numerical experiments to illustrate the intuition underlying the theoretical predictions that were reported in the preceding section. Our focus is on predictions 
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based on a constant level of idiosyncratic shocks. The results for varying the shocks will be analysed separately in Section 3.4. The initial distribution of wealth for the reported results is assumed to be lognormal with a mean of 2.5 and standard error of 0.4 and there are 501 agents. Based on the extensive numerical experiments that we have carried out there are essentially three types of results which are characterized by the parameter sets reported in Table 1.14 Furthermore in our numerical experiments, we are able to identify some threshold levels of adoptions costs δ  which would characterise whether equilibrium is a poverty trap or a dual 
economy, given initial distribution and productivity parameters.15 For illustrative convenience, we label them Hδ  and Lδ , where LH δδ >   .   Table 3.1: Productivity Parameter Values and Adoption 
 δ  wB ,γ  Poverty Trap: Case 1 Lδδ >  1, << wBA γγ  Poverty Trap: Case 2 Hδδ >  wBA ,1 γγ <<  Dual Economy: Case 1 Hδδ <  wBA ,1 γγ <<  Dual Economy: Case 2 Lδδ <  1, << wBA γγ  Balanced growth Any δ  wBA ,1 γγ <<    Generally the results from the numerical experiment with the stochastic version of the model confirm the predictions made above. Figure 3.6 illustrates the implications for technology choice, inequality and economic growth for the main poverty trap outcome. In this case the productivity parameters of both technologies are low (i.e. less than 1) and δ  is above the lower threshold Lδ . Panel (a) of Figure 3.6 shows the number of agents that adopt Technology A or 
Technology B in different time periods. As evident in panel (a), although both Technology A and 
Technology B co-exist in the initial stages, all agents in the economy eventually adopt the former technology.   Panel (b) illustrates the evolution of inequality within this ‘poverty trap’ economy over time. The inequality within this economy initially fluctuates at high levels and then decreases sharply in the transition to the steady state and eventually converges to zero. The initial, 
                                                          14 Note that the parameters choice was also guided by all the other parameter restrictions state in Section 2. An additional restriction is that: δεη ≥++ )()( itl Ww   15 We are not able to analytically solve these threshold levels of δ . Note that the balanced growth outcome is independent of the level of adoption cost since Technology A is productivity enough to enable agents to accumulate adequate wealth needed to adopt Technology B. 
 48 | P a g e  
 
relatively high level of inequality is due to the fact that some agents adopt Technology A while others adopt Technology B. However, because Technology B is costly but not very productive, agents who adopt this technology find themselves unable to pass sufficient resources to their offspring to enable them to adopt Technology B and consequently the offspring switch to 
Technology A. The initial fluctuations in inequality reflect the uncertain nature of the wealth of the agents who initially adopt Technology B. Once Technology A is fully adopted, inequality stabilises. This explains the rapid fall in inequality and the convergence of inequality to zero.   In panel (c) of Figure 3.6 we show the behaviour of growth. For the same reason as in the case of inequality, average growth is subject to fluctuations in the initial stages. However, both become stable in the steady state. In panel (d) we separate the growth rate of different groups in the economy. The growth rate of the top rich agents (i.e. 20% agents at the top end of the distribution) tends to fluctuate more than that of the poor agents (i.e. 20% agents at the bottom end of the distribution) in the early stages of the economy. This is because the rich initially adopt the Technology B in the early stages, but because it is unproductive, they will eventually switch to Technology A. The growth rate of the median agent starts very low, but increases in the transition process. Once the economy reaches the steady state, the growth rates of all agents converge.  Figure 3.7 illustrates the implications for technology adoption, inequality and economic growth for the ‘poverty trap’ case 2. Here the productivity of Technology B is above average while that of Technology A is below average. However, because Technology B is too costly (i.e. 
Hδδ > ) relative to the endowment of most agents very few agents initially adopt Technology B. Furthermore, because the few agents that adopt Technology B may face a bad shock, the entire economy ends up adopting Technology A in the steady state. This is evident in panel (a) of Figure 3.7. The transitional behaviour of growth and inequality for case 2 are quite similar to that of case 1. However, in case 2, the initial fluctuations in both growth and inequality are more pronounced that in case 1. These high fluctuations are in part due to the presence of unstable steady state for Technology B. Moreover, because the productivity of Technology B is above average, it takes more time for both growth and inequality to converge to their steady state equilibrium. The growth rate of the rich and median agents start low but monotonically increase in the transition to the steady state while the growth rate of the poor agent is initially high but decreases sharply.   
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Figure 3.6 Technology adoption, inequality and economic growth in the Poverty Trap sub-outcome 1 
 
Figure 3.7 Technology adoption, inequality and economic growth in the Poverty Trap sub-outcome 2 
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 Figure 3.8 presents the numerical results for the main dual economy outcome. In this case the productivity parameters of Technology A are low while the productivity parameters of 
Technology B are high. Given the initial distribution some agents are above the unstable steady state illustrated in Figure 3.3. Technology A and Technology B co-exist in the steady state. Agents who adopt Technology A will be poorer while those that adopt Technology B will be richer. Thus, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 3.8, this economy is characterised by very high levels of inequality. The average growth rate for this economy is slightly above that of the ‘poverty trap’. This is due to the component of growth that is emanates from agents who adopt the more productive Technology B. The growth rate of the poor agents starts quite high while that median agent starts low. The two growth rates then monotonically move towards one another and converge. However, the two growth rates never converge to that of the rich agents.   Figure 3.9 presents the numerical results for the other dual economy sub-outcome. In this case the productivity parameters of both technologies are low. However, the adoption cost is very low i.e. Lδδ < . The set of other parameters is such that Technology B has a stable steady state as presented in Figure 3.4. The distinguishing feature of this equilibrium is that inequality remains fluctuating and never converges. This is part is due to the fact that both technologies have stable steady states. In this of equilibrium, the growth rates of all the groups of agents remain close and they are all subject to fluctuations.  
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Figure 3.8: Technology adoption, inequality and economic growth ‘dual economy' sub-outcome 1  
 
Figure 3.9: Technology adoption, inequality and economic growth ‘dual economy' sub-outcome 2 
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 Figure 3.10 presents the numerical results for the balanced growth case. In this case, the productivities of both technologies are high enough to allow agents’ wealth to grow at a relatively high rate. Consequently, irrespective of which technology they start with, all agents in the economy eventually adopt Technology B. Inequality in this economy increases in the transition process and remains persistently high. The high level and persistence of inequality is due to the fact that agents switch from Technology A to Technology B at different times. Furthermore, some of those that have switched to Technology B may be subjected to a negative shock thereby reverting back to Technology A. Agents who switch to Technology B earlier, and also receive a good shock will accumulate more wealth than those that remain in Technology A and those that adopt Technology B and face a bad shock.  The steady state average growth rate for the balanced growth economy is much higher than that of the dual economy since both technologies are very productive. Furthermore, the adoption cost has no impact on the long economic outcomes. However, the cost tends to affect transitional behaviour of the ‘balanced growth’ economy. More specifically, the time taken for the economy to fully adopt Technology B and for growth and inequality to converge to their steady state paths is increasing in the adoption cost.16   
                                                          16 Since in our comparative analysis show that W* is increasing in δ, it is clearly intuitive that agents who initially adopt Technology A  will take more time to switch to Technology B if δ were higher. 
 53 | P a g e  
 
  
Figure 3.10: Technology adoption, inequality and economic growth in the ‘balanced growth’ case   We carried out additional experiments to analyse how the initial level of inequality, the parameters representing the probability of a bad shock, p and the degree of altruism, θ affect the predictions of the stochastic version of the model.17 While the basic predictions of the model remain qualitatively the same, one additional observation is worth noting. Changes in the initial inequality and the degree of altruism θ  tend to affect the period that it takes for growth and inequality to reach steady state levels. More specifically, the higher the level of initial inequality, the longer time period taken for growth and inequality to reach their steady states. This result also applies for the degree of altruism, θ.   
3.4 Varying the size of shocks In this section, we analyse the implications of uncertainty in the model. Figure 3.11 below illustrates the effects of different-sized shocks on the adoption of the more productive 
                                                          17 Note that theoretically, p and θ  affect the slope of the bequest function thus do not change the main predictions of the model.   
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technology. It is evident that given other parameter values, shocks with a high standard deviation (henceforth ‘high’ or ‘large’ shocks) results in the economy converging to the poverty 
trap where no agent adopts the productive technology. Moderately sized shocks will result in a dual economy where both technologies co-exist. Small shocks result in a balanced growth, where all the agents will end up adopting the productive technology. Also evident is that, although all agents end up adopting the productive technology when shocks are low, the timing of technology differs depending on the size of shocks. The lower the standard deviation of the shocks, the quicker is the complete adoption of the better technology. In what follows, we now discuss the growth and inequality outcomes of these different sized shocks.  
   Figure 3.11: Number of Agents adopting Technology B under different sized shocks   Figure 3.12 presents the inequality and growth rate from the different sized shocks. Panel (a) reports the Gini coefficient, panel (b) reports the average growth of the economy, panel (c) reports the growth rate of the 20% agents at the top end of the distribution, and panel (d) reports the growth rate of the 20% agents at the bottom end of the distribution. As evident from Figure 3.12, when the shocks are too high, the incomes of all agents converge since every agent ends up adopting the less productive technology. The growth rate stagnates, so does the growth 
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of rate of the wealth of all the agents. On the other hand, when the size of the shock is low, the economy converges into a high long run growth path and the divergence of wealth is persistent. The size of the shock has an almost perfect negative correlation with average growth i.e. the higher (lower) the shock, the lower (higher) the growth rate.  It is interesting to note that the divergence of wealth is quickest in the dual economy. This highlights the fact that the incomes of rich agent who are able to adopt the superior technology will grow persistently while those of the remaining agents will stagnate. Furthermore, the higher the shock, the quicker inequality reaches its steady state path, except for the poverty trap case.  It is interesting to note that in the 
poverty trap and dual economy cases, the economy can experience growth reversals during the transition process.   
    Figure 3.12: Growth and Inequality under different sized shocks  
 
3.5 Empirical Analysis This section empirically examines whether risk affects the technology adoption decisions in the short run and the level of long run technology adoption as predicted by our model. Finding an appropriate proxy for technology adoption is not an easy task, particularly for developing nations where data is very limited. Furthermore, because technology adoption 
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decisions in different countries are affected by country-specific factors such as culture, country history, and policy, it is often difficult to compare measures across countries. As such our case study here focuses on a single country, India, and we focus on the adoption of agricultural technologies.   The choice of India is motivated by the fact that it is among the developing countries that implemented intensive technological and other agricultural reforms, commonly known as the Green Revolution since the 1960s. To date, India ranks second in production of cereals such as wheat and rice, courtesy of these technological and other reforms. In terms of its standing in the world economy, India has become one of the fastest growing and closely watched emerging economies, along with Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa. These five countries have increasingly become influential by cooperating in economic and political issues through what is commonly known as the BRICS. This augments India’s suitability to the current study.  Our empirical analysis is constrained by a number of data-related issues. Firstly, the available state-level technology adoption data has so many gaps rendering it unsuitable for any meaningful empirical analysis. As such we rely on aggregate level data. Secondly, there is no aggregate data for two indicators of technology adoption; crop intensity and area cropped with HYVs. Therefore we rely only on four indicators which are: total fertilizer consumption, total land under irrigation, number of tractors used per thousand hectare, and harvest thrasher use per hectare. The data on these indicators and the output measures such as Gross Production Index (GPI), the Gross Production Value (GPV) and Export Unit Value Index (EX_V) for the agricultural sector were sourced from the database of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2012). All the remaining data was obtained from the Word Bank Databank (2012). The analysis here covers the period 1965 to 2001, and the choice of period is based on data availability. The summary statistics for all the variables used in this study is provided in Appendix 3.4.   To construct out technology adoption index, we follow an approach in Jain et al. (2009). This is related to the approach used by the United Nation Development Program (2006) to compute the Human Development Index. We begin with standardising each of the indicators of technology adoption as follows: 
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where Xi is the ith value of the technology adoption indicator in question, Xmin , Xmax denotes the minimum value and the maximum value of this indicator, respectively.  Once all the indicators are standardised, we now use normalised weights (denoted by αi for technological indicator i) obtained from a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to compute the aggregate technology adoption index (henceforth TAI) which is given by: 18  
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= α      This index takes values strictly between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating a larger extent of technology adoption.  In Table 3.2, we report the αi’s  and in Figure 3.13 we report the TAI.  We use four measures of risk. These are based on volatilities of GPI, GPV and EX_V, and the volatility in Gross Domestic Production (GDP) at 2000 constant prices. The volatilities of these variables were computed use using an appropriate GARCH-type volatility model for each of the variables.19 An advantage with the GARCH-type models is that they account for time-varying volatility.20  In Figure 2.14 (see Appendix 3.3), we present the correlation plots of TAI and each of the measures of risk. A negative correlation is evident between TAI and all the measures of risk suggesting that risk potentially slows technology adoption. We also report the correlation coefficients between TAI and a host of its possible determinants in Table 3.3. The TAI is evidently negatively correlated with all the measures of risk and positively correlated to such as Consumer Price Index (CPI), logarithm of aggregate real Gross Fixed Capital Formation (LGFCF), 
                                                          18 Given that the PCA is a widely used in the economics literature, we will not describe the method here. However, we provide a precise discussion of the method in Appendix 5.2. Readers who need more details on the method are referred to textbooks such as Dunteman and Lewis-Beck (1989) and Stock and Watson (2002). 19 By ‘appropriate’, we mean that the ARCH-type model used to generate the volatility of each of the variables passed a number of stringent tests. For instance, we ensured that the mean equation had no evidence of serial correlation, and the model used does not violate the non-negativity condition/constraint and its coefficients are  non-explosive. The residuals were further tested to ensure that no ARCH effects remained in the data. Furthermore, we experimented with various specifications to ensure that the final formal used had the Minimum Information Criteria. For detailed discussion of the GARCH-type volatility models, see Brooks (2008). 20 Note that we also experimented with risk measures based on the standard deviation and the squared standard deviation of these variables. The results were qualitatively similar to those obtained using the GARCH-type volatility measures.  
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ratio of total expenditure on education to GDP (EDUEXP), life expectancy (LIF_E), and GDP. Nevertheless correlation between two variables does not necessarily imply causality because it might be the case that the variables are driven by a common exogenous factor. As such it is important to carry out formal econometric analysis, which is the subject of the next section.   
Table 3.2   Weights for the Variables  Variable Normalised Weights Total Fertilizer consumption 0.25192 Total land Under Irrigation 0.24838 Number of tractors used per thousand hectare 0.25066 Harvest Thrasher Use per hectare 0.24904   
 
Figure 3.13: Technology Adoption Index: 1961 – 2002    
Table 3.3: Correlation between the TAI and its explanatory variables  
 TAI VOLGDP(1) VOLEX_V(1) CPI LGFCF EDEXP LIF_E VOLGPI VOLGPV TAI          VOLGDP -0.269         VOLEX_V -0.094 -0.046        CPI 0.963 -0.223 -0.085       GFCF 0.991 -0.260 -0.042 0.565      EDEXP 0.871 -0.207 0.064 0.256 0.287     LIF_E 0.478 -0.254 0.026 0.385 0.440 0.428    VOLGPI -0.402 0.615 0.009 -0.406 -0.414 -0.340 -0.409   VOLGPV -0.402 0.694 0.009 -0.406 -0.414 -0.339 -0.409 0.999  GDP 0.993 -0.161 -0.082 0.611 0.702 0.662 0.474 -0.403 -0.403Notes: VOLGDP = volatility in GDP, VOLGPV = volatility in GDV, VOLGPI = volatility in GPI, VOLEX_V =volatility in EX_V 
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3.5.1 Testing for Long Run and Short Run Relations between the TAI and Risk In this section we examine the short run and long run relationship between TAI and the four measures of risk. Moreover, we control for the other determinants of TAI. To that end, we test for a long run relationship using the multivariate Johansen and Juselius (1990) maximum likelihood-based cointegration approach. Once long run relations are identified, we then estimate the Vector Error Correlation Models (VECMs) to examine how any short run disequilibrium in the relationship between TAI and its determinants adjusts back to the long run path. The VECM model will also allow us to examine the signs and significance of the long run and short run parameters.21  We begin our analysis by testing each of our variables for unit roots. To that end the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillip Peron (PP) are employed. To determine the appropriate lag length for the ADF test we use the Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). In the PP test, we use the Bartlett Kernel estimation method and the bandwidth is selected using the Newey West method.  The results are presented in Table 3.4. It is evident that, based on both tests, all the variables only become stationary when differenced, except for the volatility series which are stationary in levels.   Next we tested for cointegration between the variables. This is done by specifying three Vector Autoregression (VAR) models, each featuring the TAI index and other variables. The specification of VAR model was guided by the need to minimise multicollinearity. To that end, the correlation coefficients reported in Table 3.3 are utilised. In Model 1, we include TAI, volatility in GDV, volatility in EX_V, CPI, GDP, LIF_E, GFCF, Edu. Exp.  In Model 2, we include TAI, volatility in GDI, volatility in EX_V, CPI, GDP, LIF_E, GFCF, Edu. Exp.  In Model 3, we include TAI, volatility in GDP, volatility in EX_V, CPI, LIF_E, GFCF, Edu. Exp. Variables such as GDP, GDFC, LIF_E were logarithmically transformed to address issues associated with skewness and outliers.  Furthermore, lagged rather than contemporaneous values of GDP were used because in the context of our model, increases in wealth/income is likely to improve technological adoption in the next period as decisions for the current period have already taken place. More specifically, an increase in GDP is likely to increase the amount of bequest left for the future generation and thus affect this generation’s technological adoption decision. All the risk measures were included at ‘lead’ since current technology adoption decisions are likely to 
                                                          21 Since our analysis is based on the standard Johansen cointegration technique and we do not do any extension or modifications to the model, discussion of all the technical aspects of the model is beyond objectives of this essay. As such we will highlight steps and the procedures we think are necessarily for the purpose of making the current empirical analysis clear to the readership. More technical issues on the multivariate Johansen cointegration and VECM are available in time series textbook such as Kirchgässner and Wolters (2007).  
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depend on agent expectation about the future risk. Moreover, recall that in our model, agents take technology adoption decisions before the shock has been observed. In all the specifications, we include a dummy variable to account for India’s economic reforms that began in July 1991.  In selecting the appropriate lag length for test for cointegration, the Akaike information criteria (AIC) and the SBIC were considered. However, in cases where they gave conflicting lags, we relied on the AIC since the SBIC is inefficient in small samples (see Brooks, 2008). The residuals from the selected lag order were further tested for serial correlation to ensure that a lag with good diagnostic properties was used. The Johansen cointegration tests were then performed using this lag. The results thereof are reported in Table 3.5. Also reported are the lag length and the estimation assumption used in performing the cointegration test. It is evident that there are four cointegrating relations in each of the model. This implies that TAI has a long run relation with the variables in each of the models.   To analyse the nature of these long run relationships and to examine the short run dynamics, we proceeded to estimate the VECMs. The VECMs is estimated on truly endogenous variables. As such we performed the weak exogeneity tests to identify the endogenous variables. Because our concern here is on whether TAI is influenced by the other variables, we only report the weak exogeneity results for this variable. Similarly, we only report the VECMs normalised on TAI. Both results are reported in Table 3.6. We also reported the VECM coefficients, the coefficients of the dummy variable, adjusted R-squared for each model, and the results from serial correlation tests.  As evident in this table, TAI is endogenous in all the three models. Regarding the VECMs, it is evident that the long run parameters for all the four measure of risk are negative and statistically significant at 1% in almost all the specifications. This implies that risk has a negative influence on long run technology adoption levels, even after controlling for the other determinants of technology adoption. Furthermore, the short run parameters of all the four risk measures are negative and three of them are statistically significant implying that risk influences short run technology adoption decisions of agents. All the VECM coefficients are correctly signed and statistically significant at 1% suggesting that in the event of short run disequilibrium in the relationship between TAI and the other variables, adjustment back to equilibrium takes place. Furthermore, the VECM coefficients are reasonably large implying that the adjustment in quick. For instance, in Model 1, the VECM coefficient is 0.19 implying that 19% 
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of the short run disequilibrium from the long run path of the variables in this model is corrected every year. Consequently, it takes just over five years and three month for this short run disequilibrium to adjust back to the long run path.   The coefficients of all the other determinants of TAI have the expected signs, except those of life expectancy, which is surprisingly negative. In the early classical theoretical literature such as Kuznets (1973) and Rum and Shultz (1979) increased life expectancy is expected to increase technology adoption and economic performance by increasing the time spent on education and human capital development. Ang and Madsen (2012) provide two pieces of evidence consistent to this idea. Firstly, they show that educated workers are more likely to retire later. Secondly, they show that the propensity to innovate increases with age.   However, models such as de la Croix and Licandro (1999), and Boucekkine et al. (2002), suggest that an increase in life expectancy could be counterproductive, especially if human capital is considered a vintage asset. Other explanations based on models of endogenous life expectancy in human capital suggest that multiple equilibria are possible depending on the initial level of life expectancy (see Blackburn and Ciprian, 2002; Cavalletti and Sunde, 2005). Finally in political economy explanations, conflicts between vested-interest groups, one comprised of the aged agents and the other the young agents could result in a negative relationship, especially if the former group is large or has a stronger influence on the political system (see Lancia and  Prarolo, 2009). The idea here is the aged groups is not in favour of new technologies as they are ‘too old’ to begin learning. Whether this negative result is because India has reached this threshold level of life expectancy as emphasised in the endogenous life expectancy models, political conflicts arising from its democracy, or is due to other reasons remains an interesting question for future research.  It is also surprising that while GFCF has a positive influence on long run TAI, it has negative effects in the short term although the coefficients are all insignificant. Similarly, CPI negatively influences TAI in the long run but positively in the short run. This result implies that moderate price increases that reward risk takers may encourage technology adoption in the short run, but unsustainable price increases may backfire in the long run through reducing in real wealth and consequently limiting the potential to adopt new technologies. The coefficients of expenditure on education have the correct sign in all of the specifications and are significant 
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in most of the cases. Although the coefficients of GDP are correctly signed they are not significant for all the specifications.22   Overall the empirical analysis gives indirect support to the main outcome of our model that risk negatively affects both transitional technology adoption decisions and long run technology adoption levels. Nevertheless, whether these effects are large enough to affect long run economic growth and inequality are questions beyond the current empirical exercise. In the absence of fine data on many variables such as inequality, we believe that this question is for future empirical analysis. Furthermore, conscious of the data challenges mentioned earlier, we also caution that our empirical results should be interpreted caution.  Notwithstanding these data challenges, our empirical exercise gives important insights into issues relating to the relationship between risk and technology adoption upon which further research can be established.   
Table 3.4: Unit Root Tests 
 Augmented Dickey Fuller Phillips Peron  Level p-value 1st Difference p-value Level p-value 1st Difference p-value Technology Adoption Index -2.03 0.56 -4.23 0.01a -1.88 0.65 -4.04 0.02a CPI 0.628 0.99 4.49 0.01a 0.523 0.99 4.45 0.01a LGFCF 1.776 0.69 6.94 0.00a 0.696 0.74 6.98 0.00a VOLGDP -5.76 0.00a   -5.77 0.00a   LIF_E  1.63 0.97 -1.68 0.07c -2.16 0.49 -1.59 0.09a EDEXP  -1.12 0.91 -6.54 0.00a -1.12 0.91  -6.56 0.00a VOLEX_V -5.35 0.00 a   -5.48 0.00a   VOLGPI -4.93 0.00 a   -4.87 0.00a   VOLGPI -4.93 0.00 a   -4.86 0.00a   Notes: a, b, c entail 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively   
Table 3.5: Multivariate Johansen Cointegration Tests 
Cointegration results for Models 1965-2001   
MODEL K A 
Trace 
   
Max  r≤0 r≤1 r≤2 r≤3 r≤0 r≤1 r≤2 r≤3 Model1 1 3 301.2[0.00]a 208.4[0.00] a 134.7 [0.00] a 83.2[0.00] a 92.8[0.00] a 73.6[0.00] a 51.5[0.00] a 27.3 [0.06]a 
Model2 1 3 301.2[0.00] a 208. 5[0.00) a 134.8[0.00]) a 83.3[0.04] b 92.8[0.00] a 73.6[0.00] a 51.63[0.00]a 30.3[0.06]c 
Model3 1 3 232.9[0.00] a 141.3[0.00] a 83.8[0.00] a 45.6 [0.08] c 91.6[0.00] a 57.5[0.00] a 38.1[0.00] a 28.7 [0.04] b Notes: p-value in [ ], a, b, c entail 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively   
                                                          22 Note that we do not include GDP in Model 3 to avoid possible multicollinearity with volatility in GDP. 
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Table 3.6: Vector Error Correction Model 
           Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Exogeneity Tests for TAI              14.177[0.00] 14.156[0.00] 8.933[0.00] 
 Long Run Parameters Short Run Parameters Long Run Parameters Short Run Parameters Long Run   Parameters        Short Run           Parameters Constant 1.284 0.086 1.288 0.085 2.874 0.005 VOLEX_V(+1) -0.004(0.00)a -0.0002(0.00) -0.005(0.00)a -0.0003(0.00)  -0.0003(0.00) VOLGDP     -0.112(0.01)a -0.005(0.00)c VOLGPI   -0.619(0.21)a -0.173(0.06)a    VOLGPV(+1) -0.609(0.20)a -0.171(0.05)a      CPI -0.014(0.00)a 0.002(0.00) -0.014(0.00)a 0.002(0.00) -0.014(0.01) a 0.004(0.00)c LGDP (-1) 0.229(0.35) 0.180(0.23) 0.232(0.35) 0.180(0.23)    LIF_E -1.045(0.27)a -7.944(1.82)a -1.05(0.27)a -8.10(2.07)a -1.465(0.64)b -5.594(1.76)a LGFCF 0.175(0.13)c -0.036(0.07) 0.197(0.12)c -0.028(0.07) 0.277(0.23)c -0.057(0.08) EDEXP 0.132(0.03)a 0.021(0.01)c 0.132(0.03)a 0.021(0.01)c 0.656(0.09)a  0.017(0.01) Dummy 0.001(0.01)  0.002(0.01)  0.006(0.01)   VECM Coefficient  -0.190(0.05)a  -0.183(0.04)a   -0.049(0.01)a Serial LM Test 70.92[0.25]  70.94]0.25]  54.123]0.28]   Adj R-Sq 0.475565  0.430905  0.3409   Notes: Standard errors in ( ), p-value in [ ], a, b, c entail 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively  
3.6 Concluding Remarks The purpose of this chapter was to examine the link between growth and inequality in transitional economies where the adoption of high-risk, high-return technologies is subject to a fixed adoption cost. The underlying motivation for this study stems partly from three empirical observations. Firstly, it is motivated by empirical evidence suggesting that transitional and developing economies still experience diverse growth experiences. Secondly, it is motivated by the persistence of cross-country and intra-country inequality of incomes in these countries. Thirdly, it is motivated by the empirical observation that some countries are characterised by high fluctuations in inequality while others are characterised by much smoother changes in inequality.   We develop a simple endogenous growth model in which growth takes place through physical and human capital deepening, and agents are heterogeneous in their initial resource endowments. In the model, an agent faces the choice of adopting either of the two technologies available in the economy, a safe low return and risky-high return technology. Furthermore, there is a cost associated with adoption of the risky-high return technology. We interpret this 
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cost as an implicit ‘learning-by-doing’ fixed cost associated with uncertainty in an environment which has less developed economic and financial institutions.  Depending on the initial productivity differences between the two technologies and the implicit fixed cost of adopting Technology B, three outcomes are possible. We characterize these as poverty trap, dual economy and balanced growth. Further analysis of these three outcomes reveals that, once agent-idiosyncratic uncertainty is introduced into the model new sub-outcomes emerge within the poverty trap and dual economy outcomes. Each of these sub-outcomes is associated with different sets of productivity parameters and adoption costs and shows its own unique growth and inequality patterns. This suggests the existence of diversity 
within diversity. Consequently, our model has the potential to explain the diverse growth and inequality patterns observed in the empirical data better than other models in related literature.   Furthermore, by experimenting with different levels of shocks, we are able to disentangle that uncertainty influences for both the transitional technology adoption decisions and the long run technology adoption levels. In so doing we find that uncertainty affects the transitional path of growth and inequality as well as the long run economic outcomes of nations. More specifically nations that face large production or consumption shocks and will potentially fall into poverty trap if they do not have developed institutions to diversify or to alleviate the effects of these the shocks. Studies such as Dercon (2011) have provided evidence consistent with this idea.   In this essay, we also provided empirical evidence which offers indirect support to the idea that risk negatively affects technology adoption decision in the short run and the long run levels of technology adoption even after controlling for other determinants of technology adoption. This empirical analysis is based on aggregate levels of technology adoption in the Indian agricultural sector. Moreover, the impact of the other standard determinants of technology adoption is found to be in accordance to a priori expectation, except for life expectancy. Finally, in light of data constraints, we believe that the findings of our empirical analysis set a good foundation for future empirical work once better data becomes available.  Given the importance of risk and cost impede technology adoption, technological progress, and long run economic outcomes, reforms that are aimed at tackling these two barriers are necessary if a nation is to escape underdevelopment. However, reforms often create new issues for technology adoption, growth and inequality. These issues pertain to the fact that these 
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reforms have different effects on the preferences of heterogeneous economic agents. As such agents are likely to respond to these reforms in a variety of ways depending on the various mechanisms available to express their preferences and consequently creating new complexities for technology adoption, growth and inequality. These are the issues addressed in the political economy extension to the benchmark model presented in the next chapter.                            
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Appendix 3.1: Proof of inequality (12) Agents adopt Technology B iff. indirect utility of Technology B is greater that indirect utility of 
Technology A. This implies that agents adopt Technology B  
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Appendix 3.2: Proof of Proposition 1 Firstly, it is to see the LHS and RHS in (12) are both continuous functions in Wit. Secondly, the following applies as Wit approaches the origin 
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Thus, as  𝑊 → 0,  LHS < RHS iff: )3()1(])[(])[( Awpwhpwl φδεηδεη <−−+⋅−+  Thirdly, expressing equation (12) in logarithmic form and taking the derivatives of the LHS and the RHS with respect to W* we obtain the following:23  
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In A7 it is easy to see that LHS > RHS. Thus assuming that (A3) applies, the W* exists.    
                                                          
23 Taking logs amounts to a monotonic transformation, so comparing slopes of the transformed LHS and RHS are 
equivalent to the corresponding comparing of the untransformed levels. 
 68 | P a g e  
 
Appendix 3.3: Correlation between TAI and the measures of risk
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Correlation between the Technology Adoption Index and Various Measures Risk 
0 
0.001 
0.002 
0.003 
0.004 
0.005 
0.006 
2.86 2.88 2.9 2.92 2.94 2.96 2.98 3 3.02 3.04 Techno
logy  A
doption
  Index
 
Volatility  in  Agricultural Gross  Production  Index 
0 0.001 
0.002 0.003 
0.004 0.005 
0.006 
2.86 2.88 2.9 2.92 2.94 2.96 2.98 3 3.02 3.04 Tech
nology
  Adopt
ion  
Index 
Volatility in Agricultural Gross Production Value 
0 
0.001 
0.002 
0.003 
0.004 
0.005 
0.006 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 
Techno
logy  A
doption
  
Index 
Volatility in  Agricultural Export  Value  Index 
-0.2 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 Techn
ology  A
doption
  
Index 
Volatility  In  Gross Domestic  Product 
 69 | P a g e  
 
 
Appendix 3.4: Summary Statistics for Variables Used for Empirical Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 INFL i_rate LGDP LGFCF LIF_E M3 MORT VOLEX_V VOLGDP VOLGPI VOLGPV TEL Ter. Enrol TAI  Mean 7.26 15.53 11.36 11.59 56.83 38.41 129.04 60.42 9.94 2.90 2.90 0.85 5.81 0.46  Median 8.11 16.28 11.34 11.54 57.46 41.20 124.05 55.73 9.70 2.89 2.89 0.45 5.65 0.48  Maximum 13.87 18.92 11.70 12.63 61.97 56.93 192.30 97.27 13.68 2.99 2.99 3.60 9.62 0.94  Minimum -7.63 12.08 11.03 10.51 47.82 19.42 85.00 52.14 9.57 2.88 2.88 0.16 4.78 0.04  Std. Dev. 4.33 1.62 0.19 0.65 3.66 9.36 30.92 11.28 0.76 0.03 0.03 0.91 1.12 0.27  Skewness -1.16 -0.53 0.12 0.03 -0.81 -0.30 0.49 1.78 4.20 1.77 1.77 1.74 2.33 0.10  Kurtosis 5.72 2.88 1.88 1.79 3.08 2.62 2.27 5.36 21.13 5.53 5.53 5.05 8.49 1.89  Jarque - Bera 16.01 1.42 1.65 1.84 3.30 0.65 1.87 22.77 499.29 23.71 23.71 20.40 64.97 1.61  Probability 0.00 0.49 0.44 0.40 0.19 0.72 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45  Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
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CHAPTER 4 
RISK INSURANCE AND COSTLY TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: A POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 
 
4.1 Introduction An important finding from the benchmark model presented in Chapter 3 is that adoption cost and uncertainty constrain technology adoption in developing nations. These two barriers can determine the long run growth and inequality outcomes of nations through their effects on agents’ transitional technology adoption decisions and the long run level of technology adoption. The variation in the strength of these barriers across nations usually depends on differences in institutions. More specifically, the extent to which shocks affect agents depends on the availability and accessibility of institutions (such as insurance or financial institutions) that help alleviate these shocks, or appropriate government policies that ensure that agents are insulated from the shocks. Consequently, institutional and policy reforms that help to create or develop such institutions are likely to improve technology adoption and the long run economic outcomes of a nation.   The benchmark model also shows that, given initial heterogeneity in the income distribution, the above mentioned constraints to technology adoption may worsen inequality. This is because the rich agents who can pay the adoption cost and diversify the uncertainty associated with the superior technologies can adopt more productive technologies, while the poor agents will be stuck with the risk-free, cost-free and low-productivity technology. As a result the wealth of the former group of agents increases faster than that of the latter group of agents.  This then creates conflicts among these two groups, which in turn necessitates the need for policy and institutional reforms.    However, the aforementioned reforms are often endogenous, in that they depend on the preferences of agents in the economy. Firstly, as stated in the preceding paragraph, these reforms are initiated by distributional conflicts among agents in the economy. Secondly, the success of the reforms and their influence on growth and inequality hinge on the preferences of different groups of agents in the economy and the mechanisms available to express these 
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preferences. As such, the outcomes depend on the groups of agents that either constitutes the majority or those who have greater influence in the political process underlying the determination of such reforms. It is therefore more appropriate to model institutional and policy reforms and their impact on the economic outcomes using a political economy construct. In this regard, the essay extends the benchmark models developed in Chapter 3 by incorporating political economy issues.   A number of studies attempt to explain the role of political economy issues in growth and inequality, albeit with mixed conclusions. One strand of these studies includes endogenous growth models by Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994), where agents are allowed to vote for the tax rate on capital. The political outcome in these models depends on the preferences of the median agent. In an economy with high initial inequality the median agent is poor. Consequently, the majority of the agents prefer a high capital tax rate resulting in a negative relationship between growth and initial inequality.   Another strand of political economy studies predicts that relationship between growth and initial inequality is either positive or ambiguous. One such study is by Li and Zou (1998). This study modifies the model of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) by allowing the government to be engaged in both production and consumption.24 They then show that, if the government consumption is incorporated into the preferences of the agents, the relationship between growth and inequality would either be positive or ambiguous, depending on the trade-off between private and public consumption.  Other models analyse how the adoption of new technologies affect the political economy relationship between growth and inequality. For instance, a study by Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) develops a three-period lived model where agents vote on whether to adopt new technologies or maintain the old technology. In the presence of heterogeneity in initial endowments, vested-interest groups comprising of the users of the old technology use their political influence to block the new technologies. This then results in low rates of technological change and long cycles of economic stagnation. An alternative model is a two-period lived overlapping generations model by Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2013). This model uses more general preferences, and an AK technological structure to show political outcomes which are somewhat similar to Krusell and Rios-Rull in the sense that they may slow down the pace of technological 
                                                          24 In Alesina and Rodrik (1994) the role of the government is only limited to providing the productive technology. 
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progress. However, the political outcomes of this model are based on the majority rule. The poor agents, who are unable to afford the adoption costs associated with new technology, are the majority at the early stages of the economy block the allocation of resources towards R&D. However, because this model has redistribution in the form of taxation and lump-sum transfer payments, the poor agents are able to accumulate the threshold wealth required to adopt the productive technology.  As such, all agents will eventually support allocation of resources towards R&D.   Mixed findings are also noticeable in the empirical literature. The differences in empirical results often reflect the underlying differences in the theoretical basis for the empirical models, the causality restrictions imposed in the empirical models, and the choice of inequality measures. Persson and Tabellini (1994) use a measure of inequality based on the top 20% share of income to provide evidence of an inverse relationship between growth and inequality holds for democracies, but not for non-democracies. Similarly, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) also provide evidence of a negative relationship between growth and initial inequality using measures of inequality based on the Gini coefficient and distribution of land. However, they do not find significant evidence that this relationship differs between democracies and non-democracies.   On the contrary, Clarke (1995) shows that the negative relationship between inequality and growth is neither robust across different income inequality measures, nor across specifications of the growth-inequality regressions. Other studies such Forbes (2000) provides panel regression evidence based on mostly OECD nations suggesting that growth and inequality are positively related. Li and Zou (1998) also provide evidence supportive of the positive relationship between the two variables, although they cannot rule out the fact that the relationship can also be ambiguous.  Yet another strand of empirical studies provides evidence that questions whether the relationship between growth and inequality is monotonic, as assumed in many empirical studies. For instance, Barro (2000) provides panel regression evidence consistent with the Kuznets (1955) idea that the relationship between growth and inequality is negative for the nations at early stages of development, and positive for developed nations. Similarly, using a sample comprising of developed and developing nations, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) document evidence, based on non-parametric analysis that the relationship between growth and inequality follows the Kuznets curves. However, unlike the Kuznets hypothesis where the 
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inverted U-shape results from a natural process of development, their explanation is based on the idea that, in a political economy changes in inequality from any direction will negatively affect growth. Furthermore, these authors argue that, for the relationship between growth and inequality to be captured properly, empirical analysis should not rely on models that impose linear, unidirectional, parametric structures on these two variables.    From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the relationship between growth and inequality is inconclusive both at theoretical and empirical levels. This suggests that there is scope for further research. To this end, we contribute to this debate by developing a political economy model where agents make technology adoption decisions in the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty. In this model, we extend the benchmark model by allowing for the existence of financial intermediaries that help agents to alleviate the risk associated with the superior technologies. We assume that these financial intermediaries are able to reduce this through pooling the idiosyncratic risks of agents. In order to access the financial system, agents pay a fixed entry fee and a periodic cost that varies with the return on the superior technology.   To introduce political economy issues in the model, we assume that there is a government which facilitates R&D and financial development, and redistributes wealth. The government raises its revenue by levying a constant and exogenous tax rate on agents’ wealth. Agents are then allowed to vote on the proportion of the revenue that should be spent on two competing alternatives. One alternative is a lump-sum transfer to every agent. The other is cost-reducing R&D and financial development expenditure. The voting process takes place before agents know whether they will face a good shock or a bad shock. Once voting has taken place, the proportions of revenue for the two respective alternatives above are allocated accordingly.   The presence of idiosyncratic shocks in our model entails that the changes in the preferences of the agents is non-monotonic. As a result, the effects of these changes on the political outcomes of our model are quite distinct relative to those in related literature. Our model shows that, agents at both ends of the distribution collude to block the allocation of resources towards cost-reducing R&D and financial development expenditure.25 This result is similar to the “ends against the middle” feature observed in some political economy models, for example, the model of Epple and Romano’s (1996)   
                                                          
25 As shall become clear later, the top-end (‘rich’) and the bottom-end ‘poor’ agents are defined in a relative to a certain 
threshold level of wealth that is required to access financial intermediaries. 
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A key reason for the aforementioned collusion is that agents with different wealth levels face different trade-offs, and that these trade-offs change in non-monotonic ways as wealth increases. This results in a situation where the preferences of agents from both ends of the distribution increase in lump-sum transfer faster than in the proportion allocated towards cost-reducing R&D and financial development expenditure. However, as redistribution continues, the middle of the distribution becomes successively thicker, and the majority of the agents start preferring the allocation of more funds towards cost-reducing R&D and financial development expenditure.  During the transitional process, the growth rate and inequality show patterns of recurring inverted Kuznets curves. These patterns are due to political cycles, which emanate, in part, from the group conflicting choices initiated by the presence of disparities in the initial resource endowments of agents. The political cycles are then exacerbated by the fact that the presence of uncertainty causes precautionary voting. To elaborate on this point, starting from certain initial level of inequality, unexpected shocks induce bias towards more redistribution in the next period, thus resulting in sudden reduction of inequality. However, the sudden decrease in inequality reduces the preference for redistribution in the subsequent period, thus resulting in an increase in inequality. These political cycles continue until the economy reaches the steady state which is characterised by a balanced growth rate and equitable distribution of wealth.   Further numerical experiments show that the political cycles, and the resulting sluggishness and fluctuations in transitional growth and inequality are more pronounced when initial inequality is low and shocks are large. The explanation for this is that low inequality decreases the number of agents in favour of redistribution in the form of the lump-sum transfer. This can cause an increase in inequality, which alters the majority preference in the next period, and so on. This then leads to fluctuations, and sluggish reductions in inequality. The excessive precautionary voting caused by the presence of uncertainty then exacerbates these fluctuations.   The abovementioned features of our model are quite useful in explaining why developed nations sometimes experience reversals in their path of inequality.26 According to our model, these reversals are due to the two-way link between inequality and redistribution. More specifically, a decrease in inequality resulting from high redistribution in the current period will reduce the preference for redistribution in the next period, thus resulting in an increase in 
                                                          26 Zillono document that a number of many European and European Offshoots s nations have experienced increases inequality between the early 1980s and the early 1990s. This followed a falling trend since the 1950s. 
 75 | P a g e  
 
inequality.  This explanation is in line with an observation by Zollino (2004) that the decrease in inequality in Europe resulted in reduced preference towards social welfare policies. This two-way link suggests that non-linear and non-parametric empirical models, such as those suggested by Banerjee and Duflo (2003) are more plausible in analysing the short run relationship between growth and inequality, compared to empirical models that impose linear, parametric or one-way link between the two variables.  Finally, our numerical experiments show that the political economy choices are sub-optimal in the early and transitional stages of economy. This is because they do not coincide with choices which maximize the aggregate welfare of all agents. However, once the economy reaches the steady state path, the political economy choices become optimal.   The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the economic environment and carry out some comparative static analysis with the political economy model. To shed light on the dynamics, in Section 4.3, we conduct some numerical experiments with the political economy model. We then compare the political outcomes to the welfare maximizing outcomes. In Section 4.4, we conclude the paper. The appendix presents some technical details of the analysis in Section 4.2.  
4.2 The Economic Environment We consider a two-period overlapping-generations economy with N-agents whose wealth holdings are heterogeneous. A new generation is born every period. Each ith agent is born with a unit of unskilled labour endowment that can earn them a subsistence wage w . Agents born in period t also inherit wealth from their parents in the form of bequests. Time is discrete, with t = 0, 1, 2,...., and initial distribution of wealth is described by W ( . ).    The economy has two technologies, one subject to high risk (hereafter referred to as 
Technology B) and another, that is only accessed through financial intermediaries, who are able to minimize the risk by pooling risks of all agents (hereafter referred to as Technology F). The total return on Technology B has two components and is given by tt εηϑ += , where 0>η  is a time-invariant and non-stochastic component and tε is a time-variant shock that is agent-idiosyncratic. If the agent faces a bad shock, and this occurs with the probability p, then 
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0<= lt εε , while if the agent faces a good shock 0>= ht εε . We assume that 0][ =tE ε  and 
ηε <l . The return on Technology F is similar to that of Technology B when the agent faces a good shock i.e. ht εηϑ += . However, when the agent faces a bad shock, the return on Technology 
F is φ  where ηφεη <<+ l . This modelling approach follows an idea by Townsend and Ueda (2006, 2010).  As in Townsend and Ueda (2006, 2010), agents who decide to use financial intermediaries will deposit all their wealth in financial intermediaries. However, we assume that agents cannot borrow to adopt a certain technology. Rather, financial intermediaries invest on behalf of all the agents who deposit funds with them and offer the returns as described above depending on the type of shock that an agent faces. Financial intermediaries charge two intrinsic and non-refundable costs. Firstly they charge a once-off fixed entry fee 0>ψ . This fee implicitly represents the registration and other fees that financial intermediaries incur including any mark-up they charge on customers. Secondly they charge a periodic service fee ]1,0[∈λ  , which is a constant proportion of the returns on Technology F.27 Thus if agent i uses financial intermediaries, his/her return at any time t is given by ),(max)1()( φϑλϑ ttR −= .   There is also a government in the economy. The government supervises the financial intermediaries.28 The government raises its revenue by levying a constant tax rate of τ is levied on the heterogeneous agents’ total endowment. The distribution of the agents’ total endowment is described by a density function )(.)(Wf with support ),0( κ . The total revenue that the government raises in any period is described by: 
[ ] )1(
0
(.))(.)((.) tWdWWfWtGR τ
κ
τ =










= ∫  
where ( ).W  is as defined earlier and GRt is the revenue raised in period t. The government then uses a proportion tt Wg τα=  of the funds to reduce the cost associated with registering a financial intermediary and to fund its regulatory activities. The latter cost may, for example, include things such as the cost of training a financial regulator, engaging in research and other 
                                                          
27 As we shall discuss later, ψ  is endogenous in this model. They are determined by the proportion α of government 
revenue allocated towards financial intermediation. Every period agents vote for on the desired level of α and the winning 
α becomes the proportion that the government allocates towards financial intermediation. 
28 We assume that there are extortionist elements in the financial system that would charge exorbitant fees without 
appropriate supervision. Note that we do not explicitly model financial regulation. 
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activities aimed at improving the financial system. Thus ψ  is decreasing in gt which in turn depends on α .The remainder of the revenue tt Wtr τα )1( −=  is given to all the young agents in the form of a lump-sum transfer.   In this model, we consider the following properties for the functional forms of ψ 29 
(i) .0)('';0)(' ≥< gg ψψ  (ii) 0)( =
∞→g
gψ  
The fixed cost is specified as follows: 






+
=
)1(
)(
tg
tg
ψ
ψ , where ψψ =)0( .     We assume that the tax rate τ  is exogenously determined by the government. However, the agents vote on the proportion α  that should be allocated towards cost-reducing financial development expenditure. Voting takes place at the ‘first stage’ of each period t and the political outcome is determined by majority rule.  In the “second stage” of period t, after considering the political outcome, agents now decide whether they should use financial intermediaries or not. The timing of events is as characterised by the figure below:                                                  The economy produces output (Y) using capital (K). The production functions G(K) assume a simple “AK” specification. Specifically, the production functions for Technology F is G(Kt) = BKt and for Technology B is G(Kt) = FKt, where B and F denote the respective total factor productivity parameters associated with the two technologies, and B < F.  
                                                          
29 We also explored the case where 𝜆 is endogenous. However, the results for this case were too obvious. As would be 
expected, both analytical and numerical result showed that the agents who adopt Technology F would favour the highest 
possible gt to be allocated towards the reducing 𝜆 while the agents who adopt Technology B prefer the highest possible trt. 
We provide a formal explanation in Appendix 3. 
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The agent does not consume in the first period of his life. The utilities of the agents use and those who do not use financial intermediaries are as described in equations (2) and (3), respectively: 
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In equations (2) and (3), 1+itc  and 1+itb  denote period 2 household consumption and bequests for the ith agent. Superscripts B and F simply imply that the agent adopts Technology B and Technology F, respectively, while superscripts l and h denote that the agent faces a bad shock and a good shock, respectively. The parameter 𝜃 describes the extent of imperfect intergenerational altruism in the model.   Every period each generation faces a problem regarding whether to use financial intermediaries or not. This decision depends on an agent’s resource endowment and this depends upon the resources they inherited from their parents through bequests.   Agents face different budget constraints depending on whether they use the financial intermediaries or not. The budget constraints for agents that do not use the financial intermediaries are as follows:  
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itc ταεητ −++−++−=+  The resource endowments for agents depend on whether their parents used financial intermediaries or not, in addition to the idiosyncratic shocks faced by their parents. The resource endowment for agents whose parents did not use financial intermediaries is given by 
xB
itb
xB
itWitW
,, ==  while the endowment of agents whose parents used financial intermediaries is given by xFitbxFitWitW ,, == , where x = h, l.  For agents who use financial intermediaries, the budget constraints are described as follows:  
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 Agent i’s problem is make choices of 1,1 ++ itbitc  that maximise his/her utility. More specifically, agents that do not seek financial intermediation maximise equation (2) subject to constraints (4) and (5). This yields the following optimal state-contingent consumptions and bequest plans:  
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=+  Alternatively, agents who use financial intermediaries maximise equation (3) subject to constraints (6) and (7). This yields the following optimal state-contingent consumption and bequest plans.    
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where FU and XU  represent the indirect utility functions for the agents who use financial intermediaries and agents who do not use financial intermediaries respectively and the subscript * denotes the optimal choice of the variable in question. It can then be shown that (16) implies the following (See proof in Appendix 4.1): 
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 In equation (18), the LHS gives the ratio of the expected wealth of an agent who uses financial intermediaries to the expected wealth of an agent who does not use financial intermediaries in the event that they face a bad shock. Alternatively, the RHS gives the ratio of the expected wealth of an agent who does not use financial intermediaries to the expected wealth of an agent who uses financial intermediaries in the event that they face a bad shock. Since in equation (17), the RHS > 1, it is clear that an agent will use financial intermediaries, iff the risk-alleviating benefits of financial intermediaries are such that in the event of a bad shock, the expected wealth of an agent who uses financial intermediaries will outweigh the expected wealth of an agent who does not.   We define W * as the Wit that solves equation (17).30 This W * would represent the threshold level of initial endowment that is required for an agent to enter the financial intermediary system. It is possible to gain some insight on how people vote by analysing the total change of W * with respect to changes in α . The results of the comparative static analysis presented in Appendix 4.2 show that W * is decreasing in α .31  This then suggests that agents are likely to prefer a high α  in order to enter the financial intermediary system quickly. However, this decision is not clear cut because agents also receive a lump-sum transfer payment
tWτα )1( − , which is decreasing in α . Thus agents will have to weigh the trade-off between the benefits from a reduction of W * (in the form of high expected returns from financial intermediaries) and the lump-sum transfer. This trade-off is likely to vary from agent to agent depending how close they are W *.   Thus, it is important to analyse how the indirect utilities of individual agents change as αchanges. More specifically, we compute the partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions of each agent i with respect to the parameter α i.e. ),(', ταtiV . Although it would be intuitive to argue that the rich agents would favour α > 0 (and poor people α = 0) to benefit from a reduction in entry costs, the political solution from this exercise is not conclusive because the sign of 
),(', ταtiV  is neither clear nor constant across the range of values of α. Furthermore, the presence of uncertainty in the model introduces more complexity.32 This is because W * also shifts depending on the sign of εt. More specifically, if 0<lε , W * increases while if 0>hε , W * 
                                                          
30 Intuition and numerical analysis suggest that this must be the case but it is difficult to provide formal proof. 
31 See the derivatives in Appendix 3.2. 
32 Recall that the shock is only revealed after agents have voted. 
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decreases. Based on this observation, it is intuitive to further subdivide the rich *WitW ≥ and the poor *WitW < in the four groups: (i) the poorest *WitW << who are at the lowest end of the distribution; (ii) the lower middle income *WitW < who are below but close W *; (iii) the upper middle income *WWit ≥  who are above but close to W *; (iv) the richest *WitW >> who are at the top end of the distribution.   It is then possible to draw some intuition on how the four groups of agents vote on in the presence of uncertainty. Essentially, in the presence of uncertainty, the choice of α is now motivated by two more things. Firstly, a high α that reduces W * would be useful for agents just below W * (i.e. *WitW < ) especially when they expect that 0>= ht εε  because it could give them an opportunity to enter the financial system. However, agents *WWit <<  would not benefit as they are too far below W *. Secondly, a high α that reduces W * would be useful for agents just above W* (i.e. *WitW ≥ ) especially when they expect that 0<= lt εε  because it will protect them from the possibility of exiting the financial system. However, agents with *WWit >>  would not worry about exiting financial system because they are too far above W *. In summary, the presence of uncertainty is likely to result in involuntary collusion of poorest and richest agents ( *WWit << and *WWit >> ) in favour of α = 0 and involuntary collusion of agents 
*WitW <  and *WitW ≥  to vote α > 0. This collusion of agents at both ends of the distribution to oppose the choices of the agents at the middle of the distribution is partly consistent with Epple and Romano’s (1996) idea of the ‘ends against the middle’. In what follows we now present and discuss the results from numerical experiments with our model.   
4.3 Numerical Experiments and Discussion In this section, we use numerical experiments to analyse how agents vote for their desired
α . The section is divided into two main parts. In the first part, we analyse how the winning value of α  is determined through the political process. Subsequently, we analyse the implication of the political outcome for technology adoption decisions, and the evolution of growth and inequality over time. In the second part, we then examine how the outcome of the 
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political process compares to an outcome that would result if the choice of α  was based on social welfare consideration.   The initial distribution of wealth for the reported results is assumed to be lognormal with a mean of 2. 5 and standard error of 0.4 and there are 501 agents. The parameters used are reported in Table 4.1. The parameter choices are guided by the conditions set in the Section 2. The numerical results presented are robust to sensitivity tests with different distributions and parameter values.   
4.3.1 The Political Outcome The results from the numerical experiments with the models are shown in Figure 4.1. In Figure 4.1, panel (a) shows the number of agents who use financial intermediaries versus those 
who do not. The winning values of α, and the proportion of agents voting for the winning value are shown in panels (b) and (c), respectively. Panels (d) and (e) show the implication of the political process on the transitional dynamics of inequality and growth, respectively.   These numerical results are quite consistent with the intuition set out in Section 2. As discussed in Section 2, the political outcomes of this model are determined by the battle between agents from both ends of the distribution (i.e. *WitW << and *WitW >> ), who prefer lump sum transfer payment and agents from middle of the distribution (i.e. 
** WitWandWitW ≥< ), who prefer redistribution in the form of cost-reducing financial development expenditure. Because most agents are poor in the early stages of development, the political outcome is characterized by α = 0.33    To elaborate on the reasons of the different choices made by different groups of agents above, agents at the bottom end of the distribution prefer a lump-sum transfer because a reduction in the cost of entering the financial intermediaries ( ψ ) will not help them enter the financial system since their initial endowment is too far below from the threshold level of wealth required, W*. Agents at the top end of the distribution also prefer a lump sum transfer because cause a reduction in ψ  will not benefit them much given their endowment large enough; they can still afford to use financial intermediaries even in the event of a bad shock. On 
                                                          33 Note that at some points in the early stages of the economy, the political outcome is unclear because the proportion of agents voting for the winning is below 50%. 
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the other hand, the agents at the middle of the distribution i.e. ** WitWandWitW ≥<  prefer redistribution through cost reducing expenditure for different reasons. For the former group this is because a reduction in entry cost will help them enter the financial system especially if there is a good shock. The latter group of agents (i.e. *WitW ≥ ) prefer α > 0 because of the desire to secure themselves from exiting the financial system in the event that they face a bad shock.  As redistribution of wealth through taxation and lump sum transfers continues, agents’ wealth converges towards the middle of the distribution. As such the winning value of α and the proportion of agents voting for it sharply increases (see (b) and (c)). Once all agents have entered the financial system the winning value of decreases and converge at zero.  Inequality (see panel (d)) falls sharply in the transition to the steady, although it shows patterns of recurring ‘Kuznets’ curves. The decrease in inequality is due to the redistributive effects of taxation and transfer payments and is consistent with the idea that the downward segment of the Kuznets curve is driven by political reforms (see Lindert, 1994). The latter feature is due to reserve causality between inequality and the political preference for redistribution. We explore this feature in detail in the next section.  Panel (e) shows the implication of the political process on growth. We separate the growth into three categories: the poor, representing 20% of the agents at the bottom end of the distribution, the rich, representing 20% of the agents at the top end of the distribution, and average, representing the average growth of all agents. During the early stages of the economy, the growth patterns vary across the different groups. Initially, the growth rate for richest agents is high but it gradually decreases, albeit non-monotonically. This highlights the fact that their tax payments outweigh the lump-sum transfer receipts. On the contrary, the growth rate of the poor agents start low but non-monotonically increases implying that the lump-sum transfer receipts outweigh their tax payments. The transitional path of the average growth rate seems to be driven by the growth rate of the rich agents. Eventually, the growth rates of all agents in the economy converge to a unique steady state.   Generally, the numerical results show that both inequality and average growth generally decrease in the transition to the steady state suggesting that growth and inequality are 
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positively related in the short run. However, the relationship is bidirectional and non-linear. As argued earlier, this feature of the model entail that empirical studies that impose linear and parametric relationship between growth and inequality are unlikely to appropriately capture the transitional relationship between these two variables within a political economy.   
 Figure 4.1: The political outcome  
 
4.3.2 Political Cycles, Economic Fluctuations and Sluggishness: Role of shocks and Initial Inequality A unique feature of our political economy model is that the uncertainty inherent in the productivity parameters interacts with initial inequality in a manner that produces political 
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cycles during the transitional stages of the economy. These political cycles result in a non-linear and bidirectional relationship between inequality and growth. These political cycles also slow the pace at which the economy converges towards a balanced growth path.   There are two sources of these political cycles. Firstly, they emanate from the fact that there is a two-way link between inequality and the political preference for redistribution. Given initial heterogeneity in wealth, the majority of the agents will prefer redistribution in the next period resulting in a reduction in inequality. The resulting low inequality then entails that the agents’ preference for redistribution is reduced. Consequently, inequality increases in the next period, which changes the political preference in the next period, and so on.   The second source of political cycles is the fact that uncertainty causes precautionary voting by agents with wealth close to the threshold level. To elaborate on this point, in the presence of uncertainty, agents with *WitW ≥ face two competing choices. Firstly, they face the opportunity to further increase their wealth by voting for redistribution through lump-sum transfer receipts. Their wealth would especially increase if voting for a large transfer payment is then followed by a good shock in the next period. However, there is also a risk that voting for a transfer payment instead of cost-reducing financial development expenditure would leave them vulnerable to the possibility of exiting the financial system, especially if they were to face a bad shock in the next period. Thus, until their wealth becomes secure, these agents have a tendency to exercise ‘precautionary’ voting. This entails fluctuations in their preferred α depending on their previous experience and their expectations about future shocks.   To explore the conditions under which these political cycles are more pronounced, we experiment with different levels of shocks and initial inequality. The results for the political outcomes and the economic implication of these political choices are presented in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, respectively. In Figure 4.2, we report the winning values of α and the proportion of agents voting for the winning α under of high inequality (i.e. Gini coefficient = 0.73) and low inequality (i.e. Gini coefficient = 0.11), with given levels of shocks.   The results show that when shocks have a low variance (i.e.  with 5.0;5.0 =−= hl εε ), the 
level of inequality does not seem to influence the winning value of α. However, agents reach a consensus quicker, the higher the levels of initial inequality. This is evident from the fact that the proportion of agents in favour of the winning α converges quicker when the level of initial 
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inequality is higher. Consequently, growth and inequality converge to their steady state slower relative to the case in which initial inequality is low. Furthermore, inequality shows some signs of fluctuations.   When shocks are ‘high’ ( 1;1 =−= hl εε ), the political choices significantly vary with initial levels of inequality. Low initial inequality is associated with significant political cycles. These shocks are evident from the fluctuations of both the winning α and the proportion of agents voting for the winning α. As evident from Figure 4.3, these political cycles then cause significant fluctuations in transitional growth and inequality, and delay the pace at which the economy converges to an equitable and balanced growth path.     As argued earlier, the political cycles and resulting fluctuations in growth and inequality are due to precautionary voting that results from the presence of uncertainty, and the two-way causality between inequality and political preference for redistribution. The results suggest that, if initial inequality is low, poor agents are few.  As such redistributive policies are likely to be difficult to pass. This feature of the model explains the inequality patterns of a number of developed nations. While inequality has historically decreased in developed nations, countries such as UK, Sweden and USA, Japan, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand, and Netherlands have experienced an increase in inequality between 1981 and 1992 (Smeeding, 2000; Brandolini, 1999; Zollino, 2004). A common explanation for this inversion in the trend of inequality is often based on the ‘imperfect democracy’ argument (see Benabou, 2000; Saint Paul, 2001). However, our explanation is related to an idea by Zollino (2004:8) that that endogenously determined political economy fluctuations could trap developed nations ‘in a region where inequality shrinks and enlarges periodically and counter-cyclically’.   
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 Figure 4.2: Political Cycles: Role of initial inequality and shocks  
 Figure 4.3: Economic Fluctuations and Sluggishness: Role of initial inequality and shocks 
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4.3.3 The Political Outcome versus Social Welfare Maximization In this section we compare the political economy α with the α that would result if its choice was motivated by social welfare considerations. We define social welfare maximization in the utilitarian sense, i.e. the value of α that maximizes the sum of the utilities of all agents in the economy is the welfare maximizing outcome. The numerical results from this exercise are reported in Figure 4.4. The solid line shows the winning α from the political economy, while the broken lines shows the α that would result when choice was based on the maximum of the sum of welfare of all agents.   It is interesting to note that policy choices differ between the political economy and the welfare maximization case both in the early stages of the economy, and in the transition to the steady state. At the early stages of development, the political process tends to produce a winning 
α that is significantly below the one that maximizes social welfare. The explanation for this is that at the early stages of the economy, most agents are poor and they prefer lump-sum transfer payments. As redistribution occurs through each successive generation, the middle of the distribution becomes thicker. This then explains why the winning α from the political economy moves above the α that maximizes total welfare. However, because of the precautionary behaviour of agents in the face of uncertainty as described earlier, there is a tendency for the political economy α to keep fluctuating. Once all agents enter the financial system and their wealth levels have stabilized, the winning α from the political process converges to that of the welfare maximizing case. At this stage both α’s start decreasing monotonically and eventually converge to zero.  
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4. 3.3 Policy Choice: Political Outcome versus Social Welfare Maximization Thus far, an important revelation from the numerical experiments is that certain groups block development-oriented policies especially at the early stages of the economy. This implies that policies that maximize the overall welfare of the society may continue to face resistance. The question that arises, then, is whether an economy that is run with the objectives of maximizing overall welfare results in better growth and inequality outcomes compared to a political economy.   This debate has indirect empirical relevance for some economies. An example that commonly features in the comparative economics literature is that of China and India (see Wong, 1989; Nin-Pratt et al., 2008; 2010), two economies that that are well known for the large geographical size and large population, the majority of which has remained poor during most of the twentieth century (Nin-Pratt et al., 2010). Since the late 1970s both countries embarked on rapid reforms that included accelerated industrialisation, international trade reforms, agricultural reforms, etc (Anderson, 2003). However, while China, a ‘command economy’ experienced a sevenfold increase in GDP and sustained growth in agricultural sector productivity, India, an ‘open, participatory and multiparty democracy’ only experienced a twofold increase in GDP and quite disappointing increases in agricultural sector productivity (see Nin-Pratt et al., 2010). China has also outperformed India with reference to other development indicators such as per capita GDP, life expectancy, child mortality, and human capital development as measured by adult literacy and tertiary enrolment rates.34 Some of the key explanations that have been suggested for the impressive performance of China over India include the additional institutional reforms in China that resulted in migration of labour from agriculture to other sectors of the economy (Hari, 2002).   An argument that has been made by some political analysts and academics, then, is that given its ‘command economic system’, China might have managed to implement growth-oriented policies relatively easily while India, a ‘multiparty democracy’ might have found it difficult to implement growth-oriented reforms due to opposition from lobbies and interest groups (see Huang, 2011). To some extent this argument has indirect support from the analysis that follows. Specifically, we compare the outcomes of the political economy case with that which would prevail if a social planner maximized the collective welfare of all agents in the economy. While we do not claim that the latter case proxies a ‘command economy’ in the style of 
                                                          34 The conclusion here is based on comparing the two nations using data from the World Bank (2012), World Development Indicators. 
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China, the analysis below does serve to highlight that the endogeneity of policies that is typical in democracies may result in ‘sub-optimal’ outcomes.   Figure 4.5 compares the growth and inequality outcomes of a political economy to those of an economy that is run on social welfare considerations. Panel (a) compares technology adoption decisions, panel (b) compares the transitional dynamics of inequality, and panels (c) and (d) compare the transitional behaviour of average growth, under the two policy choices. In all the panels, the solid line represents the political economy outcomes and the broken line represents the social welfare outcomes.  It is evident that the timing of technology adoption does not seem to differ much between these two cases. However, the transitional behaviour of both growth and inequality differ. Inequality tends to converge to the steady state quicker under the welfare-maximizing economy than the political economy. Moreover, because the welfare-maximizing choices are more likely to result in the pooling of the risks faced by individual agents, the convergence of inequality to the steady state is much smoother, while under the political economy, the convergence is non-monotonic. The same can be said with regards to the average growth rate. However, the transitional fluctuations in the political economy are not significantly larger relative to the welfare maximizing case. Furthermore, the two outcomes eventually converge once the economy reaches its steady state.  
      Figure 4.5: Political Process versus Central Planner under endogenous entry cost 
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4.4 Concluding Remarks This essay contributes to the growing body of literature that analyses the role of political economy issues in the trade-off between growth and inequality. We develop an endogenous growth model where agents vote on their preferred mode of redistributing wealth. In the model, agents adopt a high-risk, high-return technology either directly or indirectly through the financial system. Financial intermediaries are able to alleviate risk through risk pooling. On average, agents who use the financial system earn higher returns. However, the use of the financial system is subject to entry and periodic costs, with the former cost depending on the proportion of government revenue spent on supervising and developing the financial system. This proportion in turn depends on the preference of the agents in the economy who express their preferences by voting between distributing government revenue through cost-reducing financial development expenditure and lump sum transfers. The political outcome is mostly based on the majority rule.  The analytical and numerical results show that agents at the bottom end and the top end of the distribution form a majority that blocks expenditures towards cost-reducing financial development during the early stages of the economy. This collusion emanates from the fact that agents with different wealth levels face different trade-offs, and these trade-offs change in non-monotonic ways as wealth increases. This then results in a situation where agents at both ends of the distribution benefit more from a lump sum transfer than from cost-reducing financial development expenditure. However, as redistribution continues through generations, the middle of the distribution becomes successively thicker and the majority of the agents start supporting policies aimed at cost-reducing financial development expenditure.   Our model shows a unique feature of political cycles. These cycles then cause ‘Kuznets’ curves patterns in transitional growth and inequality, resulting in a bidirectional and non-linear relationship between these variables. Furthermore, these cycles delay the pace at which the economy converges to its balanced growth path. These cycles partly emanate from the two-way link between changes in inequality and the political preference for redistribution, but are further exacerbated by the fact that the presence of shocks results in precautionary voting. The political cycles, the resulting fluctuations in growth and inequality, and the delay in convergence towards the steady state are more pronounced the lower the initial inequality. This highlights the idea that when inequality is low, poor agents are few and thus there is little support for redistribution through a lump-sum transfer payment.   
 92 | P a g e  
 
 Finally, the results show that the political outcomes do not coincide with the welfare maximising outcomes during the early and the transitional stages of the economy. This is in line with the idea that interest groups in the economy slow the pace of technological advancement (see Krusell and Rios-Rull, 1996). However, once there are more agents are in the middle of the distribution, the political process tends to produce outcomes that are supportive of development, although this is subject to periodic reversals. The political economy outcomes only converge to the welfare maximising outcomes once the economy has reached its steady state path.                         
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Appendix 4.1: Proof of Equation (19) Agents invest in project B iff indirect utility of project B is greater that indirect utility of project A. This implies that agents invest in project B  
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Now rewriting hXitlXithFitlFit cccc ,1,1,1,1 ,,, ++++  in terms of their definitions in steady state equations (10), (11), (14), (15) and given that there exist a level of endowment W* that equates the LHS to the RHS, we can obtain equation (19).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94 | P a g e  
 
 
Appendix 4.2: Comparative Statics Analysis Assuming that W* exist, we can rewrite equation (19) in logarithmic form as follows:  LHS:  −+++−− −−++−− ))1(()*)(()1(ln)())1(()*)(1()1(ln tWWwlptgttWWwp αεητψαλφτ   RHS:  −−+++−−−− −+++−− )())1(()*))()(1()1(ln)1())1(()*))(()1(ln)1( tgttWWwhptWWwhp ψαεηλταεητ   Then taking the total derivative of W* with respect to α, simplifying and collecting like terms will yield the following will then yield the following for the LHS: 35   
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It is convenient to interpret the first fraction in the brackets as some weighted average consumption for an agent i who seek financial intermediation and the second term as some weighted average consumption for an agent i who do not seek financial intermediation after multiplying the consumption under each state with the net return on investment under that state. Since the model is such that the agents who use financial intermediaries are on average better off than agents who do not use financial intermediaries, it is easy to see that the above expression is greater than zero.   For the RHS we obtain the following:  
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Here we can interpret first fraction in the brackets as some weighted average consumption for an agent i who seek financial intermediation and the second term as some weighted average consumption for an agent i who do not seek financial intermediation each multiplied by government revenue. Since, the first term is greater than the second term, the sign of the above expression is inferred from the third term. Since 0)(' <tgψ , the third expression is less than zero. Thus, 0* <
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35 Notice that by using the steady state consumption functions in equations (10) to (19), it is possible to write each of the 
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Appendix 4.3: Changes in Indirect Utility Functions (IUF) with respect to α when λ is endogenous 
All agents *WitW < will adopt Technology X. Thus their preferences are characterised by equation (2).   
)ln()1()ln()ln()1()ln( ,1
,
1
,
1
,
1
hX
it
lX
it
hX
it
lX
it bpbpcpcp ++++ −++−+ θθ  Recognising that 11 ++ = itit cb θ , we can substitute for 1+itb  and using the laws of logarithms and then simplifying, we can obtain the following indirect utility function:   
θθθθ ln)ln()1()1()ln()1( ,1
,
1 ++−++ ++
hX
it
lX
it cpcp   Now we can substitute for lXitc ,1+  and hXitc ,1+  using their optimal consumptions equations (10) and (11) to obtain the following:   
[ ] [ ] θθαεητθαεητθα ln))1(()()()1(ln)1)(1())1(()()()1(ln)1()( +−+++−+−+−+++−+= tWitWwhptWitWwlpxIUF  Now differentiating with respect to α and simplifying we can get the FOC for IUFx  
0
,
1
,
1
),1)1(
,
1()( <
+⋅+
+−++−=
∂
∂
lX
itC
hX
itC
lX
itCp
hX
itpCWxIUF τ
α
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αFIUF  Therefore, if λ is endogenous and ψ is exogenous, the political economy is characterised by agents *WitW <  voting α = 0 and agents *WitW > voting α > 0.     
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CHAPTER 5: 
GLOBALISATION AND EFFICIENT SECTORAL REALLOCATION OF CAPITAL: 
EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA   
5.1 Introduction  The role of reallocation of resources in enhancing productivity growth and long run economic growth has been emphasized in various strands of literature. This literature stems from an idea in the classical literature on economic growth and development that structural change is intrinsic to the process of growth and development (Clark, 1940; Kuznets, 1966; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975; Timmer, 1998). According to this idea, the take-off of nations from underdevelopment to a balanced growth path is associated with a reallocation of resources from non-productive to productive sectors of the economy. Typically, this take-off begins with productivity increases in the agricultural sector, which is usually made possible by the adoption of modern agricultural technologies. Sufficient increases in agricultural productivity then facilitates the releasing of resources towards the manufacturing sector, after which the services sector follows.   Maddison (1997) and Temple (2001) provide evidence that the majority of developed nations in Europe and European Offshoots experienced inter-sectoral reallocation of labour in the fashion prescribed in the classical development-economics literature, particularly in the post-World War II period. Robinson (1971) provides empirical evidence suggesting that the gains from reallocation of resources are much larger for nations at the early stages of development than for developed nations. In support of this idea, Cortuk and Singh (2011) show evidence that reallocation of labour was among the key drivers of growth in India for the period 1988 - 2007.   Nevertheless, because some nations do not necessarily follow the pattern of development suggested in the classical development literature, it has been accepted that the growth-enhancing reallocation of resources does not only result from the reallocation in the classical pattern, but any form of reallocation that exploits productivity differences among 
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firms/sectors.36 In line with this idea, Feder (1986) uses Robinson’s (1971) model to provide cross-sectional evidence suggesting that reallocation of resources from low productivity non-export sectors to high productivity export sectors results in large gains in growth.   Other studies attempt to quantify the contribution of allocation of resources to economic growth. One such study is Fan et al. (2003), which develops a model and uses it to show that approximately 17% of China’s growth between 1978 and 1995 was attributed to reallocation of resources from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors of the economy. In similar spirit, Pagés (2010) shows that approximately half of the 4% productivity growth in Latin America between the period 1950 – 1975 was attributed to the reallocation of resources from non-productive to productive sectors.  Given the role that the reallocation of resources plays in enhancing productivity and economic growth, understanding the factors that drive efficient reallocation of resources becomes of relevance to policy. In the economic development literature, this reallocation of resources is initiated by productivity increases in the primary sector, which then pushes labour from the primary sector towards other sectors. Formal models supportive of this idea include Matsuyama (1992), Laitner (2000), Caselli and Coleman (2001), and Gollin et al. (2002). An alternative explanation is offered in models such as Lewis (2008) and Hansen and Prescott (2002). In these models, structural transformation is set in motion by an increase in productivity in the modern sectors, which then pulls resources away from the primary sectors of the economy.    However, implicit in the aforementioned resource reallocation is the availability of appropriate signals which guide resources towards the sectors where resources are valued the most.  Ensuring the availability of appropriate signals is important because the misallocation of resources, in the form of either output or welfare losses, is costly. For instance, Swiecki (2012) provides quantitative model-based evidence suggesting that domestic inter-sectoral misallocation of resources can result in approximately 6.6 percentage points loss in the welfare gains from trade. Furthermore, because reallocation of resources is subject to an adjustment 
                                                          36 See, for instance Lahiri and Ratnasiri (2013) the case of India, where productivity gains in agriculture due to 1960s and 70s green revolution was followed by a services-sector led ‘revolution’, before the and not the manufacturing sector, as prescribed by the classical literature. 
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cost, misallocation would double this adjustment cost as these resources would need to be reallocated.37   The aforementioned signals for resource allocation often emanate from the availability of well integrated factor, product and financial markets. Consequently, reforms aimed at improving the functioning of these markets could improve the allocation of resources. To that end, a strand of literature has analysed the impact of a broad range of economic, institutional, and policy reforms. For instance, Brown and Earle (2008) document evidence that the post-reform contribution of resource reallocation to productivity growth in six former socialist nations exceeded that of market economies.    The reforms that we are particularly concerned with in the current essay are those aimed at the financial sector because these were the main reforms in South Africa, and they were preceded by very restrictive financial policies.38 We collectively term these reforms ‘financial globalisation’.39 Typically, these reforms improve the functioning of the financial system, thereby enhancing efficient allocation of capital through various channels. These channels include minimising asymmetric information, facilitating better choice of investment projects, enhancing the insurance and diversification of risk thereby encouraging agents to invest in high-risk, high-return projects (Obstfeld, 1994), and reducing the adjustment cost associated with the reallocation of resources. There is evidence suggesting that a well-functioning financial system enhances two key drivers of long term growth, innovation and technological progress (see Ang and Madsen, 2012).     There is also consensus that reforms result in increased inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (see Kose et al., 2006 and references therein). FDI then improves the allocation of capital through two main channels. Firstly, it brings with it managerial and technological expertise, investment in research and development, education and on-the-job training, all of which will potentially result in efficiency, productivity and other external spillovers to the whole economy  (Bailliu, 2000, Agénor, 2003, Kose et al., 2006). Secondly, FDI often involves setting up operations in emerging and developing countries, which help foster 
                                                          37 The adjustment cost associated with the reallocation of labour is emphasized in the dynamic models of Steger (2003), Mussa (1978), and Kemp and Wan (1974), while the adjustment cost associated with the reallocation of capital is emphasized in dynamic models of Hayashi (1982), and Abel and Blanchard (1983). 38 Although the financial reforms are the main focus, our empirical analysis also accounts for other reforms such as trade reforms, political reforms, and other macroeconomic reforms.  39 In this study, the terms financial globalisation, financial liberalisation and financial reforms are interchangeably used to refer to liberal financial reforms. 
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competition among domestic firms forcing them to develop new and efficient methods of production, and to train their employees to stay in touch with new technologies (Agénor, 2003).   A number of empirical studies are of relevance to the current essay. For instance, Cho (1980) provides evidence that allocation efficiency, as measured by the variability of borrowing costs across sectors, improves after liberalisation. However, this measure is unreliable if capital allocation does not solely depend on economic factors (see Abiad et al., 2008). Studies by Harrison et al. (2004) and Forbes (2007) use a measure as of efficient allocation of capital based on the sensitivity of investment to cash flows. They find evidence that capital account restrictions and/or taxes on capital flows are associated with the worsening of the allocation of capital. Using the same measure, Forbes (2007) and Leaven (2003) provide evidence that the efficiency-allocation benefits of financial reforms are stronger for small firms than for big firms. Nevertheless, this measure is problematic when the sensitivity of investment to cash flows changes non-monotonically with financial frictions, which is often the case (see Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000; Stein, 2003).   Studies such as Wurgler (2000) and Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) use a measure of efficiency that is based on assessing whether new investment flows from sectors with low changes in value added to sectors with high changes in value added. Wurgler (2000) provides evidence that this measure is positively associated with financial deepening. Similarly, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2004) document evidence that this measure is negatively associated with state ownership, but positively associated with a developed and well-functioning stock market, and minority investor protection. Galindo et al. (2007) use two measures of efficiency based on comparing firms’ marginal products of capital to a benchmark that would result if capital were allocated according to firm size, to show that financial globalisation is associated with improvements in the reallocation of capital across firms in 12 developing countries. Similarly, Abiad et al. (2008) provide cross-country panel evidence that financial globalisation has efficiency-reallocation effects, using a measure based on the dispersion of firms’ Tobin’s Q’s from their optimal level.    As evident, the majority of the studies on the reallocation effects of reforms have not explicitly explored inter-sector reallocation, but rather focussed on economy wide firm-level reallocation. Consequently, it is difficult to interpret these studies in the context of the resource reallocation narrative that is implied in the classical development-economics literature. 
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Furthermore, majority of these studies focus on cross-country panel evidence. A potential issue with such analysis is that reforms are often endogenous, in the sense that they originate from the preferences of different stakeholders (e.g. consumers, firms, government, etc), which in turn depend on country-specific factors. Moreover, the nature of the reaction of different stakeholders and the mechanisms through which such reactions are expressed are key elements that determine the effects of these reforms on the allocation of capital. Because these issues differ across nations, cross-country analysis may distort country specific issues.   To this end, the current essay contributes to the growing literature on the reallocation effects of financial reforms by focussing on the intra-sector and inter-sector reallocation of capital.40 We use a measure of efficiency based on the dispersion of marginal returns to capital. We specifically examine the case of an emerging economy, viz. South Africa, which has not received similar empirical attention. The choice of South Africa is motivated by the fact that it is an emerging economy which has experienced a series of rapid financial, legal, policy and institutional reforms since the early 1990s. The fact that these reforms were preceded by very restrictive financial policies during the pre-1994 political democratisation makes South Africa an interesting case study.41   South Africa is also an interesting case for two other reasons. Firstly, it is the largest economy on the African continent as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Secondly, its financial system is, by far the largest on the African continent. More specifically, South Africa’s four banks are ranked the top 4 largest in Africa by both total assets and capital (see Bankers Almanac, 2012) and its stock market is also by far the largest stock market in Africa as measured by market capitalisation and market turnover. South Africa is the only country from the Sub-Saharan countries with data that is adequate enough to allows us to perform a meaningful analysis. Furthermore, there is preliminary graphical, descriptive and prima facie evidence from South Africa that suggests that the pre-1990s financial restriction and the post-
                                                          40 The term intra-sector reallocation relates to reallocation within a specific sector. We consider four sectors which include: primary, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, services. Further elaboration on the type of firms that each sector is composed of is provided in Section 5.3.3. Inter-sector reallocation relates to reallocation between firms in any two sectors, for example, reallocation between primary and manufacturing, between primary and retail and wholesale, between primary and services. Based on this, there are 6 combinations that form inter-sector.     41 In Appendix 5.3, we provide a summary of the financial policies (restrictions and reforms) from the late 1960s to 
2007. This summary is based on sources as the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange (JSE), South African National Treasury, and other authors such as Farrell and Todani (2006), Casteleign (2001), 
Loots (2002) and Stals (1997), etc.  
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1990s financial reforms might have affected the sectoral/industrial allocation of resources.42 We provide this preliminary evidence in the next Section 5.2.  Our focus on intra-sector and inter-sector aspects of efficient reallocation of capital yields dividends in the form of some striking differences and additional findings relative to previous studies. Firstly, our intra-sector coefficients are smaller than the inter-sector coefficients, which in turn are smaller than the economy-wide firm level coefficients of Abiad et al. (2008). The implication of this finding is that factors that promote market concentration and barriers to entry or exit from a sector may limit the resource reallocation benefits of financial globalisation. Thus, any forms of natural, geographical, or institutionalised monopolies, and/or any other forms of collusions that distort the free flow of resources across sectors should be dismantled.    Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that the impact of financial globalisation on efficient reallocation of capital is marginally stronger among firms within the modern sectors of the economy (services and manufacturing) than in the primary sector. The results for the inter-sector reallocation show that reallocation from the primary sector to the other sectors of the economy is subject to inefficiency, raising concerns regarding whether SA might have failed to satisfy some of the pre-conditions for takeoff as suggested in the development economics literature. Firstly, SA might have failed to properly channel the early productivity gains from the primary sector towards the development of other sectors of the economy due to inappropriate policies. Secondly, SA might have failed to achieve the structural transformation that is considered necessary for economic development – namely maintaining the productivity of the primary sector at sufficiently higher levels and progressively integrating the sector into the macro-economy ensure that resources continue to move towards the modern sectors of the economy. In Section 5.2, we provide preliminary evidence suggesting that South Africa failed to maintain productivity in the primary sector high enough to ensure that resources keep flowing towards other sectors of the economy.   Thirdly, the inclusion of institutional quality, in the form of controlling of corruption, ensuring political stability, rule of law, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, and government effectiveness as control variables adds an interesting dimension to the existing 
                                                          
42 Because most of the reforms took place after the 1994 political democratisation of South Africa, we use 1994 as the cut 
off year. Thus the context in which the terms pre-reform and post-reform are used is with reference to the period before 
and after 1994 respectively.  
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literature on the reallocative effects of financial globalisation.43 The results suggest that the benefits of financial globalisation seem to diminish once institutional quality is controlled for. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that financial globalisation enhances institutional quality as some authors have argued (e.g. Kose et al., 2006). This implies that for a country to sufficiently reap the benefits of financial globalisation, commitment to institutional quality should precede financial reforms. Finally, there is also evidence to suggest that reallocation benefits of financial globalisation may also manifest indirectly through augmentation of the domestic financial institutions.  The remainder of the essay is organised as follows. In Section 5.2, we present some preliminary evidence suggesting that the aforementioned reforms might have improved reallocation of capital in South Africa. In Section 5.3, we outline the theoretical basis for our empirics. In Section 5.4, we outline the empirical methodology and data. In Section 5.5, we present and discuss our empirical findings. Section 5.6 concludes the paper.   
5.2 Background and Preliminary Analysis This section presents some preliminary evidence that is consistent with reallocation of capital in South Africa. We analyse data on value added, productivity growth, and Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF). The data was sourced from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and the United Nations General Industrial Statistical panel (INDSTAT-3) Databases.   Figure 5.1 presents the percentage changes in GFCF for the mining, agriculture, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and transport and communication sectors of the SA economy.44 The plot shows that growth in GFCF was very volatile for the pre-reform period, but became quite stable in the post-reform period. We believe that volatility in growth of GFCF from period to period implies agents may have overinvested/underinvested in a sector in a certain period. When they realise this, they then move capital from overinvested to under invested sectors in the next period. In order to make these decisions, investors need properly functioning market signals. In instances where market signals are not working properly, investors may potentially move more/less capital than necessary between underinvested and overinvested 
                                                          
43 La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) postulate that good legal systems which enforce private property rights, support private 
contractual arrangements, and protect the legal right of investors, enhance investment. Galindo et al. (2007) attempt to test 
this hypothesis, but due to data constraints they resort to comparing the countries that use English Common Law against 
those that do not. However, they found that the countries with an English Common Law background have better investor 
protection than those with other forms of law.  44 Note that we only analyse the sectors for which data is available. 
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sectors resulting in high changes in GFCF. Consequently the reduction of volatility in growth of GFCF might be reflective of the fact that market signals started working better and quicker in the post-reform than the pre-reform period. It is also evident that the growth in GFCF for the primary sector (mining and agriculture sectors) is below that of other sectors in the post-reform period.   In Figure 5.2 we plot the percentage growth in value added for the period 1961 – 2009 for the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Very little distinguishes the growth in value added to the growth in GFCF. Firstly, the growth in value added for the primary sector seems to dominate those of the secondary and the tertiary sectors for the pre-reform period, but the opposite happens for the post-reform period. The sudden decrease in growth in value added of the primary sector in the early 1990s might have been due to the abandonment of directed credit and other financial subsidies that the primary sector was getting during the pre-reform period. This might have then resulted in the exodus of resource from the primary sector to the other sectors of the economy. Secondly, the growth in value added especially for the primary sector seems to be less volatile in the post-reform period. We believe that the same explanation as suggested earlier for the reduction in volatility of the growth of GFCF is also applicable here.   Figure 5.3 and 5.4 plots growth in labour productivity in the non-agricultural and agricultural sectors respectively.45 As evident from Figure 5.3 and 5.4, growth in labour productivity was much higher in the agricultural than the non-agricultural sectors between 1970 and 1990. Of interest is the sharp increase in productivity in the former sector for the period 1965-1990 followed by the sharp decline in 1990-1994. This sharp decline and the subsequent low growth in agricultural productivity in the post 1990 period raises a question about the role played by preferential credit treatment and subsidies that this sector received in the pre-reform period. Furthermore, the subsequent and sustained increase in the productivity of non-agricultural sectors suggests that the earlier (1965-1990) increase in agricultural productivity might have prompted the release of resources from the latter sector to the former sectors.   It is also interesting that agricultural productivity recovered after 1994 when full-fledged reforms started. Since then productivity in both sectors of the economy has remained positive, albeit higher for the non-agricultural sectors. However caution should be taken in inferring 
                                                          45 Due to data constraint,s Figure 1d is directly adopted from a study by Ramaila et al. (2011, p. 7) published by the South African Department of Agriculture (SADA). 
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efficiency in the allocation of capital from the post-reform growth in labour productivity. Theoretically, improvements in labour productivity may result from better combinations of labour and capital used in the production function.  Next we attempt to examine whether the changes in value added are contemporaneously related to the changes in GFCF. To this end we use a measure of capital allocation efficiency suggested by Wugler (2000). The measure (hereafter referred as EFF) is based on dividing the percentage change in value added by the percentage change in GFCF.46 The summary descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) based on this measure are presented in Table 5.1. We first present the statistics for the overall period and then statistics for the two sub-periods (i.e. pre-reform and post-reform). The statistics for the overall period show that this measure is on average positive for all the sectors except for the mining sector. Generally, the average EFF is highest in the tertiary sectors of the economy (i.e. wholesale & retail trade and transport & communication sectors). The standard deviations of the measure for the tertiary sector are lower than those of the other sectors. Generally these results show that changes in value added are positively associated with changes in GFCF, which suggests efficient allocation of capital. Comparing the pre-reform and post-reform statistics, it is evident that EFF increased in all the sectors for the post-reform period, except for the mining sector. Furthermore, the variability of returns for the tertiary and the secondly sectors decreased in the post-reform period suggesting an improvement in efficiency.  Next, we attempt to link the changes in EFF to changes in bank credit to the private sector as percentage of GDP (an indirect proxy of the financial reforms) by analysing the correlation between the two for the pre-reform period, post-reform period and the entire period. The correlation coefficients are reported in Table 5.2. The results show a mixed picture. For the entire 1963 – 2009 period, the correlation between EFF and a proxy of financial reforms for the primary sector is negative, while it is positive for the other sectors. When the period is divided between pre-reform and post-reform, the results change. For the pre-reform period, the correlation is negative for all the sectors, except for the manufacturing sector. For the post-reform period, correlation is positive for all sectors except for the mining and agricultural sectors. However, the correlation coefficients for all sectors suggest an improvement in allocation of capital in the post-reform period. 
                                                          46More specifically, the formula is as follows: )1ln(/)1ln( −−−−= tItItVtVEFF , where Vt and Vt-1 represent current period and previous period value added and It and It-1 represent period and previous GFCF, respectively. 
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  Thus far, the preliminary analysis suggests that there is possible improvement in the allocation of capital. Nevertheless, there is need for further formal tests, which is the subject of the next sections.   
     Figure 5.1. Percentage Growth in GFCF (1963-2009)     Figure 5.2. Percentage Growth in Value Added (1963-2009) Data Source: South African Reserve Bank    Data Source: South African Reserve Bank          
  Figure 5.3. Growth in Labour Productivity in the          Figure 5.4. Growth in Agricultural Productivity (1910-2008) Non-Agricultural Sector (1970-2010)   Source: Ramaila et al. (2011, p7), SADA Data Source: South African Reserve Bank   Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics on EFF 
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 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Overall 0.046 0.402 -0.024 0.401 0.173 0.431 0.135 0.311 0.055 0.328 1963 – 1993 0.038 0.387 0.044 0.371 0.139 0.448 0.079 0.327 -0.008 0.361 1994 – 2009 0.048 0.440 -0.148 0.440 0.237 0.443 0.238 0.258 0.168 0.226   Table 5.2: Correlation between the Log of FD and EFF Period Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Wholesale &Retail Transport & Communication 
Overall -0.009 -0.219 0.199 0.235 0.216 1963 – 1993 -0.113 -0.143 0.042 -0.217 -0.197 1994 – 2009 -0.038 -0.074 0.481 0.384 0.098   
5.3 Theoretical Framework Following Lucas (1967) and Abiad et al. (2008), we begin by considering the following profit function for a competitive firm that faces adjustment costs of investment as it responds to changes in demand and whose production technology follows constant returns-to-scale.47 
)1()(),(),( ttttttt RKIwLLKpFLK −−−= φπ  
where ),( tt LKπ denotes the profit function, p is the price faced in the output market,  
),( tt LKF is production function that is linearly homogenous in labour tL , capital tK , and investment tI . R and w are the factor incomes for capital and labour, respectively. The production function is increasing and concave in both factor inputs, i.e. 0;0 '' >> kl ff  and 
0;0;0 '''''' <<< klkl fff , respectively and capital accumulation follows the standard adjustment process, ttt IKK +−= −1)1( δ , where δ  a constant rate of depreciation. Capital accumulation is subject to an adjustment cost )( tIφ , which is increasing and convex in investment i.e. 0)(' >tIφ ; 
0)('' >tIφ .  Perfectly competitive firms maximise equation (1) subject to the capital accumulation process. The conditions that characterize the steady state are:   
)2()('),( *** RILKfMP kk =−= φ  
)3(),( ** wLKfMP ll ==  
                                                          
47 The discussion here closely follows Abiad, et al. (2008). 
 107 | P a g e  
 
)4(** IK =δ  The investment decisions of firms are uniquely characterised by the above steady state conditions. Particular emphasis in the current study is on how R determines the allocation of capital. Assuming that )(' *Iφ ’s were equal across firms, then all firms’ investment decisions would be closely tied to the rental rate of capital R, which under competitive conditions, is equal across all firms.48 However, if the government intervenes in the financial sector, for instance by controlling credit allocation, interest rates or restrictions/taxes on of foreign capital, distortions are likely to arise.49 Firms are then likely to face different levels of R depending on how each is affected by these interventions and how financially connected they are. Firms that benefit from these interventions or that are financially connected face Rlow < R while firms that are disadvantaged will face Rhigh > R. This result in misallocation of capital as firms facing Rlow will overinvest and get low kMP  while firms facing Rhigh will under-invest and get a high kMP .   The extent of the misallocation caused by these government interventions are reflected by the variability of individuals firms’ sMP k '  around the optimal kMP . 50 The higher the variability the worse are these distortions. A reduction in this variability would signal an improvement in allocation of capital. Thus, the current study aims to examine whether financial globalisation is associated with an improvement in allocation of capital as shown by a reduction in variability of individual firms’ kMP after controlling for other determinants of this variability.   
5.4 Empirical Methodology 
 
5.3.1 Measuring Efficient Allocation of Capital Building on the theoretical framework discussed above, we seek to capture the idea of reallocation of capital as the variation of the marginal returns to capital across firms within a particular sector. An appropriate way of empirically capturing this is by examining the dispersion of the ex-ante expected marginal returns to capital. A commonly used measure of the expected returns to capital the Tobin’s Q (hereafter refer as Q) and it is computed as follows: 
                                                          
48 We assume that there are no financial frictions. 
49 A large body of literature has shown that financial liberalisation reduces these distortions (see McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 
1973; Gertler and Rose, 1994; Obstfeld, 1994; Phelan, 1995). 
50 Note that variability may also emanate from productivity shocks and other factors. As shall be seen later, the other 
factors that may influence variability in returns are controlled for in the empirical exercise. 
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)5(
Capital  theofCost t Replacemen
Capital sFirm' of ueMarket val' =QsTobin  
The market value of the firm’s capital comprises of the market value of its equity (stock market capitalisation) and the market value of its debt securities. The replacement cost of capital is given by the sum of the value of all its tangible and intangible assets. Assuming that there are no measurement errors and that markets are functioning perfectly, the equilibrium value of the Q should be unity and any short term deviation are quickly arbitraged away by rent-seeking investors or mergers (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002).  Q may vary from unity due to such issues as measurement errors, financial constraints, and market imperfections (Blanchard et al., 1993). Moreover, due data constraints, the marginal Q can only be indirectly approximated using the average Q.51 Because not all variations of the Q are attributed to variations in the marginal returns across firms, it is essential to control for excess variation. Following Abiad et al. (2008), these adjustments are made through the estimating the following regression: 
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where siq is the logarithm of the average Q for firm i=1...I, in sector s, Agei is the difference between the current year and the year of establishment of firm i, Li/Ai and (Li/Ai)2 denote the value and the squared value of the liabilities-to-asset ratio for firm i, a proxy for debt-overhang, to accommodate for the possibility that the probability of default non-linearly increases with debt-asset ratio (Abiad et al., 2008). Industryi,k is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if firm i belongs to industry k and 0 otherwise, ei is the component of qi that is not explained age, debt overhang, and industry.  
The adjusted Q of each firm i in sector s, ∧siq is then computed as follows:  
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 The measure of efficiency is now based on the dispersion of the adjusted Q across firms. We use measures of dispersion based on the Gini coefficient, the mean logarithm of deviations, 
                                                          
51 There are many adjustment which we did in line with Abiad et al. (2008) e.g. adjustment for depreciation of assets, for 
cumulative inflation, etc. Also see Blanchard et al. (1993); Chari and Henry (2004b) for other adjustments. 
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Theil index, and the coefficient of variation. A decrease in the dispersion of the adjusted Q across firms entails the worsening of efficiency in reallocation of capital, vice versa.  
5.3.2 Measuring Financial Globalisation Measuring financial globalisation appropriately is important as some views in the literature allege that differences in results on the growth-enhancing effects of financial globalisation can be partly traced to differences in its measurement (see Prasad et al., 2004; Kose et al., 2006; Henry, 2007). The convention in most studies is to either use measures based on whether the pre-requisites for financial globalisation are met (de jure measures) or measures based on whether the outcomes of financial globalisation are evident in the financial system (de 
facto measures).52 However, because financial globalisation is a gradual process that involves both de jure and de facto elements, there is an increasing consensus among researchers that an appropriate measure of financial globalisation should capture both the de jure and the de facto elements, and the gradual process that financial globalisation manifests. For this reason, and following a trend in recent literature (see Demetriades and Luintel, 2001; Laeven, 2003, and Ang and McKibbin, 2007), we construct a measure that takes into account the interaction between the de jure and de facto elements and also the gradual process in which SA’s financial system has been integrated into the world.   We track financial restrictions/reforms in the SA financial system and financial markets since 1969. These restrictions/reforms are with regards to interest rates (INT), entry into the banking sector (EBB), prudential regulation of banks (PDR), credit controls (CC), the stock market (SM), and controls on foreign exchange and capital (FEC).We then allocate values from 0 (representing extreme restriction) to 1 (representing no restriction and full institutional reforms). Intermediate values of 0.33 and 0.50 and 0.66 are allocated to years depending on the extent of restrictions/reform and whether the removal of restrictions was completed with institutional improvements. For instance, in 1986 credit controls were partly removed, but because the majority of the SA population was financially excluded, we allocate a value of 0.33. Similarly, foreign capital inflows and exchange rate controls were loosened in 1983, but because SA was under international sanctions, we allocate a value of 0.5. We then use the Principal 
                                                          
52 Readers who require a detailed understanding of the different measures of FG and their strength and weaknesses are 
referred to studies such as Chinn and Ito (2008), Kose et al. (2006), Montiel and Reinhart (1999). 
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Component Analysis (PCA) to extract a single measure of financial globalisation that represents all the five forms of reforms/restrictions.53  To examine whether this measure captures both the de jure and the de facto elements of financial globalisation, we examine its pairwise correlation with the two latter measures. These results are reported in Table 5.3. As evident in Table 5.3, our measure of financial globalisation is highly correlated with all the de jure and de facto measures.  Table 5.3: Correlation between the Financial Globalisation measure and the de jure and de facto measures 
  
De facto 
measures 
     
De jure 
measure 
 Net Capital Flows Gross FDI inflows Net FDI inflows Gross PE inflows Net PE inflows Gross PD inflows Net PD inflows  DUMMY1995 FG 0.76 0.911 0.84 0.87 0.80     0.91   0.90      0.831 
 
5.3.3 Data and Data Sources  To compute the measures of reallocation of capital, we use a panel of firm-level balance sheet and income statement data for firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). The data cover eighteen years for the period 1991-2008 and was sourced from the Bloomberg Database. The data on the other control variables used were sourced from the International Financial Statistics and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) databases.   Since all the firms are listed their financial statements are prepared and audited according to International Accounting Reporting Standards (IARS) as required by the regulator of the JSE. Consequently the reliability and comparability of the data across firms and sectors is not a concern. However, the exclusion of non-listed companies which are the potential beneficiaries of financial globalisation poses some concerns.54 As a standard in related studies, we exclude financial firms as they are the ones that perform role of allocating capital (see Galindo et al., 2007; Abiad et al., 2008 and references therein). Firms with many missing observations were dropped. In cases where firms have very few missing data, we replace the missing observations with the average of the available observations.   
                                                          
53 See the appendix for more detail on how the measure of FG is constructed.  
 
54However, it is possible to draw implications for non-listed firms from our findings as they are even more financially 
constrained than listed companies (Abiad et al., 2008).  
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After making these adjustments, the remaining data is as follows; primary (mining) sector: 20 firms, manufacturing sector: 20 firms, retail and wholesale trade sector: 20 firms, services sector: 26 firms. The composition of the four sectors is as follows: The primary sector comprises firms in the agricultural and mining sector. The manufacturing sector includes all firms in this sector. As seen the services sector was divided into two, retail and wholesale trade sector and ‘other services’ sector. The retail and wholesale trade sector includes firms in engaged in merchandising, warehousing and distribution. The services sector then includes any other remaining firms in the services sector such as IT, communication, hospitality, etc. Although the main motivation of breaking the services sector into two was to balance the number of firms in each of the four sectors above, the wholesale and retail sector is usually a standalone, particularly for stock market listing purposes. Of course the IT and mining are also usually standalones, but attempt to consider them as such was constrained by data challenges.   
5.4 Empirical Results 
 
5.4.1 Descriptive Evidence To lay a foundation for formal econometric analysis, we analyse the descriptive properties of the measures of reallocation of capital before and after the financial reforms of 1995 as well as their association with the measure of financial globalisation both for the intra-sector and 
inter-sector level.55 Figure 5.5 reports the mean of each of the four measures of dispersion for periods 1991-1994 and 1995-2008 and 1991-1999 and 2000-2008. Dispersion of Q as shown by all the four measures has decreased in the post-reform period for all the sectors except for the mining (primary) sector where all the measures show an increase. The decrease in dispersion of the Q is more pronounced in the wholesale & retail sector, followed by the services sector. This suggests that the allocation of capital has improved in these sectors more than in other sectors while it has worsened in the mining (primary) sector. Comparing the relative changes in the four measures, it is evident that the Gini coefficient, which is more sensitive to changes around the centre of the distribution (Abiad et al., 2008) seems to show lower decrease than the three generalised entropy-based measures of dispersion.  This suggests that the firms that were worst disadvantaged by and those that most benefited from financial repression were the ones most affected by the financial reforms.  
                                                          
55 For succinctness we do not report the descriptive statistics for the Q dispersion measures of the inter-sector. However, 
the measures were lower and showed larger decreases in the post-reform period than the intra-sector measures.  
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To examine whether these changes in allocation of capital are linked to the financial reforms in SA, we plot the trends in the four measures and the measure of financial globalisation in Figure 5.6 in the appendix.56 It is evident that there is a negative association between the movements of the measure of financial globalisation and the Q-dispersions especially for the wholesale & retail sector and the services sectors. The negative association between the Q-dispersion and financial globalisation is not as clear cut for the mining and the manufacturing sectors although there are some points where a decrease/increase in financial globalisation was followed by an increase/decrease in at least one of the measures of the Q-dispersion. Generally, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 reveal that there is a possible association between the post-1994 reforms in SA and reallocation of capital that is worth pursuing. In what follows, we thus formally test whether these financial reforms had any effects on reallocation of capital in SA. We begin by analysing intra-sector reallocation and then inter-sector reallocation.   
5.4.2 Intra-Sector and Inter-sector Econometric Evidence To analyse the intra-sector reallocative effects of financial globalisation, we estimate the following panel regression:   
)8(,,,, tititiiti XFGD εγβα +++=  where subscripts i and t denote sector and time, Di,t denotes the measure of Q-dispersion, FGi,t is a contemporaneous measure of financial globalisation, Xi,t is a vector of control variables and εi,t is an error term. The null hypothesis being tested is that β = 0. The control variables used include four measures of financial deepening , which are the ratio of banks’ lending to the private sector to GDP, the ratio stock market capitalisation to GDP, the ratio of stock market turnover to GDP and the ratio of stock market turnover to stock market capitalisation. The ratio of government expenditure on tertiary education to GDP is used as a proxy of human capital development. The ratio of government debt to GDP is used as a measure of government expenditure. We control for inflation as a measure of macroeconomic instability. 57 We also control for business cycle fluctuations using GDP growth. Furthermore, we control for differences in mark-up pricing between trading and non-trading firms using changes in real effective exchange rate. Finally, we control for trade openness using the ratio of net exports to 
                                                          
56 Notice that the measure of FG is plotted on the right axis while the measures of Q dispersion are on the left axis.  
57 We also use the ratio of broad money supply (M3) to GDP as a proxy of inflation. However, following the finance 
literature, this variable can also be interpreted as proxy of financial development.  
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GDP and ratio of exports to GDP. Conscious of the problem of multicollinearity, control variables whose pairwise correlations were high were not included in the same regression.58   We begin by estimating equation (8) for each of the four measures of Tobin Q dispersion using both the fixed effects model (FEM) and the random effects model (REM).59 We control for financial deepening (proxied by ratio of stock market turnover to GDP) and trade openness. Stock market turnover is a measure of the size, depth and liquidity of the stock market. Since the depth and liquidity of the stock market determines the extent to which firm-related and other macroeconomic information is reflected in the market value of securities, illiquidity has the potential to cause transitory deviations between its current Q and its steady state Q, thereby potentially inflating the variation of the Q. Although financial globalisation may be seen as a conduit through which financial market and banking sector development can be promoted, it is possible to achieve the latter without necessarily having the former. Thus the issue of which of the two should be promoted or whether they should be equally promoted is of important policy relevance. Consequently, it is important to separate the dispersion of Q that emanates from the micro-structure of the stock market and the dispersion of Q that results from financial globalisation.   In a country like SA where financial reforms contemporaneously occurred with other reforms such as trade reforms, it is important to also control for trade openness. Trade openness may cause potential differences in Q-dispersion between trading and non-trading firms. The fact that trade reforms and financial reforms might have happened contemporaneously may result in correlation between the error term and the regressors, making the estimators inconsistent under the null hypothesis. However, this is addressed by the FEM. The measure of trade openness that is first explored is the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP.  Tables 5.4 and 5.5 report the results for the intra-sector and inter-sector levels, respectively. The results are similar for both the FEM and the REM. The coefficients of financial globalisation are all negative for both the intra-sector and inter-sector levels suggesting that FG 
                                                          58 Pairwise correlation tests among the control variables were computed, but we do not report them for brevity.  
59 While we experimented with both REM and FEM, the REM model was not always appropriate as the Hausman test 
statistics were sometimes significant. Furthermore, we believe that the there is a possibility that there are some firm-
specific characteristics e.g. locational differences, number of employees, etc that we could not control for when we 
adjusted the Tobin Q in equations (6). The FEM can account for these firm specific characteristics.  For these reasons, and 
for succinctness, we only report the results for the FEM.  
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is associated with improvement in allocation of capital. However, the economic and statistical significance of the coefficients of financial globalisation is higher for the inter-sector level than the intra-sector level implying that the impact of financial globalisation on efficient reallocation of capital is stronger when capital can move across firms in different sectors than when capital can only be moved among firms within the same sector. The coefficients of financial deepening and trade openness are positive in both cases, although all insignificant in the intra-sector case. However, the coefficients for financial deepening are significant for the inter-sector case suggesting that stock market depth is associated with misallocation of capital. While this finding is surprising, it may be due to the following reasons. Firstly, the early stages of financial reforms may be associated with transitory lending booms and busts which may result in misallocation of capital (see Loayza and Rancière, 2004). Secondly, in a country like SA where most small firms are financially excluded, an improvement in stock market liquidity might only help the big and financially connected firms. It might be that the excluded firms are in fact the more efficient ones.    Next we control for inflation, human capital development, government expenditure, interest rates, savings, GDP growth and bank credit to the private sector.60 Since the Wald test suggested significant evidence of GroupWise heteroscedasticity in the panel, we estimate these models using the robust standard error estimator.61 The results for the intra-sector and inter-
sector are reported in Tables 5.6 to 5.7, respectively. Inflation is expected to inversely affect allocation of capital. Firstly, unstable prices have the potential to disrupt effective strategic planning for firms. Secondly, since inflation redistributes wealth from lenders to borrowers, as it makes borrowers repay less than what they borrowed in real terms, it may disrupt smooth lending. Inflation can also be interpreted as a measure of macroeconomic instability, as it makes it difficult to identify good investment opportunities if prices are unstable (Galindo et al, 2007). In both the intra-sector and inter-sector cases, inflation has the expected sign (i.e. positive) and is significant especially for the inter-sector results.  
                                                          
60 Our estimations were based on both the REM and the FEM. In most cases, our results were very close, but in some 
cases, the Hausman Test suggested the REM was inappropriate. For succinctness, we only report the results for the FEM. 
Results were also very close across all the measures of the Q-Dispersion, but for succinctness, we only report results for 
the GINI based measure. Results are available on request. 
61 Notice that robust standard error estimators were only used in cases where we found evidence of heteroscedasticity 
and/serial correlation. In notes provided under our Tables of results, we highlight to the reader whether or standard errors 
are robust or not. Tables whose notes just read standard errors should therefore be interpreted as those where no evidence 
of heteroscedasticity and/or serial correlation was found. 
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Human capital development is expected to enhance efficient allocation of capital independent of financial globalisation. Reallocation of capital entails movement of capital from one firm/sector/industry to another and this may entail the adoption of a new technology in the firm/industry/sector where capital is migrating. In this regard flexible and developed human capital may be necessary to facilitate a smooth transition to the new technology. The results indeed show that human capital development as measured by government investment in tertiary education has a negative and very significant coefficient. In fact, it is the only control variable that is always correctly signed and statistically significant across all the Q dispersion measures, estimated models, and both in the intra-sector and inter-sector cases.   There is some theoretical ambiguity with regards to the undesirable effect of government expenditure on efficient allocation of capital. According to some economic models government expenditure ‘crowds out’ private sector investment (Spencer and Yohe, 1970), although this idea has been contentious in recent literature (see Romer, 2012, p. 72-73). Our results confirm the inconclusive nature of this debate; while the sign of most of the coefficients is in line with the crowding out hypothesis, these coefficients are usually statistically insignificant.  We also control for the interest rate. The effect of this factor is ambiguous as the level of interest rate may reflect other variables in the economy or the structure of the financial sector. Our results show that the interest rate is significantly associated with a worsening allocation of capital. This finding is sensible in an economy like SA where the banking sector is concentrated. It is possible that the interest rates they charge on loans are above the optimal levels. Indeed, policy makers and practitioners have raised concerns with regards to interest rate margins of SA banks.   One channel through which financial globalisation improves allocation of capital is through reducing financial constraints among small firms (Laeven, 2003). However, since domestic savings can also be channelled to investment, they can also reduce financial constraints. Thus, we also controlled for the effects of savings. While the coefficient of savings is correctly signed in most of the estimated models, it is only significant in the inter-sector based models.   The business cycle may also cause fluctuations in the Tobin Q (see Christiano and Fischer, 1995). Therefore we control for a variable that has been used as a proxy for business cycle 
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fluctuations in the literature i.e. GDP growth.62 The results suggest that business cycle fluctuations are associated with worsening allocation of capital although the coefficients are not significant.  Finally to control for financial deepening we used an alternative proxy of financial deepening, viz. bank credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. This proxy is important especially for emerging nations where financial markets are not as deep as in developed countries. Like in the previous financial deepening measure, most of the coefficients are positive and insignificant except for one case in the inter-sector results where the coefficient is negative and significant. Our interpretation of this result is similar to the interpretation we made earlier about stock market liquidity. We also controlled for trade openness using an alternative proxy, exports as a ratio of GDP, and unlike the previous proxy the coefficients in the regressions are always correctly signed and statistically significant.   Despite controlling for the other determinants of the efficient allocation of capital, all the coefficients of financial globalisation remained negative. However, a few of the coefficients of financial globalisation in the intra-sector regressions become insignificant, while most of the coefficient for the inter-sector regressions remain significant. Moreover, like in the previous case, the coefficients for the inter-sector regressions are larger than those of the intra-sector regressions suggesting again that financial globalisation is more beneficial if capital is allowed to move across sectors than when its movement is restricted within sectors.   
5.4.3 Further Robustness Checks  Thus far, the results seem to suggest that gradual financial reforms are significantly associated with an improvement in sectoral allocation of capital and that this effect is more pronounced if reallocation is across-sectors than within-sector. This result is largely confirmed by all the Q-dispersion measures and it seems robust even after controlling for some of the usual determinants of the allocation of capital. As further assessment of the robustness of this finding, we carry out additional tests. Firstly, we control for institutional quality. Secondly, we control possible non-linearity in the effects of financial globalisation on the allocation of capital. More specifically, we explore whether financial globalisation affects efficient allocation of capital through its effects on financial deepening and on institutional quality. Third, we examine 
                                                          
62 See the discussion by Boileau and Normandin (1999) and references therein on the suitability of real GDP growth as a 
proxy of the business cycle. 
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whether or not our results are being driven by specific sectors. Fourth, we test whether the finding remain significant for another stringent estimation techniques, a dynamic panel model. Lastly, using the dynamic panel model, we examine whether our findings are not just driven by the measure of financial globalisation that we constructed. We use alternative measures of financial globalisation that reflects both the de jure and the de facto elements of financial globalisation. In what follows we explore each other these five robustness checks.  
Controlling for Institutional Quality We begin by controlling for institutional quality. The role of quality institutions in the form of an efficient legal framework that protects property rights, the rights of minority shareholders, expropriation of foreign capital has been strongly emphasized in various strands of literature. Theoretical contribution by authors has La Porta et al. (1998) and empirical contribution by Acemoglu et al. (2005) highlights the importance of quality institutions as facilitators of growth and development. Empirical studies by Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005) and Galindo et al. (2007) then contextualise quality institutions in terms of their effect on the efficient allocation of capital. Both studies give empirical support to this allocative role of finance. However, the study Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005) does not explicitly explore financial globalisation, and there are concerns with the measure of efficient allocation of capital they use, as we highlight in Section 1. On the other hand, the study by Galindo et al. (2007) was constrained by the availability of data on institutional quality. Thus their finding was largely drawn from a proxy based on whether the origins of a country’s legal framework is English common law or not. In the current study we use six continuous measures of institutional quality that were obtained from the World Bank Database and are often referred to as Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). They include variables such as commitment by governments to ensure Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.   We control for the 6 WGI in each of our benchmark regressions. The results for the intra-
sector and inter-sector, based the Gini measure are reported in Tables 5.8 and 5.9, respectively. It is interesting to note that once we control for institutional quality, most of the coefficients of financial globalisation become insignificant, although they are still negative. As before, we also notice that the coefficients of financial globalisation for the inter-sector allocation measures are on average higher and more statistically significant than those for the intra-sector reallocation measures. The coefficient of the proxy for financial deepening is still incorrectly signed. 
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Moreover while they are statistically insignificant for the intra-sector measures, they are significant for inter-sector reallocation measures. The coefficients of the measures of WGI indicator are quite appealing across all the measure of Q dispersion. Coefficients for corruption, voice and accountability, and rule of law are positive, implying the deterioration of these factors is associated with a misallocation of capital. On the contrary, the coefficients for government effectiveness, political stability and regulatory quality are negative implying that improvements in these factors are associated with an improvement in the allocation of capital.  
Do Reforms Enhance Resource Reallocation Indirectly? Proponents of financial globalisation often argue that the effects of financial globalisation on macro-level growth might be difficult to detect as they manifest through indirect channels. Some of the indirect channels that have been suggested include promoting of financial sector development and financial deepening, enhancing domestic institutional quality (promoting public and corporate governance), imposing macroeconomic discipline and signalling (see Kose 
et al, 2006 and references therein).   We therefore ‘interact’ a measure of financial globalisation with the measures of financial deepening and institutional quality. This allows us to examine how financial globalisation affects efficient allocation of capital non-linearly through its effects on financial deepening and institutional quality. 63 The results from interacting financial globalisation with financial deepening are reported in Tables 5.10 and 5.11. Most of the coefficients of for financial globalisation still remain negative and significant. Interestingly, once we interact financial globalisation and financial deepening, the coefficients are negative and statistically significant. This suggests that financial globalisation does not only directly enhance reallocation of capital, but also enhances its role of improving the functioning of the financial sector. The coefficients from interacting financial globalisation and institutional quality did not make economic sense. As such, we do not report them in this essay.    
                                                          
63 Notice that the measure of FG used in this interaction takes a value of zero in the pre-reform period (1991-1994) and one 
for the post-reform period (1995-2000). We could not use the measure of FG that we constructed to minimise possibility 
of multicollinearity. 
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Do The Efficiency Enhancing Effects Of Reforms Vary Across Sectors? Given that our descriptive statistics and graphical correlation analysis suggest thaton average the decrease in Q-dispersion was more pronounced in the services and wholesale and retail sectors, a legitimate question to ask is whether our main result on the re-allocative role of financial globalisation varies across sectors. If this were the case then it will be of policy interest to analyse why reallocative effects of financial globalisation are stronger in some sectors than others. Positive lessons from the sectors that are responding strongly can then be applied to sectors that are responding weakly. For instance, if the weak response of capital allocation to globalisation is a consequence of tacit collusion behaviour by a few firms in some sectors, then regulators could find some way to deal with this problem. To address the above issue, we include in the regressions a variable that captures sector-specific effects of financial globalisation. This entails the creation of a new variable which is the product of the financial globalisation index with a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 corresponding to the sector in question and zero otherwise. We then estimate separate panel regressions for each of the sectors.  The results based on Gini measure of Q-Dispersion are reported in Table 5.12 and 5.13. In terms of intra-sector allocation, the coefficient for the mining is the only one that is positive suggesting that financial globalisation is associated with a worsening of the allocation of capital in this sector. However, all the coefficients are not significant. In terms of the inter-sector results, the coefficients representing allocation between firms in mining (primary) sector with retail & wholesale trade and manufacturing sectors are positive and statistically significant. Although this result may be attributable to the imperfect substitutability of resources used in the two sectors, it may also reflect the lack of structural transformation that is often identified as a pre-condition for economic development (see Rostow, 1960). That is, the economy must experience an increase in primary sector productivity, which enables the release of resources to other sectors of the economy. The inefficiency in the allocation of capital in the mining sector, however, is suggestive of a lack of such structural change.   This lack of primary sector transformation also reinforces our discussion in Section 1 of the paper. As evident from Figure 4.4 presented earlier, productivity in another primary sector, namely agriculture, did increase between 1965 and 1990. However, this increase seems to have been temporary, suggesting that SA might have failed to undertake policy initiatives to keep this sector productive and to integrate it with the rest of the economy, thereby facilitating the 
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structural transformation mentioned above. To this extent, the experience of SA seems to have followed similarly the path as that of many transitional economies such as India where the lack of sufficient structural reforms has resulted in sluggish growth in agricultural productivity especially in the rural areas as well as weak spillover effects of agricultural growth to other sectors of the economy (see Ravallion and Datt, 1999).  However, it is important to emphasize that the current empirical analysis does not include the agricultural sector. This is because of issues with regard to measuring the agriculture sector efficiency in a manner that is consistent with other sectors of the economy. More specifically, in the current study where the measure of efficient allocation is the dispersion of the Tobin’s Q, there are challenges with regard to computing the Q for the agricultural sector since most firms in this sector rarely sell their stocks to the public. This is especially true for transitional economies like SA where the agricultural derivative market is not that deep. As such our empirical inference for the primary sector is based on the mining sector.  
Controlling for Possible Endogeneity, and Persistence in Ds,t, and Using Alternative 
Measures of Financial Globalisation An estimation assumption upon which our analysis so far is based on are that our regressors are exogenous and there is no simultaneity in the relationship between the measures of efficient reallocation and the explanatory variables. If either of the two assumptions above were violated, then the problems endogeneity and incidental relationship will result. To address this issue, the following regression was estimated: 
)10(,1,,,, tstststssts DXFGD εϕγβα ++++= −   where Ds,t-1 denotes the lagged value Q dispersion measures and the other variables are as defined earlier. A potential problem with (9) is that including the lagged dependent variable will given rise to autocorrelation. To address this problem and the problems associated with endogeneity, the Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel General Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator was utilised. The dynamic panel GMM was first proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and it helps us to address the problems of autocorrelation and endogeneity. Firstly, to address the problem of endogeneity arising from possible simultaneity between the measures of efficient reallocation and financial globalisation, as well as the problem of weak 
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instruments, we used the lagged values of the endogenous regressors as instruments.64 Second, to eliminate the possibility of bias resulting from invariant sector-specific characteristics (e.g. location of firms) and the possibility of spurious correlations due to non-stationary variables, all the variables in equation (8) and their instruments were differenced before estimation. Third, to address the possibility of autocorrelation resulting from using the differenced lagged values of the dependent variable Ds,t-1, we instrumented it with its differenced lagged values.  The results are reported in Tables 5.14 and 5.15. Evidently, if anything our main result on the allocative effects of financial globalisation become even more statistically significant and in some cases economically stronger. Moreover, the coefficients of most of the control variables are still significant. Our results do not show any evidence of serial correlation or over-identification.   Finally, to examine whether our main findings are not just picking the measure of financial globalisation that we constructed, we re-estimate equation (10) using alternative measures of financial globalisation. These measures capture the de facto elements of financial globalisation and they include aggregate net capital inflows, gross FDI inflows, gross portfolio equity inflows, and gross portfolio debt inflows. All these measures were expressed as percentage of GDP.   The results for intra-sector and inter-sector are reported in Tables 5.16 and 5.17, respectively. The coefficients of all the alternative measures of financial globalisation were negative and mostly statistically significant except for portfolio debt which was positive but insignificant. This is expected since portfolio debt inflows are likely to lead to moral hazards and currency mismatch (Kose et al. 2006). On the other hand portfolio equity inflows improve allocation of capital through different channel. Often portfolio equity only flows to firms that have signalled willingness to adhere to strict corporate governance standards. This can be through cross-listing on stock markets that has strict accounting and disclosure requirement. Furthermore, such firms are closely followed by concerned stakeholder including analysts. As such, this type of flow usually brings qualitative benefits in the form of improving allocation of capital. FDI brings benefits through bringing managerial expertise, horizontal and vertical technological transfers, on the job trainings, and research and development all of which have positive spillovers to the economy.    
                                                          
64 One of the criticisms of the instrumental variable econometric technique is that ‘strong’ instruments may be difficult to 
get. Thus, the Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic panel (GMM) estimator uses the lagged values of the regressors as 
instruments in addition to any other additional exogenous instruments provided.  
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How do our findings compare to existing literature? The findings of this study add an interesting dimension to existing studies. Our results are not directly comparable to those in existing literature for two main reasons. Firstly, our focus is 
intra-sector and inter-sector reallocation of capita while the majority of the existing studies have focussed on economy wide firm-level reallocation. Secondly, we focus on a single country, whereas the majority of the studies focus on cross-country data. Notwithstanding these issues, a few lessons that can be drawn by comparing our study to that of Abiad et al. (2008) upon which methodology is based.   Firstly, our findings are generally in line with those of Abiad et al. (2008) that financial globalisation enhances efficient reallocation of capital. However, the economic significance of the coefficients of our intra-sector firm-level reallocation are lower than the coefficients of inter-
sector firm-level reallocation, which in turn are lower than the coefficients of economy wide firm-level reallocation considered by Abiad et al. (2008). Consequently, the results suggest that the reallocation benefits of financial globalisation are likely to be greater if there are no implicit or explicit barriers that inhibit free movements of capital across firms in different sectors. In this regard, market structure based barriers, such as monopolies or institutionalised barriers, such as government incentives to promote investment in certain industries or regions might limit the size of the reallocative benefits of financial globalisation. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily imply the effects of financial globalisation in movement of resources across firms in different sectors in always smooth. As we showed earlier, some inter-sectoral reallocations are subject to efficiency losses. The efficiency losses result from the adjustment cost of capital and the imperfect substitutability of capital.   Secondly, in contrast to Abiad et al. (2008), our findings suggest that institutions play an important role in intra-sector and inter-sector reallocation of capital. The absence of good institutions may actually limit the capital reallocation benefits of financial globalisation. Furthermore, there is very little evidence that financial globalisation indirectly enhances efficient allocation of resources through its effects on institutions. This suggests that good institutions should be considered as a pre-requisite rather than an outcome of financial globalisation.   Thirdly, unlike in Abiad et al. (2008), human capital development is an important determinant of intra-sector and inter-sector reallocation capital, while trade openness does not 
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seem that important. The former finding suggests that the availability of skills that is not only specialised but also flexible is important if capital reallocation is to be smooth. Otherwise, the efficiency reallocation effects of financial globalisation are likely to be derailed if the labour skills/input cannot complement the new capital moving into a firm/sector. The latter finding might be because the once the economy-wide firm level data is broken into sectors, the number of trading firms in each sector may not be as large. Thus the benefit of trade openness may not be observable at sectoral level.   
5.5 Conclusions  This essay analysed the effect of financial globalisation in efficient intra-sector and inter-
sector reallocation of capital in SA. The speed with which SA has instituted and implemented various liberal reforms since the 1994 political dispensation makes it an interesting case in the context of globalisation and its impact on efficiency. Currently, existing firm level studies have focussed on economy wide firm-level reallocation of capital. Consequently, our analysis at the 
intra-sector and inter-sector firm level provides new insights and policy implications that are relevant for other sub-Saharan African and other emerging economies.   In testing whether financial globalisation enhances efficient reallocation we use firm level data for the period 1991-2008. We construct our own measures of financial globalisation by tracing the various financial reforms/restrictions that happened in SA since 1969. This measure allows us to capture the gradual nature in which financial globalisation manifests rather than treating it as a once-off event. We use Abiad et al. (2008) measure of reallocative efficiency-reallocation which is based on the concept of variability of firms’ marginal returns (as proxied by Tobin Q) around the sectors’ steady state level of marginal returns.   Generally our main finding is that financial globalisation enhances efficient sectoral reallocation of capital in SA. However, there is a new insight from our results; we find that efficient reallocation effects of financial globalisation are larger at inter-sector than intra-sector level. Moreover, compared to the coefficients of Abiad et al. (2008) based on economy wide firm-level reallocation, our inter-sector firm-level reallocation coefficients are smaller in magnitude. This suggests that implicit or explicit barriers that inhibit free movement of capital across firms in different sectors of the economy potentially limit the reallocation benefits of financial globalisation.   
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There is evidence to suggest that intra-sector reallocation of capital in the primary (mining) sector of the economy is the weakest. Moreover, the empirical results show that the effects of financial globalisation on both the intra-sector allocation of capital in the mining sector and for inter-sector reallocation from the mining sector to other sectors of the economy seem to be the weakest. Thus, although SA is benefiting from financial globalisation, there is a need to undertake structural and institutional transformation that ensures the efficiency gains are experienced in all sectors of the economy. Typically, this requires that the productivity growth of all sectors converges to a stable level and that the primary sector (particularly agriculture) is integrated to the rest of the economy through infrastructural development and market-equilibrium linkages (see Timmer, 1988). As such positive lessons can be learnt from an emerging nation like China, whose structural, institutional and technological transformation of the agricultural sector paid-off through not only massive increase in productivity growth in this sector, but also spillover effects to the non-agricultural sectors and the entire economy.65 However, since the conditions in China were different from those of SA when the former implemented its reforms, the reforms that SA needs might be more extensive than those implemented in China. For instance, the structural changes that SA should implement need to take into account the historical land ownership imposed by colonialism as well as the economic exclusion of the majority of the population.  There is also evidence to suggest that poor institutions limit the reallocative effects of financial globalisation and as can be expected, human capital development has an independent and significant effect on reallocative efficiency. Furthermore, while there is no evidence to suggest that financial deepening has independent effects on the efficient reallocation of capital, there is evidence to suggest that it is one of the indirect channels through which financial globalisation can potentially affect the reallocation of capital. Our findings are robust to several stringent tests.  While our study provides new and interesting insights into the intra-sector and inter-sector effects of financial reforms, a number of questions still have to be answered. These are in relation to whether the effects of financial globalisation on sectoral reallocation vary according to the size of firms and whether there are differences between exporting and non-exporting firms. Pending the availability of a richer data set, we leave these questions as a future direction of research. 
                                                          
65 The total factor productivity (TFP) in China’s agricultural increased by 55 percent from 1979 to 1984 and this is 
attributed to several structural and technological improvements were made prior to 1979 (see Stone, 1993). 
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Appendix 5.1: Tables of Results and Figures    Table 5.4Benchmark Results: Intra-Sector   Fixed Effect Model Random Effect Model  Gini Theil M.L.D C.V. Sq Gini Theil M.L.D C.V. Sq FG -0.044* -0.024* -0.023 -0.097** -0.044* -0.024 -0.023* -0.097**  (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.039) (0.024) (0.015) (0.012) (0.040) Stock Market Turnover 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.015 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.015  (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012) Change in Trade Openness 0.025 0.009 0.011 -0.008 0.025 0.009 0.011 -0.008  (0.033) (0.020) (0.017) (0.055) (0.033) (0.020) (0.016) (0.055) Constant 0.105** 0.035** 0.033** 0.102** 0.105** 0.035** 0.033** 0.102** Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 Number of Sectors 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4 R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.123 0.07 0.06 0.07  0.11   Hausman Test Statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   Hausman Test p-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, *,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.         Table 5.5: Benchmark Results: Inter-Sector  Fixed Effect Model   Random Effect Model    Gini Theil M.L.D C.V. Sq Gini Theil M.L.D C.V. Sq FG -0.062*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.093*** -0.062*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.093***  (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.031) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.031) Stock Market Turnover 0.013*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.017* 0.013*** 0.006** 0.007** 0.017* (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) Change in Trade Openness 0.020 0.009 0.011 0.022 0.019 0.009 0.011 0.022 (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.043) (0.019) (0.013) (0.010) (0.043) Constant 0.119*** 0.0401*** 0.0382*** 0.111*** 0.119*** 0.0401*** 0.0382*** 0.111*** Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 NO. of Sectors 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 R-squared 0.209 0.134 0.173 0.107 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.1    Hausman Test Statistic NA* NA* 0.000 NA*    Hausman Test p-value   1.000  Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, *,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.                  
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   Table 5.6 Controlling for other Determinants of Tobin Q dispersion: Intra-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII FG -0.029 -0.040 -0.023 -0.068*** -0.031 -0.077 -0.077*** -0.063**  (0.034) (0.064) (0.036) (0.011) (0.030) (0.036) (0.012) (0.012) Stock Market  Turnover 0.005 -0.032* 0.012 0.015 0.008 0.009 0.011*  (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)  Inflation 0.001**         (0.0002)        Tertiary Education Exp.  -0.039***        (0.011)       Exports/GDP   -0.097         (0.052)      Government  Expenditure    -0.103        (0.145)     Interest Rates     0.002*         (0.0004)    Savings      -0.210         (0.153)   GDP growth       0.002 0.001        (0.001) (0.002)          Bank Credit to the Private Sector        0.007        (0.004) Constant 0.090** 0.256*** 0.227** 0.261 0.076** 0.379 0.120*** 0.111*** No. Of Sectors 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Observations 72 48 72 72 72 72 72 72 R-squared 0.10 0.35 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 Notes: Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, *,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.       Table 5.7 Controlling for other Determinants of Tobin Q dispersion: Inter-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI  I II III IV V VI VII VIII FG -0.045*** -0.070 -0.027* -0.057*** -0.054*** -0.090*** -0.086*** -0.084***  (0.011) (0.062) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) Stock Market Turnover 0.011*** -0.032* 0.019*** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.016***  (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  Inflation 0.001***         (0.0001)        Tertiary Educ. Exp  -0.039***         (0.007)       Exports/GDP   -0.147***         (0.009)      Government Expenditure    0.046        (0.084)     Interest Rates     0.001**         (0.0003)    Savings      -0.181**         (0.068)   GDP Growth       0.002 0.002*        (0.001) (0.001) Bank Credit to the Private Sector      -0.015*         (0.006) Constant 0.103*** 0.237*** 0.301*** 0.0540 0.101*** 0.355*** 0.131*** 0.158*** No of Cross Sections 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Observations 108 72 108 108 108 108 108 108 R-squared 0.24 0.49 0.31 0.20 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.24 Notes: Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, *,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.         
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  Table 5.8 Controlling for Institutional Quality: Intra-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI  I II III IV V VI FG -0.096** -0.121 -0.057 -0.020 -0.154* -0.077  (0.047) (0.086) (0.049) (0.092) (0.068) (0.068) Stock Market  Turnover 0.025* 0.022 0.021 0.011 0.022* 0.018 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) Corruption 0.043**       (0.009)      Government Effectiveness  -0.006       (0.012)     Political Stability   -0.010**       (0.003)    Regulatory Quality    -0.042**       (0.007)   Rule of Law     0.049       (0.032)  Voice and Accountability      0.064       (0.033) Constant 0.135* 0.162* 0.121 0.103 0.180** 0.077 No. Of Sectors 4 4 4 4 4 4 Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 R-squared 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.22 Notes: Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, *,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.        Table 5.9 Controlling for Institutional Quality: Inter-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI  I II III IV V VI FG -0.156*** -0.102** -0.0615* -0.0391 -0.165*** -0.0325  (0.0390) (0.0437) (0.0326) (0.0501) (0.0386) (0.0349) Stock Market Turnover 0.0250*** 0.0212*** 0.0194*** 0.00725 0.0206*** 0.0157**  (0.00447) (0.00496) (0.00460) (0.00572) (0.00455) (0.00421) Corruption 0.0642***       (0.00300)      Government Effectiveness  -0.000328      (0.00490)     Political Stability   -0.0141***       (0.00307)    Regulatory Quality    -0.0502***       (0.00530)   Rule of Law     0.0642***       (0.00829)  Voice and Accountability      0.0855***       (0.00651) Constant 0.105** 0.146*** 0.0875** 0.0745* 0.169*** 0.0323 No. Of Sectors 6 6 6 6 6 6 Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 R-squared 0.435 0.175 0.215 0.304 0.278 0.341 Notes: Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, *,**,*** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.                          
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     Table 5.10 Interacting Financial deepening and FG: Intra-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI  I II III IV FG -0.0397** 0.0399 -0.117*** -0.0535*  (0.0124) (0.0636) (0.0367) (0.0279) Tertiary Educ. Exp -0.0222*** -0.0390*** -0.0165*** -0.0254***  (0.00510) (0.0109) (0.00594) (0.00671) FG*Turnover/Market Capitalisation -0.0232**    (0.0112)    FG*Turnover  -0.0314*     (0.0170)   FG*Market  Capitalisation   0.00740    (0.00457)  FG*Bank Credit to Private Sector    -0.0733    (0.0727) Constant 0.243*** 0.256*** 0.238*** 0.397** No. Of Sectors 4 4 4 4 Observations 72 72 72 72 R-squared 0.366 0.353 0.342 0.317 Notes: Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.         Table 5.11 Interacting Financial deepening and FG: Inter-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI  I II III IV FG -0.0305** -0.0701* -0.173*** -0.0367**  (0.0119) (0.0365) (0.0205) (0.0152) Tertiary Educ. Exp -0.0218*** -0.0389*** -0.0145*** -0.0273***  (0.00271) (0.00626) (0.00333) (0.00381) FG*Turnover/Market  Capitalisation -0.0296***    (0.00596)    FG*Turnover  -0.0324***     (0.00976)   FG*Market Capitalisation   0.00934***     (0.00256)  FG*Bank Credit to Public    -0.119***     (0.0414) Constant 0.225*** 0.237*** 0.219*** 0.479*** No. Of Inter-Sectors 6 6 6 6 Observations 72 72 72 72 R-squared 0.566 0.487 0.502 0.467 Notes: Robust Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.                         
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      Table 5.12 Do effects of FG vary across Sectors: Intra-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI 
 I II III IV FG -0.022* -0.013* -0.015 -0.023*  (0.0128) (0.07) (0.013) (0.013) Financial Crisis Dummy -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) FG*Manufacturing -0.002     (0.025)    FG*Mining  0.018     (0.025)   FG*Services   -0.041     (0.025)  FG*Retail& Wholesale Trade    -0.004    (0.025) Constant 0.0948*** 0.0936*** 0.0968*** 0.0944*** No. Of Sectors 4 4 4 4 Observations 72 72 72 72 R-squared 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.10 Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.       Table 5.13 Do effects of FG vary across Sectors: Inter-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI 
 I II III IV V VI FG -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.018** -0.017** -0.020***  (0.007) (0.00734) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) Financial Crisis Dummy -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005**  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) FG*Manufacturing-Mining 0.013       (0.018)      FG*Manufacturing-Retail  0.031*       (0.018)     FG*Mining-Retail   0.030*       (0.018)    FG*Manufacturing-Service    -0.025      (0.018)   FG*Services-Mining     -0.008       (0.018)  FG*Services-Retail      0.001       (0.018) Constant 0.0983*** 0.0976*** 0.0977*** 0.0997*** 0.0990*** 0.0987*** No. Of Inter-Sectors 6 6 6 6 6 6 Observations 108 108 108 108 108 108 R-squared 0.126 0.147 0.146 0.139 0.123 0.122 Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.        
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   Table 5.14 Allerano-Bond Dynamic Panel Model: Intra-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI 
 I II III IV V FG -0.058** -0.064** -0.003 -0.120*** -0.021  (0.024) (0.021) (0.045) (0.022) (0.027) Turnover/Market Capitalisation -0.0210*     (0.0122)     Bank Credit to Private Sector  -0.081     (0.071)    Market Turnover   -0.018      (0.019)   Market Capitalisation    0.007      (0.005)  Trade Openness     -0.097      (0.074) Tertiary Education Exp. -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.028** -0.012* -0.021***  (0.007) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) Growth 0.004 0.005** 0.004* 0.004* 0.004  (0.003) (0.002) (0.00247) (0.003) (0.004) Lagged Dependent Variable 0.269* 0.248 0.207 0.266* 0.217  (0.153) (0.155) (0.151) (0.160) (0.150) 2nd Order Serial Correlation 0 .215(0.82) 0.184(0.85) -0.006(0.99 ) 0.171(0.86)  0.101( 0.92) Sargan Test  42.241(0.37) 43.081(0.34) 44.942(0.27) 39.383(0.49) 43.739(0.32) No. Of Sectors 4 4 4 4 4 N 44 44 44 44 44 Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.       Table 5.15 Allerano-Bond Dynamic Panel Model: Intra-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI 
 I II III IV V FG -0.088*** -0.096*** -0.041 -0.141*** -0.064  (0.021) (0.032) (0.083) (0.039) (0.051) Turnover/Market Capitalisation -0.025***      (0.007)     Bank Credit to Private Sector  -0.113***      (0.039)    Market Turnover   -0.022**      (0.010)   Market Capitalisation    0.007**      (0.003)  Trade Openness     -0.194***      (0.057) Tertiary Education Exp. -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.013*** -0.025***  (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) Growth 0.003* 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**  (0.013) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Lagged Dependent Variable 0.126 0.0825 0.00392 0.128 0.0157 (0.126) (0.131) (0.126) (0.139) (0.122) 2nd Order Serial Correlation 0 .589 (0.56) 0 .873(0.38)  0.488(0.63) 0 .921(0.35) 0 .005(0.99) Sargan Test  58.491(0.19) 58.827(0.18) 47.081(0.32) 55.505(0.27) 44.469(0.36) Number of Inter-Sectors 6 6 6 6 6 Observations 66 66 66 66 66        
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  Table 5.16 Alternative FG measures: Allerano-Bond Dynamic Panel Model: Intra-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI 
 I II III IV V FGt-1 -0.059***      (0.016)     Net Capital Inflow/GDP  -0.114**      (0.055)    Gross FDI Inflow/GDP   -0.055**      (0.022)   Gross Portfolio Equity Inflow/GDP    -0.054*      (0.0281)  Gross Debt Inflow/GDP     0.006      (0.008) Bank Credit to Private Sector -0.110*** -0.182*** -0.140*** -0.150*** -0.167***  (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) Tertiary Education Exp. -0.026*** -0.0329*** -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.024***  (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) GDP Growth 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Lagged Dependent Variable 0.039 0.089 0.141 0.084 0.102  (0.12) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) (0.142) 2nd Order Serial Correlation 0.175(0.86)  0.456(0.64)  0.754(0.45)  0.521(0.60) 0 .679(0.49) Sargan Test  56.782(0.61) 61.046(0.14) 57.999(0.21) 59.624(0.170 59.124(0.18) Number of Inter-Sectors 4 4 4 4 4 Observations 44 44 44 44 44 Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.        Table 5.17 Alternative FG measures: Allerano-Bond Dynamic Panel Model: Inter-sector: Dependent Variable: GINI 
 I II III IV V FGt-1 -0.086***      (0.029)     Net Capital Inflow/GDP  -0.221**      (0.098)    Gross FDI Inflow/GDP   -0.067**      (0.032)   Gross Portfolio Equity Inflow/GDP    -0.075***     (0.022)  Gross Debt Inflow/GDP     0.003      (0.014) Bank Credit to Private Sector -0.077*** -0.191*** -0.133** -0.138** -0.165**  (0.017) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) Tertiary Education Exp. -0.022*** -0.036*** -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.021**  (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) GDP Growth 0.004** 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.002  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Lagged Dependent Variable 0.208 0.264* 0.292* 0.245 0.273  (0.148) (0.157) (0.160) (0.160) (0.167) 2nd Order Serial Correlation 0.088(0.92) 0.506(0.61) 0.359(0.71) 0.247(0.80) 0.423(0.67) Sargan Test  41.077(0.38) 37.98(0.52) 38.39(0.50) 38.55(0.49) 38.38(0.50) Number of Inter-Sectors 6 6 6 6 6 N 66 66 66 66 66 Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance level respectively.   
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 Figure 5.5: Mean of the Dispersion of the Tobin Q  
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  Figure 5.6: Trends in FG and the Tobin Q Dispersion 
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Appendix 5.2: Constructing our measure of Financial Globalisation 
 Using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), we analyse the data on the six forms of financial reforms to create a measures of financial globalisation.66 The composition of the financial globalisation variables is as follows:  
)11(654321 FECwSMwCCwPDRwINTwEBBwFG +++++= where FG is the measure of financial globalisation, the other variables are as defined in Section 3.2, and w1 ,..., w6 are the weight of each of the component as given by the respective eigenvector of the selected principal component. The estimated results for equation (8) are reported in Table A1. As evident in Table A1, the first principal component (PC) captures approximately 88.3% of the information from the original data. The remaining PCs each capture less than 4% of the information. Furthermore, following the Keiser-Guttman rule (Guttman; 1954; Keiser, 1960), it is evident that the eigenvalues of all the PCs, except for PC1 are less than one. Thus, we calculate our measure of financial globalisation as a linear combination of our six measures of financial globalisation (i.e. INT, EBB, PDR, CCR, SM, and FCE) with weights given by the first eigenvector. We  rescale the eigenvectors so that the individual contribution of INTR, EBB, PDR, CCR, SMR, and FCE to the first the standardised variance of the first principal component are 16.6%, 16.5%, 17.0%, 16.6%, 16.3%, 17.0% i.e. their sum is 100%. 67 
 Table A1: Principal component analysis for the financial liberalisation indices  PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 PC 6 Eigenvalues 5.299 0.234 0.196 0.141 0.099 0.030 % of variance 0.883 0.039 0.033 0.024 0.017 0.005 Cumulative 0.883 0.922 0.955 0.978 0.995 1.000 
Variable Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 3 Vector 4 Vector 5 Vector 6 EBB 0.406 -0.445 0.329 -0.441 0.576 0.048 INTR 0.416 -0.106 -0.349 -0.375 -0.508 0.543 PDR 0.406 -0.320 0.332 0.745 -0.167 0.198 CCR 0.418 -0.233 -0.463 0.048 -0.112 -0.736 SMR 0.400 0.569 0.554 -0.215 -0.301 -0.270 FCEC 0.403 0.557 -0.373 0.245 0.528 0.223        Notes: EBB= Entry Barriers into the banking industry, FCEC= Foreign capital and exchange rate controls, INTR = Interest rate controls, PDR= Prudential regulation, SMR= Stock market regulation and reforms, CCR= Credit Controls, PC1,....,PC6 are the Principal Components, Vector 1,...,Vector 6 are the eigenvectors.  
 
 
                                                          
66  Traditionally, the PCA has been used to reduce a large set of correlated variables into a small set of 
uncorrelated variables, called principal components (Stock and Watson, 2002; Ang and McKibbin, 2007). Each 
of the principal components can be described as a linear combination of optimally weighed values from the 
original dataset. Readers who are keen to know the theoretical basis and applications of the PCA are referred to 
textbooks like Dunteman and Lewis-Beck (1989). 
67 Note that for experimental purposes, we also constructed another FG measure based on the first four PCs, 
thereby capturing 98% of the information. The results empirical results regarding the effects of FG (based on 
this latter measure of FG) on reallocation of capital were very close to those based on the former measure, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.  
 135 | P a g e  
 
Appendix 5.3: Trends in Financial Globalisation and Financial Reforms in South Africa 
Summary of trends in Capital and Foreign exchange Control Policies in South Africa 
1961-1975: The Blocked Rand: In terms of the Exchange Control Regulation 1991 issued in terms of Currency and Exchanges Act 9 of 1933, proceeds from the sale of South Africa securities by non-residents were blocked within the country and deposited in blocked rand account with commercial banks. The balance could only be used to buy domestic shares which could be exported and sold outside Sub Saharan Africa or buy 5/more-year government securities sale, in which case repatriation at official rate would be allowed after at least five year. 
1975: Abolition of the Blocked Rand. 
1976-1979: Inception of the Securities Rand: Direct transfers between non-residents and residents were allowed so as trading of foreign currency through brokers on the JSE.  
1979-1983: The financial rand: Recommendations from a Commission of Enquiry chaired by Gerhard De Kock resulted in the implementation of the financial rand.  
February 1983: Abolition of the Financial Rand and the reunification of the rand.  
August 1985: The Financial Rand system was reintroduced as a policy response to South Africa’s Debt crisis of 1985.  
March 1995: The Financial Rand system abolished. 
July 1995: Domestic institutional investors (unit trusts, insurance companies, and pension funds) allowed diversifying in foreign markets.  
June 1996: Limit on investment on foreign assets by way of swaps raised from 5% to 10%. Outright foreign investment was introduced with the limit set at 3% of net inflows. 
July 1997: Domestic private individuals permitted to make limited investments abroad. Limit per individual was set at R200 000. 
November 1998: Limit on foreign assets by way of swaps raised from 10% to 15% for institutional investors. Limit on outright foreign investment were raised to 5% while that for regional investors (i.e. from SADC) was raised to 10%.  
February 2000: Limit on foreign assets by way of swaps raised to 20% only for unit trusts but maintained at 15% for insurance companies, and pension funds. 
February 2000: The limit on private individuals’ investments abroad increased from R200 000 to R750 000. 
November 2001: The foreign investment allowance given to institutional investors were extended to fund managers. 
2003: Tax amnesty was introduced on inward foreign exchange transaction. This was done mainly done to encourage the repatriation of flight capital.  
October 2004: Abolition of exchange control limits on foreign direct investment (FDI) of less than R500million by South Africa corporate 
October 2009: Pre-approval process for new FDI of less than R500million by South Africa corporate has been removed.  
Summary of trends in interest rate reforms and monetary policy framework 
1960 - 1980: Monetary policy was based on the on the liquid asset ratio system with quantitative controls on interest rates and credit.  
1981 – 1985: The De Kock commission recommendations to remove direct interest rate and bank credit ceilings were implemented in 1980. Mixed monetary policy system following were pursued between 1981 and 1985.   
1986 – 1998: Monetary targeting monetary policy based on the cost of cash reserves was introduced in 1986. The broad money, M3 was the monetary target. Short-term interest rate became the main instrument of monetary policy. 
1998 – 1999: Post-democratic financial liberalisation rendered monetary targeting absoluteness In March 1998 a new repo system of monetary accommodation was introduced.  
2000: Inflation targeting policy was formally introduced. 
Summary of trends in credit controls policies and reforms 
1960 - 1980: Monetary policy was based on the on the liquid asset ratio system with quantitative controls on interest rates and credit.  
1981- 1991: Direct credit control removed in 1980 but credit still poor because South Africa was under international sanctions and majority of the population was unbanked.  
1992 – 1994: Gradual improvement in lending conditions as the emergence of a democratic South Africa becomes inevitable.  
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1995-2005: After 1994 democratisation, the new government introduced various policies through the Financial Services Charter to ensure that the unbanked were given access to the banking sector. Banking services were rapidly extended to the public. But the main benefit of this was retail banking. Although wholesale and business lending to the previously unbanked increased, it remained relatively low.  
2006: Introduction of the National Credit Act to ensure that all South African have access to affordable credit. Subsequently the National Credit Regulator and the National Credit Tribunal were created. 
Summary of Banking Sector Prudential Regulations  
Prior to 1980: Due to policies aimed at limiting the entry and exit of foreign capital, the South African banking legislation was diverging from the trend towards growing internationalisation of banking regulation.  1980s: Although South Africa was not a signatory to the Basel “Concordat”, it endorsed the principles and the 1985 amendment to the South African banks act; some of the principles of Basel were implemented 
1991: In line with the EU, risk- based capital requirements were introduced. 
1998: Banks were obliged to conform to Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP). 
2002: Amendment of the Banks Act 1990 to compel banks to establish sound risk management and corporate governance. 
2007-2008: South African Banker’s Association agree on a code of conduct aimed at adhering to proper lending standard. In 2008 the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) implemented Phase 1 of the Integrated Cash Management Systems and all Banks began to officially begin to operate under Basel II. 
Summary of Trends in barriers and restrictions on foreign bank entry 
Prior to 1970: Although Banks were never nationalised, the South African Government used several policies that resulted in concentration of the banking industry and that created barriers to entry. 
1967: The South African government appointed a commission of enquiry into the banking sector, headed by Vice-President of SARB, Dr D. G. Franszen, which made recommendations to limit foreign ownership and increasing credit.  
1973: The Minister of Finance demanded that foreign shareholding in South African banks be reduced to 10 percent of banks’ shares and later that year lifted this ceiling to 50%.  
1976: The Financial Institution Act was amended in 1976 to make the 50% ceiling only binding only to banks with R20 million shares.  
1990: The Banks Act, No 94 of 1990 was instituted. Foreign banking was permitted to conduct banking operations by means of a branch in South Africa with prior authorisation of the Registrar of Banks. The 1990 Bank Act also authorised the entry of foreign banks into the South Africa banking industry by means of FDI. Local South Africa banks were also granted permission to open foreign branches. By 1993 foreign banks had opened 33 approved local representative offices.  
In the 2000s, they have been mergers of South African banks with foreign banks (ABSA with Barclay Bank International). However, the South African Banking sector remains relatively oligopolistic. 
Summary of Trends Stock Market Reform and Liberalisation 
1963: JSE becomes a member of the World Federation of Exchanges. 
1995: Substantial amendments made to the legislation applicable to stock exchanges which result in the deregulation of the JSE through the introduction of limited liability corporate and foreign membership.  
1996: The open outcry trading floor is closed on 7 June and replaced by an order driven, centralised, automated trading system known as the Johannesburg Equities Trading (JET) system. Dual trading capacity and negotiated brokerage is introduced. The value of shares traded annually reaches a new record of R117.4 billion and the new capital raised during the year reaches R28.4 billion. 
1997: SENS (Securities Exchange News Service – known then as Stock Exchange News Service), a real time news service for the dissemination of company announcements and price sensitive information, is introduced. SENS ensures early and wide dissemination of all information that may have an effect on the prices of securities that trade on the JSE. 
1999: The JSE establishes, in collaboration with South Africa’s four largest commercial banks, the electronic settlement system, STRATE, and the process to dematerialise and electronically settle securities listed on the JSE on a rolling, contractual and guaranteed basis is initiated. 
2002: All listed securities are successfully dematerialised and migrated to the STRATE electronic settlement environment, with rolling, contractual and guaranteed settlement for equities taking place five days after trade (T+5). Since the completion of this process, the JSE has had a zero failed trade record, thereby improving market integrity immeasurably and representing a major milestone in winning both local and international investor confidence. The JET system is replaced by the LSE’s SETS system, hosted by the LSE in London.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 This chapter summarises the aims of the thesis and the main outcomes documented in each of the previous chapters. Furthermore, we outline some of the policy implications of our findings and the direction for future research.  The thesis presents three essays that explore various issues related to the role of certain initial conditions that define the fundamental structure of the economy, and the changes in these conditions over time, in explaining the long run economic outcomes. The first essay, presented in Chapter 3, examines how variations in the initial conditions across nations can help explain the diverse economic experiences across developing nations. An understanding of these initial conditions is critical from a policy perspective. This is because policy makers can then use appropriate policies that engender the necessary structural changes in the economy to ‘create’ the ‘initial conditions’ that lead to better outcomes. To that end, the second and the third essay examine how policy or institutional reforms that alter the initial structural features of an economy can alter the economic outcomes we find in the first essay. More specifically, the second essay analyses the outcomes that would result from these structural changes, taking into account political economy responses that these changes would ignite. The third essay empirically analyses how the reforms can enhance structural change that is associated with the reallocation of resources from non-productive to productive firms/sectors of the economy. This study is based on South Africa, and is, from a methodological point of view, the only study of this kind for that country.  The first underlying motivation of the thesis pertains to the diverse growth outcomes of nations around the world, particularly across those commonly classified as developing economies. This diversity is evident in Maddison’s (2009) global per capita income data. This diversity has also been documented in studies such as Pritchett (1997) who shows that in a sample of 108 developing countries, eleven grew faster than developed countries, while the majority stagnated and sixteen experienced growth reversals. In fact, this diversity has been accepted as an important feature of modern 
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economic growth. The second motivating empirical observation is the non-convergence of incomes both within and across nations (see Lipton, 1977; Bourguignon and Morrison, 1998; Dercon, 2002; Jalan and Ravallion, 1997).   To that end we develop a benchmark model of technology adoption model in Chapter 3 from which further motivations arose for a political-economy extension, which is presented in Chapter 4. This benchmark model is a simple stochastic endogenous growth model, where endogenous growth takes place through human and physical capital deepening, and agents have heterogeneous initial wealth holdings. Agents produce output by choosing between two available technologies, one which superior and the other inferior, with the former technology is subject to an adoption cost and uncertainty in pay-offs. The model adopts an overlapping generations structure where technology adoption decisions confront every generation, irrespective of whether they are cohorts in the line of a dynasty that has already adopted the superior technology of its time. As discussed earlier, this structure is plausible in so far as it captures the manner in which a number of modern technologies are adopted. For example, the adoption of the modern agricultural technologies, commonly known as high yield varieties (HYVs) requires ‘learning-by-doing’ which is unavoidable irrespective of whether the previous generation in the dynasty has adopted the technology. This is mainly because new technologies are invented in each period, and such technologies are responsive to weather conditions which keep changing from generation to generation, thereby requiring learning the appropriate amount of inputs to apply in each weather condition, and each new variety of HYV that is developed. Similarly, recent technologies such as computers, mobile phones, etc keep on changing both in terms of social fashion and in software, thereby requiring agents at every generation to learn how to use the new/upgraded technology. Furthermore, these forms of technologies have been integrated into other exogenous innovative services that entail an adoption cost at every generation. For example, internet and mobile banking incur a ‘learning-by-doing’ cost at every generation, as well as the cost of upgrading security features.  In relation to the existing literature, the main contribution of the benchmark model is that technology adoption decisions are taken in an environment which is subject to 
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idiosyncratic shocks. This characterisation of the technology adoption environment is applicable to many developing countries where there are no developed institutions to alleviate the risks associated with new technologies.   In terms of the outcomes of the benchmark model, the inclusion of risk sharpens the predictions of the model in a number of useful ways. Firstly, in the absence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, the models shows that three major outcomes are possible depending on the initial levels and differences of the productivities associated with the superior and inferior technologies, and the cost of adopting the superior technologies. These are labelled as poverty trap, dual economy, and balanced growth. In the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, the poverty trap and the dual economy outcomes each has ‘sub-outcomes’. Each of these outcomes and ‘sub-outcomes’ are associated with its unique set of productivity and adoption parameters and shows its own unique growth and inequality patterns. Thus our model suggests the existence of a diversity within 
diversity, which has not been captured previously with a single, unified framework   The diversity within diversity feature entails that nations may be ‘caught’ at comparable levels of development, but the underlying initial conditions and the transitional path of growth and inequality might differ between these countries. For instance, countries such as Mozambique and Malawi are both considered to be in 
poverty traps (see Pritchett, 1997). However, the general economic performance for the period 1990 – 2005 has been much better in Malawi (see Ortiz and Cummins, 2011), suggesting that the two poverty traps are potentially driven by different initial conditions. Similarly, countries such as South Africa and Brazil are comparable as they are both considered to be dual economies. However, Brazil has performed better in terms of growth and inequality since 1980.68 Furthermore, inequality has declined in Brazil since the late 1980s. This provides indirect support to the finding in one of our ‘sub-outcomes’ that the dual economy is not always associated with an increase in inequality.    
                                                          68 Comparison based data on growth and inequality from World Development Indicators, World Databank (2012) and (see Ortiz and Cummins, 2011) 
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 Secondly, and most importantly, changing the uncertainty parameter while holding all the other parameters of the model constant affects the timing of technology adoption decisions and the long run levels of technological progress. Consequently, uncertainty influences both the transitional path of growth and inequality, and the long run economic outcomes of a nation. This suggests that some developing nations could fall into poverty traps because agents are unwilling to adopt high-risk high-return technologies in the absence of institutions that help alleviate the risk associated with these technologies. Evidence of risk-induced poverty traps has been documented for Ethiopia and Malawi (see Gine and Yang, 2007; Dercon, 2012).   In this essay, we also provide empirical evidence suggesting that risk affects short run technology adoption decisions and the long-run technology adoption outcomes. Our evidence is based on a technology adoption index (TAI) that captures various aspect of technology adoption in agriculture. It is constructed using yearly Indian data for the period 1965-2001.  In terms of policy implications, the outcomes of this model suggest that in order to promote growth, and to reduce both intra-country and cross-country inequality, nations should ensure that they create appropriate initial conditions. This entails improving the state of technologies available in the nation, and addressing the barrier (e.g. adoption cost and risk) that constrains the adoption of superior technologies. To that end, there are a number of practical steps that a nation can undertake to improve the state of the technologies available in the economy and the adoption of superior technologies. These include, among others, investing in R&D, human capital development, and physical capital deepening. Furthermore, effort should be made to protect the poor agents from technology-specific and other macroeconomic shocks. This can be through establishing shock-relief funds and technology-related insurance schemes. Likewise, strengthening the broader institutions that shield the agents (particularly those at the bottom end of the distribution) from both domestic and external shocks could improve the adoption of superior technologies by the poor agents.   Another implication is that, in light of the diversity within diversity feature of the model with idiosyncratic uncertainty, general application of policies, especially at 
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international level, should be subject to caution. Usually, the broad policies that are applied by the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) are based on classifying developing nations as low-income or middle-income. However, policies of this nature have failed in some developing nations. A common example of policies that have failed in some developing nations is the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) (see Dollar and Svensson, 2000 and references therein). Our model suggests that, appropriate policy responses for bad long run outcomes and ‘sub-outcomes’ should be based on a clear-cut and precise understanding of the initial conditions that underlie each of those specific outcomes or ‘sub-outcomes’.   Another important policy implication stems from the fact that irrespective of the availability of the institutions that reduce the barrier (i.e. adoption cost and risk) to technology adoption, the inequality outcomes of our benchmark model are persistent, except under the poverty trap outcome and ‘sub-outcomes’. This feature arises because the initial wealth holdings of agents are heterogeneous and, as such, they switch to the more productive technologies at different times. As argued earlier, high inequality creates the potential for class conflicts. An obvious solution is redistribution in the form of taxation.  However, in the presence of inequality, the form in which the revenues generated from taxation are redistributed are a subject of contention, particularly in democratic societies.   Specifically, in order to implement the policy proposals suggested in the previous two paragraphs, a nation has to undertake some form of reform. Often these reforms affect the preferences of agents differently thereby creating new conflicts in the economy and new implications for technology adoption decisions, economic growth, and inequality. This, essentially, is the motivation underlying the political economy extension of the benchmark model presented in Chapter 4.   In particular, the extension considers a situation where there are financial intermediaries that accept the risk associated with the high-risk high-return technology in return for a fixed entry fee and a periodic variable fee. The fixed entry fee implicitly includes the cost of adopting the high-risk high-return technology. To introduce  
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political economy aspects in the model, we ‘endogenize’ the fixed entry cost by assuming that it depends on the proportion of government tax revenue that is spent on R&D and cost-reducing financial development expenditure which, in turn, is determined through a political process. The political outcomes are mostly determined by majority vote. The remaining proportion of the revue is the redistributed to the agents in the form of a lump sum transfer.   The outcomes of the model show that, in the presence of shocks, changes in the preferences of the agents are such that agents at the top and bottom ends of the distribution benefit from a lump-sum transfer more than they would benefit from cost-reducing expenditure on R&D and financial development. Together these ‘ends’ constitute a majority which blocks cost-reducing expenditure policies preferred by the ‘middle’ at the early and transitional stages of the economy. Because of this, technology adoption and institutional development are slowed down relative to the ‘optimal scenario’ in which a social planner chooses the policy that maximizes the collective welfare of the agents.   The implication of this outcome is that the political/social conflicts that are endogenous in democracies may delay the implementation of growth-oriented policies. This finding is in line with the idea that democracy may create redistribution pressures that are harmful to growth (see Aghion, Alesina and Trebb, 2004; Boix, 2003). Furthermore, this finding lends indirect support to an ‘untested’ argument that China’s success over India might be due to the difficulties experienced in passing growth-oriented policies in the latter economy (see Huang, 2011).   The political economy model also shows some interesting features relative to related literature. Chief among these features is the existence of political cycles. These cycles emanate from two main sources. Firstly, they emanate from the fact that, in a dynamic model with political economy aspects, there is a two-way link between inequality and redistribution. Inequality induces redistribution through the political process, resulting in a reduction in inequality. The resulting reduction in inequality then reduces the preference for redistribution in the next period which may result in an 
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increase in inequality. Secondly, the presence of uncertainty induces precautionary voting thereby initiating or augmenting political cycles.    The presence of these political cycles results in recurring inverted-Kuznets-curve patterns in growth and inequality. Therefore, the relationship between growth and inequality in the transitional process is non-linear and bidirectional. In light of this finding, empirical models that impose a linear and unidirectional relationship between growth and inequality should be interpreted with caution.   However, once the economy has reached the steady state, growth starts increasing steadily while inequality converges to zero. This suggests that once distribution has taken place and inequality is low, the political/social conflicts among different groups of agents become minimal. This result highlights the fact that redistribution is not necessarily harmful for long run growth, as in models like Li and Zou (1998).  The third essay examines the role of reforms commonly known as ‘financial globalisation’, in promoting efficient intra-sector and inter-sector reallocation of capital. This essay focuses on South Africa, for which no related studies using a similar methodology exist. Our focus on intra-sector and inter-sector aspects of the reallocation of capital is quite appealing because it allows us to interpret our results in the context of the reallocation of resources suggested in the classical economic development literature (see Rostow, 1960; Kuznets, 1966; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975). Related existing studies cannot be directly interpreted in this manner because they have focussed of economy-wide firm level reallocation of capital. The main finding of this essay is that reforms, along with other factors such as institutional quality and human capital development enhance efficient reallocation of capital within and across sectors. As argued earlier, the two latter factors are also important for successful technology adoption. Therefore, these factors should be used in addition with others if long term growth is to be promoted.  Furthermore, we find that the reallocation-benefits of globalisation are stronger at the inter-sector than intra-sector level. The implication of this finding is that, barriers to free movement of resources across firms in different sectors may limit the benefits of reforms. Consequently, in order to improve the gains from financial globalisation, policy 
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makers should tackle market-structure-based as well as institution-based barriers to resource reallocation.   The three essays presented in this thesis provide a number of useful directions for future research. In what follows, we outline some of these directions. We begin with the research issues that stem from the essay which presents our benchmark model of technology adoption.  The benchmark model considers an environment where agents face shocks. A key assumption that we have made is that all agents are risk-averse. However, it possible that risk preferences could vary across agents as in the investment and finance literature (see Ghosh, 1994). In this regard, it is interesting to explore whether the long run outcomes of our model would differ if we allow risk preferences to vary across agents. Furthermore, our model assumes that the shocks that affect the returns on the productive technology are known with some objective probabilities. Nevertheless, shocks such as droughts and global crises happen in an unexpected fashion, in which case the probabilities of the shocks become subjective. This idea is commonly referred to as ‘ambiguity’ in behavioural economics (see Heath and Tversky, 1991; Fox and Tversky, 1995; Chow and Sarin, 2002) and has been empirically documented in Ethiopia in the context of agricultural technology adoption (see Akay et al., 2009).   Secondly, in the benchmark model, we have assumed that the adoption cost does not vary overtime. However, this cost could vary overtime, not only due to politico-economy issues as it the extension presented in Chapter 4, but due to other institutional and structural changes. For instance, the relaxation of trade restrictions that allows free inflow foreign technologies could affect the adoption cost. It is therefore of interest to explore a situation in which the adoption cost is stochastic.   The essay in Chapter 3 also raises a number of issues that are worthy of exploring empirically. Although the empirical analysis conducted in this essay provides important insights with regards to the role of risk on short run and long run technology adoption, the analysis is constrained by data limitations. Once data becomes available, it would be interesting to examine the implication of the empirical findings on the relationship 
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between growth and inequality both in the short run and long run. It would also be interesting to conduct similar empirical analyses for countries at different levels of development to see whether the results would differ.   The political economy model presented in Chapter 4 also provides interesting issues that will be worth exploring in the future. Firstly, we have assumed that the tax on agents is a constant proportion of their incomes. It will be interesting to explore other cases where, for instance, the tax structure is more progressive. Secondly, we assume that redistribution only occurs through cost-reducing financial development expenditure and transfer payments. However it is also possible to redistribute through investment in human capital development through expenditure on education, health, and other social services. Thirdly, the political economy model produces political cycles, unique inequality patterns, as well as some interesting insights into the relationship between growth and inequality. Empirically examining these issues will be an interesting direction for further research.  Pending the availability of adequate data, two issues from the empirical essay in Chapter 5 are worthy of exploration in the future. These include analysing whether the effect of financial globalisation on the efficient reallocation of capital varies between exporting and non-exporting firms, and between large and small firms. Furthermore, it could be useful to extend the analysis to non-listed firms and the informal sector. However, given that it is difficult to obtain secondary data for non-listed firms and firms in the informal sector, this would entail conducting a survey based analysis.   Finally, future research could try to explicitly explore the link between the financial globalisation explored in the Chapter 5, and the technology adoption issues explored in the Chapters 3 and 4. Theoretically, there are a number of possible channels through which financial globalisation can influence technology adoption. Firstly, financial globalisation often improves the functioning of financial markets. This in turn improves the ability of financial markets to signal the sectors of the economy in which new technologies are valued most. As a result, this creates incentives for technological innovation. Secondly, globalisation promotes competition in the capital markets thereby reducing the cost of borrowing. In this regard, financial globalisation could improve 
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technology adoption as agents can ‘cheaply’ borrow to invest in human capital deepening. Thirdly, competition within the financial system may promote financial innovation resulting in the creation of financial products that help to alleviate the risk associated with new technologies. Finally, since the reforms also reduce restriction on capital flows, it could promote FDI, a flow that often embodies the transfer of technologies from developed to developing/transitional economies. We leave these issues for future research. 
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